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Abstract 
Even though progress is registered around the world, there are still several challenges for 
countries to achieve sustainable economic growth and to secure basic social fundamentals for 
their populations. Kanbur (2011), Sumner (2011) mentioned that three quarters of the world's 
poor, an estimated 960 million people live in middle income countries. Sumner (2011) argued 
that this setting encourages development policy to consider vulnerability, inclusiveness, and 
dealing with poverty in countries at different income levels, among other aspects. 
Within this context, a demanding task is the creation of job opportunities. The World 
Bank (2012b) stated that 200 million people are currently unemployed and 600 million jobs 
need to be created by 2020. In addition, a large number of people with a job are still poor. 
The International Labour Organization (2011) stated that 476 million workers live with their 
families on less than US$1.25. They also estimated that 942 million workers (one in three 
worldwide) are living below the US$2 poverty line. Blattman (2014), Taylor (2014), World 
Bank (2015) mentioned that the expectations of dedicated development experts in public, 
private, or other institutions could sometimes differ from the expectations of the poor because 
of the influence of social environments, mental models, or differences in cognitive bandwidth. 
However, in the case of the dignity that a decent job may provide, there appears to be an 
agreement. For example, the World Bank study Voices of the Poor asked 60,000 poor people 
around the world how they thought they might escape poverty. Women and men alike 
responded that they “pin their hopes above all on income from their own business or wages 
earned in employment.” 
A streamlined investment climate can contribute to the development of the private 
sector, particularly the improvement of the living conditions of lower income households 
through employment opportunities. There is increasing macroeconomic and microeconomic 
evidence confirming the positive effects of an adequate investment climate on growth, 
productivity, and inclusiveness, among others. 
This study analyses the relationship between investment climate and private sector 
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development. A cross-country perspective was used for the study at the macro level and a 
regional and country perspective was used for the firm level. The investment climate 
variables are adjusted accordingly and they try to cover the same issues throughout the 
studies. The variables measuring private sector development cover structural, economic and 
financial indicators.  
The cross-country perspective is based on the hypothesis that a streamlined business 
environment supporting the development of competitive small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) may expand the number of enterprises and the employment opportunities. Applying 
an OLS estimation of multiple linear regression models using cross-country data, the study 
attempts to assess how much of the cross-country variation in the size, and contribution to 
employment of the SME sector can be explained by cross-country variation in the business 
environment regulations. While a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) over regulatory 
variables confirms previous findings that regulation comes in packages, the estimation results 
show that streamlined tax and labor regulations predict larger numbers of SMEs in the 
economy. Considering micro and SMEs’ contribution to employment together, it is the 
regulation of labor and product-market (ease of market entry, exit, access to credit, well 
functioning of judiciary system, and trade) that have a determinant role. However, the role of 
the latter depends on governance levels. Product-market regulation remains significant after 
an instrumental variables analysis. The evidence suggesting that a larger SME sector might 
be associated with constraining business environments is weak. Overall, an adequate business 
environment with regulatory procedures that are transparent, easy to comply, and accessible 
to all, despite social or political connections, may foster a greater contribution of the small 
enterprise sector to the economy. 
The country perspective considers the Bolivian case to explore the consideration that a 
private sector with better firm performance has the potential to create and improve work 
opportunities. Latin America and Bolivia’s productivity gains are among the lowest in the 
world. To the extent of the literature review, there are no studies on the relationship between 
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the investment climate and firm performance with firm level data for Bolivia. This study uses 
two datasets; each one focused on different sides of the firm size distribution. The results 
show that the influence of investment climate variables such as finance, corruption, ease of 
market entry and others depend on the performance variable being analyzed and on the side 
of the firm size distribution where the analysis is made. Variables such as an adequately 
educated workforce, firm age, capacity utilization, and origin of ownership are strongly 
related to firms’ productivity and profitability. Firm size is positively associated with profits, 
but its impact on productivity is less conclusive. If most Bolivian firms start addressing 
internal organizational and institutional issues, it is possible that more light could be shed 
upon specific aspects of the investment climate that need reform. 
The Latin American perspective starts analyzing the fact that productivity in Latin 
American and the Caribbean (LAC) is low compared to other growing regions and its 
improvement has been modest at best. This study proposes that a streamlined investment 
climate can contribute to private sector development through improved productivity, average 
wage rates, and gross profits per employee. With a firm level sample—panel data—of eight 
LAC countries, this study analyzes the relationship of selected performance indicators with 
investment climate variables along with firms’ characteristics, city population, distance to 
markets, country dummies, and others. Among the performance indicators, productivity is 
estimated considering several methods and only one sector at the four digit level ISIC code. 
Investment climate variables are calculated as city averages, across 30 cities, to account for 
potential simultaneity bias. Labor, tax, and trade regulations along with availability of 
financial capital are associated with higher productivity at the firm level. In addition to 
regulations of trade and market entry, stability, safety and less corruption seem to be 
important for enabling higher average wages, and gross profits per employee. Finally, firm 
characteristics such as experience in the market, larger size, a better educated workforce and 
better capacity utilization consistently appear as significant throughout the models. Overall, 
results suggest that investment climate matters. 
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In addition, the study confirmed the existence of interrelations among investment 
climate variables. For example, the PCA applied over different datasets and samples often 
found variables such as access to finance, and market entry regulation within the same 
component. A similar situation was found for trade and labor regulation. These results 
contribute to previous findings indicating that regulations appear to behave in packages. 
Efforts for reform should consider these interrelations as well as the distributional 
conflicts underlying potential change. It would be important to identify winners and losers, 
and plan implementation accordingly. There is an opportunity to accompany simplification of 
procedures with efforts for implementing eGovernments. A more egalitarian distribution of 
wealth appears to contribute to the acceptance of reforms by broader sectors of the population 
both because there is higher willingness to endure short term sacrifices and also because 
extreme political wings tend to be more isolated. Finally, incremental approaches to change 
are suggested along with securing adherence for the success of investment climate reforms. 
A common limitation is the availability of data both in terms of quantity and quality. As 
more and better data is available, new areas of research could further explore the 
distributional effects of reforms in the investment climate. Moreover, it is important to 
acknowledge the interrelationships among different aspects of the investment climate and 
study their interactions. Additionally, more analyses that determine the causality of the 
relationships and account for firms’ dynamics (entry and exit) are needed. Sector and size 
specific studies could enable more accurate findings. Finally, an increased look into location, 
availability of inputs, allocation of productive resources, and arrangements that encourage 
cooperation could be worth exploring in studies related to the investment climate. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Lucas (1988) stated that once one starts thinking about the actions that a government could 
take to set a nation in the path of economic growth, “it is hard to think about anything else.” 
This attitude is reinforced when also thinking about the absence of decent job opportunities 
for people who are capable and willing to work. The exposure to these problems in a 
developing country is particularly striking and it motivated this study to a large extent.  
 
1.1 Background 
Even though progress is registered around the world, there are still several challenges for 
countries to achieve sustainable economic growth and to secure basic social fundamentals for 
their populations. Kanbur (2011), Sumner (2011) mentioned that three quarters of the world's 
poor, an estimated 960 million people live in middle income countries. Sumner (2011) argued 
that this setting encourages development policy to consider vulnerability, inclusiveness, and 
dealing with poverty in countries at different income levels, among other aspects. 
Within this context, a demanding task is the creation of job opportunities. The World 
Bank (2012b) stated that 200 million people are currently unemployed and 600 million jobs 
need to be created by 2020. In addition, a large number of people with a job are still poor. 
The International Labour Organization (2011) stated that 476 million workers live with their 
families on less than US$1.25. They also estimated that 942 million workers (one in three 
worldwide) are living below the US$2 poverty line1. Blattman (2014), Taylor (2014), World 
Bank (2015) mentioned that the expectations of dedicated development experts in public, 
private, or other institutions could sometimes differ from the expectations of the poor because 
of the influence of social environments, mental models, or differences in cognitive bandwidth. 
However, in the case of the dignity that a decent job may provide, there appears to be an 
agreement. For example, the World Bank study Voices of the Poor asked 60,000 poor people 
                                                     
1
 According to the World Bank, in 2010, around 1.22 billion people lived on less than US$1.25 a day, and 2.4 
billion people lived on less than US$2 a day. 
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around the world how they thought they might escape poverty. Women and men alike 
responded that they “pin their hopes above all on income from their own business or wages 
earned in employment.” 
A streamlined investment climate can contribute to the development of the private 
sector, particularly the improvement of the living conditions of lower income households 
through employment opportunities. There is increasing macroeconomic and microeconomic 
evidence confirming the positive effects of an adequate investment climate on growth, 
productivity, and inclusiveness, among others 2 . In turn, setting the adequate conditions 
requires an adequate response from the private sector. Colford (2015) emphasized that for the 
private sector to deliver growth and jobs, business’ creativity and corporate recognition that a 
company’s central mission is to generate “wealth that benefits all of society” are needed. 
The investment climate could be included within the study of economic institutions. 
The World Bank (1997) defined that institutional capability affects “not just the environment 
for business, but also the overall setting for a country’s development.” Besley and Jayaraman 
(2010) mentioned that the study of institutional arrangements intensified since the last quarter 
of the past century. Arena and Paul-Marie (2002) stated that institutional arrangements 
provide a link between economic history and economic theory useful to the study of 
economic development. For instance, Besley and Jayaraman (2010) noted that at the 
macroeconomic level, the literature suggests that countries with better rule of law, more 
private property rights, good governance and better financial systems grow faster. Other 
studies emphasized geography, culture, or religion in the determination of extractive or pro-
development institutional arrangements 3 . On the other hand, the microeconomics of 
institutions had an early focus on agrarian institutions, the main insights came from game 
theory and contract theory, and only a part of it was empirical, as mentioned by Besley and 
                                                     
2
 For cross-country evidence on investment climate and growth, see Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2004). For the 
impact on productivity, see Bastos and Nasir (2004), Dollar et al. (2005), Fafchamps (2010), Hall and Jones 
(1999), Ibarrarán et al. (2009), Nina and von Vacano (2006), Parente and Prescott (2000).  H. L. Cole et al. 
(2005) highlighted the importance of competition and Bloom and Reenen (2006), Mazzucato (2013), World 
Bank (2010), (2012a) underlined inclusiveness and other positive aspects of a good investment climate.  
3
 See for example Acemoglu et al. (2009), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000). 
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Jayaraman (2010). These authors highlighted the heterogeneity in institutions and outcomes 
and suggested that in addition to the macroeconomic perspective, the microeconomic 
perspective is also well equipped to assess this heterogeneity.  
 
1.2 Objectives, Contributions and Limitations 
This study analyses the relationship between investment climate and private sector 
development. A cross-country perspective was used for the study at the macro level and a 
regional and country perspective was used for the firm level. The investment climate 
variables are adjusted accordingly and they try to cover the same issues throughout the 
studies. The variables measuring private sector development cover structural, economic and 
financial indicators.  
The cross-country study attempts to assess how much of the variation in the size and the 
contribution to employment of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector can be 
explained by cross-country variation in business environment regulations. Employment 
growth, the number of full time permanent employees, and the share of unskilled production 
workers are also used as dependent variables in a complementary way. The country study 
uses firm level data for the case of Bolivia in order to assess the association of the investment 
climate with firm performance. This study measures firm performance in terms of Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP), and profits. Lastly, the regional study uses a firm level sample—
panel data—of eight Latin American countries to analyze the relationship of selected 
performance indicators with investment climate variables. In this last study, performance 
indicators include TFP (estimated considering several methods and only one sector at the four 
digit level ISIC code), average wage rates and profits per employee. In the country and 
regional studies, investment climate variables are considered along owners and firms’ 
characteristics, among others. Firm level studies generally use subjective evaluations to 
measure the investment climate; therefore, the last two studies implement procedures to 
account for potential simultaneity bias.  
4 
 
The contribution of studying the business environment and the SME sector across 
countries is relevant because despite widespread understanding of SMEs as engines of growth 
and job creation, the data as well as high quality research to support those claims are limited 
as stated by Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2011), Hurst and Pugsley (2011), 
Innovations for Poverty Action (2013), Miliaras (2012). In addition, Ibarrarán, Maffioli, and 
Stucchi (2009) suggested that SME policies were not always accompanied by mechanism to 
track results and measure impacts. In the case of Bolivia, to the extent of the literature review, 
there are no studies on the relationship between the investment climate and firm performance 
with firm level data. Similarly, there were no regional studies exploring investment climate 
and firm performance at the firm level for the countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in the region of Latin America.  
This study also differentiates from other similar efforts in this area given its in-depth 
focus on investment climate variables. No other studies test the behaviour of all investment 
climate variables as well as detailed tests of joint significance and PCA to understand the 
interactions among variables in the investment climate. Applying a general to specific 
approach and using several datasets and samples, this study tries to identify the aspects of the 
investment climate that appear to be more relevant at different firm sizes and countries’ 
income levels. Standardized data was used and the regional firm level study made an effort to 
focus the analysis of productivity in relation to the investment climate on one specific sector. 
A common limitation for all the studies is the availability of data both in terms of 
quantity and quality. In the case of the small enterprise sector at the country level, it is of 
utmost importance to count not only with data about number of enterprises and employees 
but also with quality-type data such as the contribution to GDP, competitiveness, insertion to 
global value chains, etc. Data at the country level is not updated periodically. While firm 
level surveys conducted by the National Statistical Institute of Bolivia do not make an 
assessment of the investment climate variables, there are small sample sizes and high attrition 
rates (particularly for variables such as capital) in publicly available firm level databases 
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provided by institutions such as the World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys. The policy for 
accessing data from the National Statistics Office in Bolivia is neither well defined nor client 
friendly. Unfortunately, this might also be the case in other Latin American Countries. As 
Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2012) from the Department of Research of the Inter-American 
Development Bank said “only a subsample of countries in Latin America collects 
establishment-level data and, of those, even a smaller number make data available to 
researchers.” Likewise, better longitudinal data may allow more sophisticated analyses of 
issues such as productivity. In addition, even though they constitute a key tool for researchers 
all over the world, publicly available panel data is in most cases strongly unbalanced and 
covers only a few periods of time. Finally, further disaggregation by city, sector, gender, and 
size along with objective measures of the investment climate at the firm level would be 
highly useful. 
Other than data availability, the variation of SME definition from country to country 
constituted a challenge. The cross-country study created two samples, one retaining the 
countries’ definition and another including only those countries with similar SME definitions. 
The number of observations in the latter is significantly reduced. Other limitation is the 
scarce attention to the topic of government-business-academia relations in firm level datasets. 
Recent versions of Enterprise Surveys have incorporated more variables capturing this aspect 
and is expected that future datasets will continue to do so. 
New areas of research ought to consider the distributional effects of reform in the 
investment climate. There might be winners and losers from streamlining certain aspects of 
the investment climate and it is important to identify those political and social implications in 
order to conduct reform. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the interrelationships 
among different aspects of the investment climate and study their interactions. For example, 
reform in certain areas (e.g. trade regulation) is related or requires reform in other areas (e.g. 
labor regulation). At the moment, most objective indicators of the investment climate are 
available only at the country level while subjective indicators are commonly found at the firm 
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level. The measurement can be improved. Additionally, more analyses that determine the 
causality of the relationships and account for firms’ dynamics (entry and exit) are needed. 
In turn, sector specific studies could enable more accurate findings. For example, the 
services sector could be an interesting area to explore given the non-tradable nature of their 
products and the heavy regulation over this sector. Finally, an increased look into location, 
availability of inputs, allocation of productive resources, and arrangements that encourage 
cooperation could be worth exploring in studies related to the investment climate. 
It is worth noting that Chapter 2 uses the terminology business environment whereas 
Chapters 3 and 4 use investment climate. In this study, these terms are interchangeable, and 
the choice was adopted in order to follow the terminology used in the datasets. At the country 
level, the Doing Business datasets predominantly use the term business environment while 
the term investment climate is commonly used in firm level datasets such as Enterprise 
Surveys. The definitions for both are provided in each chapter. The definition of a firm is 
linked to each dataset used in this study. The number of employees was commonly used as a 
variable for defining thresholds of enterprise size (micro, small, medium, and large)4. 
 
1.3 Structure 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 studies the impact of the business environment 
on small and medium enterprise sector’s size and employment. This chapter includes a 
theoretical review on the size and importance of the small firm along with a review on the 
regulatory theories of the investment climate. The analysis of results is disaggregated for each 
dependent variable. Chapter 3 presents the analysis between investment climate and firm 
performance in Bolivia. This order reflects the research process of determining the need of 
additional insights from firm level studies, after conducting the cross country analysis. 
Nevertheless, the limitation of data, particularly in terms of number of observations, induced 
the consideration of more countries that could share certain homogeneous characteristics in 
                                                     
4
 For a detailed analysis of small firm definitions see Chapter 2 in Johnson (2007) and Chapter 3 in Dannreuther 
and Perren (2013). Also, Gonzales et al. (2014) made an analysis of MSME definitions across the world. 
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order to analyze specific industrial sectors. For this reason, Chapter 4 presents the study of 
the investment climate and business performance with firm level data including eight 
countries from the region of Latin America. The literature review touches upon the 
importance of economic growth and productivity, and the relationships between investment 
climate with productivity and other variables such as wages and profits. Finally, Chapter 5 
presents a summary of the conclusions from the preceding chapters and discusses some 
policy recommendations. References and appendixes follow. 
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Chapter 2  
The Impact of the Business Environment on Small and Medium Enterprise 
Sector’s Size and Employment: A Cross Country Comparison 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Chen (2005) the persistence of poverty worldwide is a major challenge of the 
21st century; more than 1 billion people struggle to survive on less than $1 a day, of these, 
roughly half are actually working5. The World Bank study Voices of the Poor asked 60,000 
poor people around the world how they thought they might escape poverty. The answers were 
clear: “women and men alike pin their hopes above all on income from their own business or 
wages earned in employment.”  
The World Bank (2012b) determined that around 200 million people are currently 
unemployed, and 600 million jobs need to be created by 2020. A number of those jobs are 
expected to be generated in the micro, small, and medium enterprise (MSME) sector given its 
high labor intensity. For instance, Stein, Goland, and Schiff (2010) stated that in developing 
countries formal small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent around 45 percent of 
employment and 33 percent of GDP (the contribution is higher when informal firms are 
accounted for). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004) stated 
that in their economies, MSMEs provide 60-70 percent of employment while accounting for 
55 percent of the GDP. In general, SMEs are often considered as engines for innovation, 
economic growth, employment and social mobility as stated by Innovations for Poverty 
Action (2013), and Ayyagari et al. (2011), Robertson, Langston, and Price (2014). 
While more evidence is needed for determining the role of SMEs in the economy, an 
enabling business environment does seem to pave the way for private sector development. 
Johnson (2007) stated that the study of small firms is important not only because of their 
numeric significance and economic functions (fostering jobs, innovation, productivity, 
                                                     
5 International Labour Organization (2011) stated that new estimates suggested 476 million workers live with 
their families on less than US$1.25. They also estimated that 942 million workers (one in three worldwide) 
are living below the US$2 poverty line. According to the World Bank, in 2010, around 1.22 billion people 
lived on less than US$1.25 a day, and 2.4 billion people lived on less than US$2 a day. 
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competitiveness, etc.) but also because small firms have distinctive business characteristics in 
relation to management style, ownership patterns and product range, among others. Therefore, 
SMEs or MSMEs are relevant, and it is important to recognize that this distinctiveness6 
encourages the development of research and policies tailored to the characteristics of the 
small enterprise sector. Even though there is a widespread recognition of the role that SMEs 
play in sustained economic growth, data is limited and more research is needed to confirm the 
role and contribution of the small enterprise sector to the economy as highlighted by Ayyagari 
et al. (2011), Gonzales (2013), Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Innovations for Poverty Action 
(2013), Miliaras (2012)7. Moreover, Ibarrarán et al. (2009) mentioned that the eagerness for 
SME policies was not always accompanied by a similar enthusiasm for tracking results and 
measuring impacts. Beck, Demirgüç-kunt, and Levine (2003) cautioned against directly 
subsidizing SMEs’ development because reverse causation erodes the findings of a positive as 
well as significant relationship between SMEs and economic growth. Furthermore, they 
assessed that cross-country comparisons do not show that SMEs boost the incomes of the 
poor. Whereas Stangler and Litan (2009) advocated that most jobs are generated by young 
small enterprises, Acs and Mueller (2008), Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), Hurst 
and Pugsley (2011), Mazzucato (2013) suggested that entrepreneurship generates an up-or-
out dynamic in the economy and highlighted that it is not the role of small firms which should 
be emphasized for job generation, but the role of high-growth enterprises (generally with 
demonstrated track record of ambition and in sectors with potential to grow). In addition, 
Dannreuther and Perren (2013), Hallberg (2000) from the International Finance Corporation 
implied that scale-based enterprise promotion is often driven by social and political 
considerations rather than by economic reasoning. Nevertheless, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2004) found that cross-country regressions provide qualified evidence that an effective 
business environment does cause growth. Consequently, there seems to be an increased shift 
                                                     
6
 Relative to firms of other sizes as Johnson (2007) mentioned. 
7
 Johnson (2007) noted that academic work on small firms has been conducted in fields such as business 
management, economics, geography and sociology. Among those fields, the author highlighted that economics 
was the slowest to make contributions, and that even though much progress has been made, gaps remain. 
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from SMEs promotion towards the impact of reforms of the business environment on 
economic growth and poverty alleviation as stated by Chen (2005), Christensen and 
Goedhuys (2004), Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (2009), Reinecke (2002). 
In light of the broader impact of reforming the business environment, and the necessity 
of a deeper comprehension of the SME sector, it seems adequate to study each issue not only 
on its own but also in relation to each other. While there is ample room for discussion about 
the influence of government behavior in private sector development, collaborative state-
business relations promote economic growth and firm survival as stated by P. Evans (1995), 
Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2009), Hansen, Rand, and Tarp (2009), Mazzucato 
(2013), Sen and Te Velde (2009). White (2005) specifically highlighted the increased 
importance of business environment for small enterprise development. However, the 
framework under which small firms operate in most developing countries could be improved. 
In the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Doing Business ranking, almost all low 
income countries are among the worst performers8 . Particularly bad is the score of low 
income countries for the Trading across Borders indicator (average ranking position of 144 
out of 183 economies). Similarly, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report ranks low income countries with an average position of 110 out of 139 economies for 
Business Sophistication and an average position of 99 for Innovation. Furthermore, Altenburg 
and von Drachenfels (2007) suggested that an effective business environment should not only 
follow a minimalistic approach but also consider other issues such as innovation and business 
sophistication. Ultimately, one possibility to improve the opportunities for the poor is to 
provide an enabling and streamlined business environment where all driven individuals could 
participate in the market independently of their gender, ethnic origin, political or social 
connections. 
The database presented in this study provides comprehensive statistics on the size, 
employment contribution of the SME, and selected business environment indicators across a 
                                                     
8 In the 2011 report, the average ranking position for low income countries is 140 out  of 183 economies, from 
37 low income countries only 6 occupy a position under 100; Kyrgyz Republic (44), Rwanda (58), Ghana 
(67), Zambia (76), Solomon Islands (96), and Kenya (98). The average ranking position including lower 
middle income countries is 125 out of 183 ranked economies. 
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broad array of countries. Applying an OLS estimation of a multiple linear regression model 
using cross-country data, this study assesses how much of the cross-country variation in 
employment and size of the SME sector can be explained by cross-country variation in 
various business environment frameworks, including; ease of market entry, access to credit, 
ease of exit (insolvency), property registration, contract enforcement, obtaining construction 
permits, getting electricity, labor, tax, and trade regulations along with variables capturing 
macroeconomic stability, physical infrastructure, and the countries’ ability to innovate 
through cooperation. Section 2.2 presents the analytical framework of the economic and 
econometric models. Section 2.3 explains data and methodology, and Sections 2.5 to 2.6 
discuss and conclude the findings. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 A Theoretical Review on the Size of Small Firms 
Technological choice and factors affecting that decision seem to be of utmost 
importance across several approaches attempting to address the economic theory of small 
firms’ size.  
You (1995) stated that for the microeconomic approach, technical and allocational 
efficiency determine firm size; therefore, the efficient size of a firm will be the one in which 
long run average costs are minimized. Panzar (1989) observed that the size distribution of 
firms in an industry could be determined both by efficient firm size as well as market size. 
Consequently, the industrial organization approach proposes that the size distribution of firms 
is determined by market power and competitive structure. For instance, firms with lower costs 
obtain greater market share and increase their chances to grow large as stated by Clarke and 
Davies (1982), stronger firms could cut prices in order to maintain output during a recession 
forcing small firms operating on the edge to close down as proposed by Saving (1970), or, 
abandoning the assumption of product homogeneity, small firms will heavily depend on 
product differentiation and market segments for market share competition as stated by You 
(1995). However, Pyke (1992) proposed that economies of scale could be reached through 
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small-firm cooperation. Collaboration implies formal and informal alliances in an institutional 
structure affecting the behavior of actors in the market as stated by EIU (2011), Lerner, Allen, 
and Leamon (2012), Sen and Te Velde (2009), White (2005). 
In the first perspective of the institutional approach, Coase (1937) stated that the 
efficient size of the firm is determined when intra-firm transaction cost equals the market 
transaction cost while Chandler (1976) implied that the efficient size will increase when 
bureaucratic costs in the organization are reduced. The second perspective attempts to explain 
different size distributions of firms across countries with similar income and technological 
levels. U. Pagano (1992) stated that during decision and negotiation processes, power 
structures influence processes of technological change. For instance, Ranis and Saxonhouse 
(2010) stated that the determinants of technology choice by Indian and Japanese cotton 
industries in retrospect is better explained by organizational and institutional environments 
rather than by factor-price distortions. In India, pervasive incentive structures induced actors 
not to behave in the best interests of the industry and to make wrong technological choices 
(e.g. investors neither had experience in the industry nor did they remained long enough to 
incentivize innovation, sales commissions for every machine purchased were given to 
managers, commissions were not based on profits and did not consider depreciation). 
Between 1883 and 1900, the Japanese halted “mule” textile machinery imports and moved to 
import “ring” textile machinery (less but more adequate machines) whereas Indians imported 
two more million “mules” in the same period. While BOREN (All Japan Cotton Spinner’s 
Association) agglomerated 97 percent of all spinners and had a pivotal role on the diffusion of 
technology, evidence suggests that among several associations, the largest, BMOA (Bombay 
Mill Owners Association) was involved in political issues like tariffs which diverted attention 
from technology. In 1885, India exported ten times more yarn than Japan to China and Hong 
Kong. By 1915, the Japanese were not only exporting more yarn than the Indians to those 
markets, but also Japanese clothes exports to India increased from zero in 1900 to around 380 
million of yards by 1930. Furthermore, Wolcott (1994) mentioned that between 1920 and 
1938, Japanese labor productivity in the cotton mills increased by more than 120 percent, 
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while Indian labor productivity increased only around 40 percent9. Ultimately, the second 
perspective considers the existence of multiple institutional equilibria. In the third 
perspective, Lazonick (1990) stated that cooperation among independent firms has benefits 
over integration because it avoids bureaucratic costs and inflexibility. Caves (1989) stated that 
if there is strong inter-firm cooperation, ceteris paribus, there will be more small firms. For 
example, You (1995) implied that the Japanese model makes the case for the influence of 
large firms’ strategies over small firms while the Italian situation highlights the importance of 
local institutions and geographic proximity to promote small firms and to spread ideas and 
innovations in horizontal style relations10. In addition, given a threatening situation were trust 
is lacking, Sengenberger and Pyke (1990) highlighted the existence of institutions and 
ideologies supporting and sustaining cooperative relations.  
The last approach to the theory of the small firm size distribution is proposed by 
dynamic models. Gibrat’s Law described by You (1995) states that given any initial 
distribution and a random variation for the firms’ growth rates, the resulting distribution of 
the firms will tend to a log-normal distribution similar to the skewed distributions observed in 
many industries. Empirically, the law seems to hold for larger firms while a negative growth-
size relationship is found by D. Evans (1987) even after controlling for the exit of smaller 
firms. Jovanovic (1982) found a negative relationship between firm growth and firm age if 
firm size is held constant. Arkolakis (2011), Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 
challenged the previous results on the grounds of misclassification leaving the discussion 
open to new empirical studies.  
Across different approaches, the size distribution of firms in the economy, the 
competitive position and the very existence of the firm seems to be subject to constant 
changes in their technology and organization. Drucker (1998) defined innovation as “the 
                                                     
9
 Parente and Prescott (2000), Wolcott (1994) attributed most of the differences to organizational changes in 
Japan and inflexibility in the labor force in India, respectively. 
10The industrial districts in Italy have strong networks and high specialization (given the current rise of the 
Chinese manufacturing industry, these clusters seem to be following the strategy of targeting specific markets 
and take advantage of the quality related to their brands). In the case of Japan, it is argued that firms rely more 
on subcontracting. The layers of Japanese suppliers have a great coordination to the extent that those with long 
term relations with the main manufacturer are not so different from the in house divisions; however, with regard 
to personnel and financial matters the small suppliers are relatively independent. 
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effort to create purposeful, focused change in an enterprise’s economic or social potential” 
and it is a determinant factor for the private sector to face constant change. Cohen and Levin 
(1989) affirmed that results for empirical research about the relationship of innovation and 
firm size are inconclusive. P. Pagano and Schivardi (2003) said inequalities among firms will 
tend to grow over time since large enterprises have higher productivity given their ability to 
cover fixed costs associated with R&D. On the other hand, if information generated outside 
the industry is important for innovation, new entrants will have an advantage as stated by 
Audretsch (1991). Systems of innovation require all actors to work together, to develop links 
and to interrelate in order to diffuse knowledge throughout the economy and translate 
knowledge into economic growth and social well being as argued by Drucker (1998), 
Freeman (1995), Mazzucato (2013), Nelson and Winter (1982).  
While larger firms might guide their technological choice by a formal process of R&D, 
small firms rely more on the diffusion of knowledge through cooperative arrangements 
(among firms, financial institutions, academia, public sector, and business associations at 
sectoral, regional and national levels) to make better technological decisions. For instance, 
Ibarrarán et al. (2009) emphasized the importance of coordinated work with groups of SMEs 
in alignment with business organizations to foster training, innovation, certification, etc. 
aiming to close the productivity gap with larger firms. Therefore, institutional environments 
could eventually lead not only to strong inter-firm cooperation, but also to adequate size 
distribution of firms that take better advantage of market opportunities.  
 
2.2.2 A Review of Small Firms and their Importance in the Economy 
Definitions assigned to SMEs vary across countries and institutions. Most definitions 
are based on quantitative factors such as number of workers, assets, and sales, sometimes 
differentiated by sector (Appendix 2.1 contains examples of SME definitions). Gonzales, 
Hommes, and Mirmulstein (2014), Kushnir, Mirmulstein, and Ramalho (2010) stated that 
business culture, size of the country’s population, industry, level of international economic 
integration, and even political reasons play a role for governments to decide on a certain 
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definition. Bartlett (2012) stated that definitions should be industry-specific. While Gibson 
and van der Vaart (2008) proposed an adjusted measure of the volume of turnover in relation 
to the per-capita gross national income at purchasing parity as a more appropriate measure, 
Innovations for Poverty Action (2013) advocated for the development of definitions based on 
the enterprises’ capacity to innovate, compete and grow (fostering transformational and not 
subsistence SMEs). Aware of the heterogeneous definitions, and circumscribed by the data 
availability, the adoption of number of workers as a common definition is a starting point for 
cross country studies. For example, Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirguc-Kunt (2007), Gonzales et 
al. (2014), Kushnir et al. (2010) agreed that number of employees is the most common used 
variable for defining MSMEs and 250 employees is the most common threshold across 
countries11. 
Ayyagari et al. (2007) asserted that the promotion of the SME sector is a core element 
to foster employment, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. Beck, Demirguc-kunt, and 
Levine (2005) found a large SME contribution to employment, and Liedholm and Mead 
(1999) as well as the World Bank (2004) stated that this contribution has been increasing 
particularly in developing countries. Furthermore, Stein et al. (2010) highlighted that SMEs 
in developing countries represent about 45 percent of employment and 33 percent of GDP. 
Based on a sample composed of 104 developing countries, Ayyagari et al. (2011) estimated 
the small firms’ (less than 20 employees) contribution to employment at 20.21 percent. When 
small firms and medium firms (20 to 99 employees) are considered together, the mean 
employment share is 47.94 percent which is comparable to the contribution made by large 
firms. Nevertheless, the findings of Ayyagari et al. (2011) should be taken with caution 
because their sample does not include data on microenterprises (less than 5 workers). 
Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirgüç-kunt (2003) pointed out that the share of GDP accounted for 
by SMEs diminishes as countries’ income level decreases. Furthermore, Tybout (2000) 
concluded that the number of SMEs not only negatively correlates with per capita income 
levels across countries but also within countries over time. 
                                                     
11
 For additional discussion about small firm definitions see Chapter 2 in Johnson (2007) and Chapter 3 in 
Dannreuther and Perren (2013). 
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The small enterprise sector in developing countries appears to be comprised of 
microenterprises mainly (not to mention a large informal sector), and the significance as well 
as contribution of SMEs seems to be limited. Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2004) stated that in their economies, SMEs provide 60-70 percent of 
employment while accounting for 55 percent of the GDP. Aris (2007) described the 
contribution to GDP by SMEs in Korea at around 50 percent, 55.3 percent in Japan, 57.0 
percent in Germany, 60 percent in China, and 47.3 percent in Malaysia. However, in a 
developing country such as Bolivia, Borda and Ramírez (2006) determined that 
microenterprises alone (1 to 9 employees) account for 95% of the firms, 83.1% (91.2% plus 
SMEs) of employment and contribute only 25.5% (31.6% plus SMEs) to the GDP. Figure 2.1 
illustrates these facts. It seems that better assessments about the SME sector could be made if 
consistent data on employment share, contribution to GDP, productivity, and other more 
quality-type variables would be available at different levels and for most of the countries. 
Figure 2.1: The contribution of SMEs in terms of number of firms, employment share, 
and contribution to GDP across different countries’ income level 
 
Source: Gonzales (2013).  
Note: LDC stands for Less Developed Countries and OECD stands for Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
17 
 
The limited contribution of enterprises in the middle of the firm size distribution 
(SMEs) could signal problems in the productive structure. A problem for SMEs is not so 
much their size, but their isolation which makes them unable to scale up production and 
specialize as stated by OECD/UN-ECLAC (2012). For example, in Colombia within the 
same 5-digit ISIC industrial sectors there are firms with less than ten workers as well as firms 
with more than two hundred workers according to Tybout (2000). He advocated that the 
coexistence of microenterprises with a handful of modern large scale factories could be 
produced because “small, diffuse pockets of demand lead to small-scale, localized 
production.” Gauthier and Gersovitz (1995) suggested that less mid-sized firms exist because 
they face the highest tax rates and labor cost since smaller firms may choose to remain 
informal in order to avoid taxes, and larger firms tend to lobby for special treatment. In 
addition, Rauch (1991) underlined that when high input prices are a characteristic of the 
market, the most talented entrepreneurs opt to operate on a large scale while less talented 
entrepreneurs remain small and informal. Moreover, Hughes (2000) highlighted that among a 
sample of EU countries and some non-EU countries, the lower GDP per capita the higher the 
share of the smallest (1-9 workers) and the larger enterprises (50 and more workers), but the 
lower the share of medium sized enterprises with 10 to 49 workers. Sleuwaegen and 
Goedhuys (2002) showed that restrained access to inputs, credit in particular, creates a bi-
modal firm size distribution, the “missing middle.” Finally, Tybout (2000) stated that when 
cross-firm productivity dispersion is high, small groups exploit monopoly power, and many 
small firms are unable or unwilling to grow. EIU (2011), OECD/UN-ECLAC (2012) 
explained this inequality as a result of “the structural heterogeneity and persistent 
productivity gaps, between and within sectors and enterprises” where small firms do not have 
access to adequate technology given that they are not part of innovation systems.  
While SMEs in developing countries often compete within national markets (not only 
with other SMEs but also with large firms frequently in the same sector), most SMEs in 
Europe and East Asia are related to one another or to larger firms in terms of production and 
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are frequently included in global value chains as suggested by Armington and Odle (1982), 
Knorringa and Meyer-Stamer (2008). More than 80 percent of small business sales in LDCs 
are to final consumers as reported by Liedholm and Mead (1999). EIU (2011) supported that 
evidence in the case of Latin America where “more than 50% of nascent and new businesses 
in the region are consumer-oriented.” Furthermore, from the demand side, Business Monitor 
Latin America (2012) established that 90 percent of the surveyed countries in the region 
identify reliability in supplies from overseas as the most pressing issues affecting their 
businesses over the past five years. 
Beck, Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005) as well as Levine and Renelt (1992) found a robust 
relationship between the size of the SME sector and economic growth; the latter include 
among their determinants an aggregate index of the overall business environment. However, 
Beck et al. (2003) suggested that reverse causation erodes the significance of the relationship. 
Subsidies to SMEs are thought to be a poverty alleviation tool because the promotion and 
development of small businesses may create scenarios for low income people to participate in 
the economy. Nevertheless, Beck, Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005) did not find a significant 
relationship between SMEs and poverty alleviation. The International Labour Organization 
(1998) highlighted that if SMEs provide adequate working conditions, and access to social 
protection, larger numbers of people, including disadvantaged groups of society, may have a 
better quality of life by having access to full, productive and freely chosen employment. On 
the other hand, detractors of pro-SME policies argue that larger firms provide more stable 
and consequently higher quality jobs as stated by Beck, Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005). In 
addition, Ayyagari et al. (2011) in agreement with Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Enterprise Surveys (2013), Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002) pointed out that small firms have lower productivity compared to large firms, even 
after controlling for age of firms. Lastly, while Stangler and Litan (2009) advocated for the 
role of young small enterprises, Acs and Mueller (2008), Haltiwanger et al. (2010), Hurst and 
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Pugsley (2011), Mazzucato (2013) suggested an increased focus on high-growth enterprises 
for job creation. 
Evidence suggests that a strong SME sector might be a characteristic of developed 
economies, but not necessarily a causal factor for economic growth. Haar and Meyer-Stamer 
(2008) affirmed that the evidence at hand mainly calls for deeper and comprehensive analyses 
because there is no single high income economy without a competitive SME sector embedded 
in an adequate industrial structure.  
 
2.2.3 Business Environment and the Small Enterprise Sector 
The International Labour Organization (1998) highlighted the importance of assessing 
the policy, legal, and regulatory environment because small firms do not have the managerial 
and monetary resources to deal with complex procedures, or frequently variable monetary and 
fiscal policies. Beck, Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005) mentioned that “the focus of the business 
environment view is not on SMEs per se; it is on the environment facing all businesses,” large 
and small. Dethier, Hirn, and Straub (2010) indicated that the business environment affects 
the economy through its influence on incentives to invest and by inflicting pressure over firms 
that were previously enjoying some kinds of protection. They also mentioned that successful 
reforms on certain regulations, trade for example, will in turn put pressure for reform in other 
issues of the business environment such as the protection of capital. Klapper, Lewin, Delgado, 
and Anat Lewin (2009) found countries with high firm entry rates provide entrepreneurs with 
a “stable political climate, good governance, modernized business registries, reduced red tape, 
and simplified business legal forms.” Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2004) affirmed that cross 
country comparisons suggest a sound business environment has an effect on poverty by 
stimulating economic growth. Lastly, Dethier et al. (2010) summarized that if there is a weak 
business environment, firms have to, among other measures; take costly counter steps to 
overcome the difficulties, spend on private security if social order and control is weak, invest 
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in extra backup for electricity when the power supply is unreliable, keep larger inventories 
and reduce potential markets if trade procedures are cumbersome. 
For the previous reasons, Shleifer (2005) stated that the World Bank’s strategy for 
promoting small firms has its focus on "leveling the playing field" which is to promote the 
establishment of business environments that give equal opportunities to all entrepreneurs 
independently of their size. The previous idea is well defined in the following statement by 
the World Bank (2012a): 
“Enabling growth—and ensuring that poor people can participate in its benefits—
requires a regulatory environment where new entrants with drive and good ideas, 
regardless of their gender or ethnic origin, can get started in business and where firms 
can invest and grow, generating more jobs.” 
One of the main points of this study is that in countries where business environment is 
complex, particularly when it comes to regulation, the success of firms (and to a large extent 
other aspects of life in developing countries) depends more on who you know rather than on 
what you know or what you can do. The section continues describing the concept of business 
environment applied in the research starting from a theoretical description of regulation and 
concluding with the establishment of the economic and econometric models to be explored. 
The effects of regulation and its impact on aggregate economic performance have 
attracted increasing attention in recent years. Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven (2010) mentioned 
that regulation can be thought of as a set of rules that constrain the actions of economic 
agents in order to meet social goals. These researchers affirmed that issues such as 
informational asymmetries, economies of scale in production, incomplete markets, and 
externalities may contribute to the existence of market failures such as the “missing middle” 
described in the previous section. Meyer-Stamer and Haar (2008) underlined that; for 
example, the “structural adjustment approach of the 1980s and 1990s tended to look at 
macroeconomic factors while neglecting microeconomic issues, such as the functioning of 
markets.” However, given that social cost and benefits are not internalized by the actors, the 
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process of raising social welfare and promotion of the private sector through regulation is not 
expedited.  
Shleifer (2005) described three theories of economic regulation. The public interest 
theory associated with the work of Pigou in 1938, claims that markets often fail; 
consequently, benign governments could correct those market failures through regulation. 
The contracting theory, based on the work of Coase in 1960, states that impartial courts 
through the enforcing of contracts could solve discrepancies when competition cannot 
successfully address market failures. The capture theory, grounded on the research made by 
Stigler in 1971, points out that the process of regulation design is captured by the industry 
sector (e.g. regulation enforced by the state ends up supporting monopolies). Additionally, the 
latter theory underlined that even when regulation is designed to achieve broader societal 
goals, regulators often fail to enforce it. As expected, the three theories have received 
different criticisms. For example, critics of the public interest theory, according to Shleifer 
(2005), suggested that courts could solve market failures, and highlighted that government 
regulators are incompetent, corrupt, and captured. On the other hand, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-
de-silanes, and Shleifer (2003) stated that courts around the world are often highly inefficient, 
politically motivated, slow and even corrupt as well. 
Alonso and Garcimartin (2013) argued that institutions “respond to problems stemming 
from social interaction in an uncertain world, where agents take non-coordinated decisions 
under a framework of imperfect information”; therefore, institutions ought to reduce 
discretionary decisions and to limit opportunism. However, they also emphasized that 
inefficient institutions will prevail if several agents’ interests are not limited and put under the 
institutions’ mandates. How to ultimately address the quality of people behind institutional 
arrangements is not in the scope of this research, the theory presented here subscribes to 
theories of economic regulation. Djankov et al. (2003) defined four strategies in regard to 
regulation that are often encountered in different economies: market discipline, private 
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litigation, public enforcement of regulation, and state ownership. Those strategies go from 
greater private control to greater public control. 
Optimal institutional designs might be based between a mix of choices and different 
arrangements according to the context and objectives. For example, Shleifer (2005) suggested 
that regulation in developing countries is often excessive, and associated with poor outcomes 
because public officials may abuse their power, meaning that finding ways to simplify the 
procedures will pay dividends. The evidence suggests that the potential areas for deregulation 
in developing countries are those where competition and market discipline could do a more 
effective job than courts (e.g. market entry and labor regulation). While excessive regulation 
of the business environment is identified among the key obstacles to growth in many 
developing countries as the World Bank (2008) stated, Blanchard (2006) implied it is also a 
concern for developed economies given that excessive regulation could be the prime cause for 
European macroeconomic underperformance in the last decade vis-à-vis the United States. 
The World Bank (2005) defined investment climate as “the set of location specific 
factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, 
and expand,” and Weiss (2013) described the business environment as a subset of it. White 
(2005) defined the term business environment as those “elements that are external to the 
enterprise itself.” Consequently, the author assessed the business environment with a 
particular focus on small enterprises considering three perspectives; a) policy, legal, and 
regulatory framework, b) organizational framework and c) markets, social and economic 
settings. These perspectives open the discussion for considering government and non-
government organizations that are created to implement and enforce policies, laws and to 
perform other functions in the business environment (e.g. business incubators, innovation 
centers, research agencies, chambers of commerce, business associations, trade unions, and 
other private associations). Dethier et al. (2010) defined the business environment in terms of 
physical infrastructure, access to finance, security (absence of corruption and crime), and the 
regulatory framework. Commander and Svejnar (2007) analyzed that firms will be able to 
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succeed depending on the macroeconomic, legal and institutional environment. Even though 
their conclusions are derived from studies at the firm level, Liedholm and Mead (1999), 
Meyer-Stamer and Haar (2008), Renko and Haar (2008) determined key aspects for 
competitive MSMEs that could be summarized in four; people, markets, technology, and 
networks which in a way, support the intention of capturing at the macro level issues such as 
the ability to cooperate. At the firm level, Reeg (2013) argued that some factors are internal to 
the firm while others are external. The author established four categories; entrepreneur 
characteristics, enterprise characteristics, inter-firm and social networks, and the wider 
investment climate. In addition, Ayyagari et al. (2007) concluded that a larger role of SMEs 
in manufacturing is more strongly associated with a competitive business environment. 
Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2007) made the case for a more comprehensive 
measurement of the business environment. They pointed out that some successful Asian 
economies (in terms of high past and present economic growth rates) usually are not well 
ranked in business environment rankings such as the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom or the IFC’s Doing Business (the case of China, India, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, for example). However, the same countries occupy much better positions on 
rankings like the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. As a result, it 
seems that there is an over focus on the harmful effect of government intervention in the 
market when it comes to measure the business environment. The United Nations Secretariat 
(1997) emphasized that public-private interaction has played an important role for the 
development of countries; for example, Malaysia started to make progress in this area from 
1979 with the Industrial Advisory Council (wider understanding of policies was secured, the 
voice of the private sector was included, and balance between stability and change was kept). 
Additionally, Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2007) commented that the first generation of 
NIC’s (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hongkong) as well as the second generation of 
NIC’s (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand), and emerging China and India have made extensive use of 
selective trade and industrial policies. Therefore, the ability to cooperate towards 
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technologically advanced industrial structures should be captured as part of an enabling 
business environment, particularly for homegrown development. Sachs (2005) affirmed poor 
countries’ governments besides providing infrastructure and social investments should also 
care of the productive inputs for private businesses. In addition, the World Bank has also 
developed the Competitive Industries Global Practice at the World Bank which increases the 
focus in industrial policies aiming to achieve growth and competitiveness with emphasis in 
local context and successful previous experiences. 
Appendix 2.2 presents a summary of the variables, compiled from some other studies 
executed in this area, used to measure the business environment. As it can be verified, there is 
an opportunity to include variables related to more competitive (innovative and cooperative) 
business environments on the study of their impact over the development of the private 
sector. In this study, four main areas were identified at the macro level; macroeconomic 
stability, physical infrastructure, regulation, and an area called transformational attempting to 
capture the ability to innovate and cooperate. Finally, endowments such as geography or 
weather may also play a role. For instance, Ibarrarán et al. (2009) mentioned that endowment 
of natural resources, among others, could also influence a “nation’s industrial composition 
and optimal firm size.” However, given the difficulty to alter those parameters, they were not 
included in the final design of the variables (Appendix 2.3, Figure 2.3.1 presents the variables 
conceptual outline). 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
In the economic model, the departure point is the assumption that the impact of 
business regulation arises from its effects on the creation, growth, and renewal of firms as 
suggested by Loayza et al. (2010). Then, the question is if regulation improves the conditions 
for firm’s activities, or on the contrary, it imposes unnecessary restrictions that increase costs 
and reduce productivity. Furthermore, Reeg (2013) highlighted the need for empirical 
evidence of how particular areas of the business environment, when combined, play a role in 
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the development of the private sector. The following main areas of a firm’s activity that are 
subject to regulation as part of the business environment were considered: ease of firm entry, 
access to credit, ease of exit (insolvency), property registration, contract enforcement, 
obtaining construction permits, getting electricity, labor, tax, and trade regulations along with 
variables capturing the macroeconomic stability, physical infrastructure, and the countries’ 
ability to innovate and cooperate. The variables will be described in detail later in this 
section. The equation below establishes the basic economic model. 
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White (2005) determined an ambiguous prediction of the business environment because 
in some circumstances it promotes the development of small enterprises and employment 
creation while “in other cases the business environment inadvertently constrains employment 
growth, reduce the quality of small enterprise employment, and contribute to poverty through 
low wages and a lack of social protection.” Ayyagari et al. (2007) also defined that a greater 
share of SMEs in the economy could be either the result of a regulation framework that 
facilitates the constant entry, growth and exit of SMEs or the result of a stifling business 
regulation which imposes a burden to the private sector by, sometimes unnecessary, heavy 
and costly regulation of contracts, registries and hiring processes among others. In other 
words, Liedholm and Mead (1999) affirmed that the increasing employment share of the SME 
sector could be either because markets are working and providing the opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, or because countries’ economies are failing to provide jobs and people are 
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forced to find refuge in activities that provide minimal subsistence support (Appendix 2.3, 
Figure 2.3.2 describes these two general mechanisms). 
Consequently, this study relates the variation in the SMEs’ number and employment 
across countries to differences in the business environment in which firms operate, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. Given that regressions on single business 
environment indicators could present bias and inconsistent parameters estimates due to 
omitted variables, Dethier et al. (2010) suggested that a “broad array of indicators and 
controls should be used in regression equations.” Loayza et al. (2010) suggested the 
exploration of governance-regulation interactions because governance turns out to be “an 
important determinant of the effects of regulation.” Dethier et al. (2010) also found that 
regulation may have a positive effect when correctly enforced. Another example is given by 
Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2007) where the findings showed a positive 
relationship of good enforcement of regulation with employment growth in small firms for 
most developing countries. Moreover, Honorati and Mengistae (2007) showed that industrial 
growth in India is affected by regulation, infrastructure, financial constraints, as well as 
corruption, and found that all those effects depend on the incidence of corruption. Alonso and 
Garcimartin (2013) indicated that the World Bank’s Governance Indicators might be the best 
proxy to gauge institutional quality. In addition, GDPpc (Gross Domestic Product per capita) 
was also used as a proxy for the economic setting of every country. Equations (2.1) to (2.5) 
below describe the generic econometric models. 
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According to Wooldridge (2009) large integer values often appear in logarithmic form 
in order to narrow the range of the variables. This is the case for smeden, pfulltw, and 
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GDPpc. The variables measuring the business environment will be in level form to facilitate 
interpretation and also because they will be measured as indexes, all of them varying from 
zero to one. RESET tests for functional form misspecification, tests for joint significance of 
some business environment variables, and other tests were studied. In addition, an 
instrumental variables procedure for the first two models is explored. 
In order to measure regulation around the world, Ayyagari et al. (2007) used one 
indicator for each regulation area 12 . Loayza et al. (2010) constructed an index of the 
regulation’s severity for each area based on different indicators and several sources. Taking 
the example of regulation of market entry, in addition to the cost, the IFC’s Doing Business 
provides information for the number of procedures as well as for the time (in days) to open a 
business for most of the decade of 2000. The three variables could help to capture in a better 
way not only the economic, but also the practical restrictions.  
Hence, in this study’s database, the variables for regulation of market entry (start), 
registering property (regprop), enforcing contracts (enfcontract), closing a business (insolv), 
dealing with construction permits (construct), and getting electricity (getelec) are built 
considering the time in days, number of procedures as well as the cost imposed by regulation. 
In the case of obtaining credit (credit), the variable captures the strength of legal rights of 
borrowers and lenders, the depth of credit information, share of private credit in the economy, 
and the behavior of interest rates. Trade (trade) captures time and costs to import and export, 
complemented with considerations over mean tariff rates, the existence of hidden import 
barriers, and their severity both for exports and imports. In the case of labor (labor), the 
variable considers issues related to minimum wage, and difficulty of hiring and firing. Lastly, 
taxation (tax) captures the number of payments and time taken to comply with this regulation 
as well as the value of the tax burden imposed over personal and corporate income. Each 
regulation index was normalized to vary between zero and one. For all of them, higher values 
                                                     
12 OLS multiple linear regressions were also explored over the defined models using single indicators for each 
area of regulation. Overall, the results showed the same group of variables as statistically significant as in the 
results presented in Section 2.4, although not always in the same models. 
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represent heavier regulatory burden13. Appendix 2.4 presents a summary of the indicators 
used, weights assigned as well as sources for the construction of each regulation index. 
Because they cover many countries, their publication is regularly on a yearly basis, and 
their methodologies are clear, the following sources for measuring regulation were used: 
Doing Business (International Finance Corporation - The World Bank), Index of Economic 
Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), Economic Freedom of the World (The Fraser Institute), 
and Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank). Some of the previous sources are 
linked to certain ideologies and political values, but the combination of them could help 
addressing the measurement of regulation in a more balanced way. Additionally, it was also 
taken into account that some sources might be more precise at measuring certain indicators 
because of their focus on certain areas14. Lastly, Dethier et al. (2010) suggested that objective 
indicators have an advantage over subjective ones in that the former are less vulnerable to 
measurement error and reverse causality. While almost all of the used indicators for 
regulations are objective, some other variables in the study come from subjective sources 
which transmit the information about the perception of entrepreneurs and could ultimately 
shape their decisions. 
In the analysis of correlations between the regulation variables, the most visible 
outcome is that tax seems to behave in a different way compared to the other variables, and 
the correlation is negative in most of the cases (see Appendix 2.5, Table 2.51). On the other 
hand, a strong and positive correlation was found among all the other variables, except for 
construct, getelect, and labor. It is also important to highlight that regprop and enfcontract 
are strongly and positively correlated with credit which might be suggesting the relationship 
of these variables through the important issues of collateral and well functioning of courts as 
suggested by de Soto (2000). The correlations in this study also suggest that start, trade, 
                                                     
13
 Following the methodology of Loayza et al. (2010), the equations below were used according to the values of 
every indicator. If higher values indicated heavier regulation: BCDBECFBEGHDBECF . And, 
BEGHDBC
BEGHDBECF
 if lower values 
indicated heavier regulation. 
14
 That was the case for tax regulation, for example. The Heritage Foundation’s indicator for total tax rate was 
used and assigned more weight instead of the one measured by the World Bank because of the focus of the 
former organization on tax issues. 
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insolv, credit, regprop, and enfcontract could be grouped under one category; product-market 
regulations. These results are in line with Loayza et al. (2010) where it was suggested that 
regulation comes in packages. In addition, Straub (2005) stated that protection of property 
rights and contract enforcement “are important not only because they improve firms’ 
productivity directly, but because they secure access to important markets, where they make 
interactions more efficient.” Furthermore, Dethier et al. (2010) commented a potential 
collinearity problem between financial and legal regulation, so it will contribute to the study 
to group both aspects along with other related variables under the label of product-market 
regulations. As for the case of construct and getelect, while the correlation between them is 
quite strong, their correlation with other variables is rather low. Finally, labor presents low 
correlation values with almost all the other variables. 
In order to complement the previous interpretation and provide statistical support, a 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was executed. The detailed results are presented in 
Appendix 2.6. As it can be verified by the eigenvalues, three components were retained. 
According to the rotated factor loadings, the first component is better explained by the 
following variables: start, trade, insolv, credit, regprop, enfcontract which comprise the 
product-market (“promar”) regulations. In the previous component labor is included; 
however, the self-determination value of labor is high. Therefore, labor will be analyzed 
without grouping it into other components. The second component is better explained by 
construct and getelect, and in this study, they will constitute the “function” component (the 
World Bank (2012a) classified these two variables along with others under a category called 
operations). Lastly, the third component is exclusively determined by the tax variable. As a 
result, the PCA analysis helped to comprise the measurement of regulation into four 
categories; promar, function, labor and tax. At the same time, using these categories may 
reduce the existence of potential multicollinearity during the regression analyses. 
Following the previous results a promar index was constructed as an average of its 
constituents, the same procedure was applied for function. Furthermore, there is a close 
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correlation of the constructed indexes with the predicted values (see Appendix 2.5, Table 
2.5.2). In a complementary way, an overall regulation index was obtained as an average of all 
constructed variables. Appendix 2.7 presents a graphical representation of regulation around 
the world. As expected, high income countries have less constraining regulation frameworks 
in general. On the other side, Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from the most constraining 
regulatory environment. Regulation of tax shows a different behavior because on average, 
high income countries inflict a stricter tax regulation. East Europe and Central Asia present 
higher values (more constraining) for the regulation of function while Latin America and 
Caribbean as well as Middle East and North Africa are among the most constraining for labor 
regulation. 
In line with the revised theory in the previous section, the independent variables are 
complemented with indices capturing the macroeconomic stability (macro), the physical 
infrastructure (infra), which measures not only the extent and efficiency of infrastructure but 
also a solid and extended communications network. Finally, the ability to innovate and 
cooperate (trans) is based on the indices “government procurement of technology,” “degree 
of cluster development,” and “university-industry collaboration” from the Innovation and 
Business Sophistication pillars of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report. The previous variables are constructed in a similar way as the regulation indices. 
Consequently, between values of zero and one, lower scores represent a less constraining 
assessment in that area.  
The variables were constructed using all the available data for the decade of 2000s. 
Hence, they represent an average for that decade. For example, in the case of Doing Business, 
comparability was allowed between 2004 and 2011 (which in practice represent the 
measurement from 2003 to 2010). Similar procedures and considerations were executed with 
all the other variables and sources. Furthermore, it was highlighted by Loayza et al. (2010) 
that regulation tends to stay constant over long periods of time. To deal with potential 
endogeneity of governance with the business environment variables in the econometric 
analysis, the measures corresponding to the year 2000 alone were taken. 
31 
 
While subjective measurements of the business environment are recently available at 
firm level thanks to the effort from IFC’s Enterprise Surveys, the objective data from Doing 
Business is only available at the aggregate level (for just a few countries, the data is recently 
disaggregated for main cities, but they only cover some indicators). In addition, data for the 
SME sector at the national level is not available on a yearly basis in most of the cases, and the 
compiled data for this sector is mainly limited to number of firms, sector distribution, and 
contribution to employment. The combination of the previous factors represent a considerable 
challenge for studies trying to make a contribution to a better understanding of the small 
enterprise sector at the aggregate level. 
The dependent variables are SME’s density –number of SMEs per 1000 people– 
(smeden), the share of employment of the MSME sector in total labor force (msmeemplo), 
along with average employment growth (empgrowth), average number of permanent full time 
workers (pfulltw), and share of unskilled production workers (uskprodw) in each country. 
Appendix 2.8 provides a complete description of the variables used in this study. The small 
and medium enterprises’ density and share of employment come from a single database 
which is a massive effort made by the International Finance Corporation. The Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprise Country Indicators (MSME-CI), updated in August, 2010, provides 
the latest global snapshot for each variable in each country. Consequently, the year in which 
the information was captured in the case of the first two dependent variables varies from 
country to country. Nevertheless, the data points are dispersed within the decade of 2000. 
Given the serious restrictions of data availability for the small enterprise sector at the 
aggregate level, and to the extent of the literature review, MSME-CI database constitute the 
only one providing a picture of the MSMEs sector across countries.  
Even though the previous database constitutes the only on its own, the variables it 
contains provide an understanding of the MSME sector mostly in terms of quantity. Reinecke 
(2002) suggested the analysis of employment by enterprise size not only to be in terms of 
quantity but also quality of employment. Therefore, an additional and related source was 
consulted; the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. Variables like employment growth rates, 
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and permanent full time workers were also explored in an attempt to gauge some quality 
aspects of employment for the small enterprise sector. Additionally, the share of unskilled 
production workers pretends to be an initial approach to evaluate the potential employment 
opportunities for the poor as a result of a streamlined business environment. The data from 
Enterprise Surveys is also captured at different years depending on the country, but the data 
points are concentrated mainly within the second half of the decade of 2000.  
Although only the formal sector is discussed (for the sake of brevity and focus), it is 
important to mention that there is evidence for a negative correlation between larger informal 
sectors and MSME density as noted by Kushnir et al. (2010). Also, Straub (2005) affirmed 
that cross-country evidence suggests a negative relationship of informality and different 
aspects of the quality of institutions such as corruption, rule of law, and regulatory burden. 
Several steps were taken to construct an adequate database. For instance, only the 
countries and variables that provided information for the non agricultural sector (MSME-
CI)15, the manufacturing sector (Enterprise Surveys), and with a defined breakdown for micro, 
small and medium enterprises were included. Additionally, Sachs and Warner (1999) stated 
that even though natural resource abundance generally shrinks the manufacturing sector, 
some countries’ tend to respond by promoting industrialization despite a Dutch Disease 
situation; however, in oil-rich states, “the natural resource base is so vast that there is no 
strong pressure to develop an extensive industrial sector.” For example, Kushnir et al. (2010) 
excluded countries that are heavily dependent on mineral resources for their analyses of 
MSMEs across countries. Consequently, economies denominated as oil producing or oil 
exporting countries were removed from the data base16. Finally, in consideration of Ayyagari 
et al. (2007), two samples were constructed; Sample A is assembled maintaining the 
countries’ official definition of SME and Sample B contains those countries whose definition 
matches an SME cut-off of 250 workers (Appendix 2.9, Table 2.9.1 and Table 2.9.2 present 
                                                     
15
 MSME-CI does not provide a further breakdown between manufacturing and services sector for the used 
variables. 
16 The following countries were removed from the sample; Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkmenistan, UAE, Venezuela, Syria, Congo, Iran, Russia, and Yemen. 
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the summary statistics for Sample A and Sample B respectively). 
It is observed that the density variables are positively correlated with GDPpc 
confirming the results of Klapper et al. (2009), Kushnir et al. (2010). This study also found a 
negative relationship between the share of microenterprises and GDPpc (Appendix 2.10, 
Table 2.10.1). Except for the share of unskilled production workers, all the other variables are 
positively correlated with GDPpc (Appendix 2.10, Table 2.10.2). Finally, bearing in mind 
that for the business environment variables, higher values represent heavier or more 
constraining regulation, all the other variables are negatively correlated with GDPpc, except 
tax. There is a strong correlation between smeden and promar as well as macro. In the case of 
msmeemplo the correlation is stronger with promar and macro while empgrowth is strongly 
correlated only with macro. Then, pfullw shows a stronger correlation with trans and infra 
(Appendix 2.10, Table 2.10.3).  
In high income countries, not only there is a higher density of MSMEs, but also 
MSMEs employ a greater share of the workforce. The MSMEs’ contribution to employment 
in high income countries fluctuates between 24 to 77 percent. The fluctuation varies greatly 
for other income levels and regions of the world. This observation might be suggesting that 
there could be an optimal range in terms of MSMEs’ contribution to employment. Therefore, 
cases in which the share of employment is too low, like in Sub-Saharan Africa, or cases in 
which is too high, like in Latin America and the Caribbean, might be signaling potential 
problems with their industrial structure. Countries with higher incomes have higher numbers 
of permanent full time workers.  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize these comments. 
Table 2.1: MSMEs’ Density and Share of Employment by Income Level17 (Sample A) 
Income 
Level 
msmeden 
(mean) 
msmeemp 
(mean) 
msmeemp 
(min) 
msmeemp 
(max) 
pfulltw 
(mean) 
HINC 43.596 49.48137 24.69496 76.98749 89.26 
UMINC 26.11015 38.03194 12.27025 80 68.08611 
LMINC 25.96468 40.94885 2.17416 92.82653 59.17857 
LINC 15.25228 26.01477 1.76125 76.103 57.34828 
                                                     
17
 HINC: High income countries (OECD and nonOECD), UMINC: Upper middle income, LMINC: Lower 
middle income, and LINC: Low income countries. 
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Table 2.2: MSMEs’ Density and Share of Employment by Region18 (Sample A) 
Region msmeden (mean) 
Msmeemp 
(mean) 
msmeemp 
(min) 
msmeemp 
(max) 
pfulltw 
(mean) 
HINC 43.596 49.48137 24.69496 76.98749 89.26 
ECA 22.566 35.44944 4.476295 65 62.73889 
EAP 24.187 30.6955 2.243632 80 92.51429 
LAC 36.919 37.44049 13.74581 92.82653 58.05 
SA 8.5175 49.47713 2.17416 78.28878 58.95714 
MNA 18.83 35.6113 12.27025 82 119.96 
SSAFRICA 17.354 39.07136 1.76125 75 44.68649 
The empirical methodology of this study is based on multiple linear regressions by OLS. 
For each dependent variable, the explanatory variables are measurements of the business 
environment. The equation below represents the generic econometric model for each 
regression. 
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For every model and regarding the regulatory variables of the business environment, 
several regressions were progressively explored starting from the inclusion of each 
interaction term individually, going through each possible combination, to the inclusion of all 
combinations at once19. Before proceeding to the results and discussion, a RESET test for 
functional form misspecification was carried out for each resulting model that is presented in 
Section 2.4. The results suggest that there is no functional form problem. A detailed 
procedure of RESET test, and summary results for each model is presented in Appendix 
2.1120. Except for model 1A, all the resulting p-values of heteroskedasticity tests are greater 
than 0.05, this means that the reported standard errors are reliable because the null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity in the model was not rejected. Nonetheless, all final results used 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Results are presented in Appendix 2.12. 
                                                     
18
 ECA: East Europe and Central Asia, EAP: East Asia and Pacific, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, SA: 
South Asia, MNA: Middle East and North Africa, and SSAFRICA: Sub Saharan Africa. 
19
 To avoid “regression fishing” as described by Goldberger (1991), Miles and Shevlin (2001), the models 
include all the main components identified in the literature review (country income, governance, 
macroeconomic stability, regulation, infrastructure, and transformational). In particular for the regulatory 
variables (promar, function, labor, tax), a general to specific approach was explored, but all variables were 
eventually included in the main models. Joint significance tests served as robustness checks to verify if 
significant variables in the main models remain statistically significant after eliminating non-significant 
variables. 
20
 Only models 1A and 3B required a significance level at the one percent to successfully pass the test. 
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As robustness checks, joint significance tests were executed for each model. In the case 
of models 1A and 1B, the variables that individually appear as not significant, are, according 
to the test results, jointly significant. In the case of models 2A and 2B, their individually not 
significant variables are not jointly significant. Similar analyses were made for models 3A, 
3B, 4A, and 4B. For all the cases in which the analyzed variables appeared as not jointly 
significant, a new OLS regression was executed excluding those variables from the model 
(the models explored after the joint significance tests have an apostrophe after the model’s 
name). Except for model 3A’ in which trans is no longer significant, in all the new models 
(2A’, 2B’, 3B’, 4A’, and 4B’) the variables that appeared as individually significant in the 
original models, remain significant. These results might be a good indicative for the 
robustness of the analysis. Detailed joint significance tests are presented in Appendix 2.13. 
Results are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Results 
Using OLS multiple linear regression, results show a significant association of several 
dimensions of the business environment with the size of the SME sector (measured by the 
number of SMEs per 1000 people in each economy), and the MSME sector’s contribution to 
employment (measured as the share of total employment) as well as with other employment 
variables across countries. In Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the models are numbered according to the 
dependent variable. A letter is added after each model’s number; the letter A establishes that 
the model was explored using Sample A, and the letter B indicates that Sample B was used. 
 
2.4.1 The Impact on SMEs Density 
Table 2.3 presented the results for the dependent variables from the MSME-CI database. 
At a regulatory level, the results suggest that less constraining regulatory frameworks for 
variables such as tax and labor are related with higher number of enterprises in an economy 
(in other words, an SME entrepreneur will be more likely to start or expand a formal small or 
medium sized business if tax and labor regulations are less constraining). Gelb et al. (2007) 
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found that “tax administration is primarily a problem in middle income countries and the 
perception of labor regulations as a severe constraint increases with GDP level.” The findings 
of models 1A and 1B confirm the previous statement. The coefficient of labor regulation is 
significant only in Sample B which is composed up to 70 percent by upper middle and high 
income countries. Furthermore, Straub (2005) stated that labor market rigidities (e.g. 
minimum wage above market clearing level) “push firms to remain informal at higher level 
of initial capital.”  
On the other hand, the significant and positive coefficients of trans suggest that 
constraining business environments generate larger numbers of small enterprises that are 
either not able to grow or do not have the incentives to grow beyond a certain size, 
particularly in the cases where the ability to cooperate and coordinate is missing. Because of 
the sign, this result seems to discourage the effect of cooperation in order to foster a large 
SME sector. However, Molina (2006), taking the example of Bolivia, described that a 
characteristic of SMEs in developing countries is that this sector spreads and tends to 
diversification without being able to specialize. The previous statement could be visualized in 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 which show a positive relation of smeden and trans in the case of lower 
middle income countries while in the whole sample the relationship is negative with countries 
like Japan, USA, Finland, or Korea presenting higher densities of SMEs and lower (less 
constraining) values of trans.  
Figure 2.2: Scatter Plot of smeden and 
trans; Lower Middle Income Countries  
Source: Author’s elaboration (Sample A) 
Figure 2.3: Scatter Plot of smeden and 
trans; Whole Sample  
Source: Author’s elaboration (Sample A) 
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If there is neither the ability to cooperate nor the incentive for coordination towards the 
creation of a competitive industrial structure, the result will be the atomization of hundreds of 
actors that have scarce possibilities to actively compete in bigger markets. Lastly, GDPpc has 
a positive and significant coefficient (model 1B). It is important to highlight that the 
dependent variable does not include micro enterprises and considers only SMEs. SMEs might 
be able to navigate market entry procedures, and the results suggest that as firms display 
higher levels of initial capital and number of workers, SMEs will turn their attention towards 
tax and, particularly, labor regulatory frameworks. 
 
2.4.2 The Impact over MSMEs Contribution to Employment 
As Table 2.3 shows, larger contributions to employment by the MSME sector seem to 
be characterized by streamlined product-market and labor regulation. However, the role of 
these variables is subjected to levels of governance. For example, in model 2A, the equation 
below defines the impact of labor regulation on MSMEs contribution to employment:  
O
O = −0.282 + 1.136	                2/ 
Thus, according to the level of governance, the effect of labor regulation could become 
positive (exacerbated) or negative (mitigated). The variable labor presents a negative 
coefficient. However, if governance takes the value of one (indicating an inadequate level of 
governance), the resulting sign of the labor regulation’s overall effect will take a positive sign. 
On the contrary, a value of zero (excellent level of governance) will turn the sign of the 
overall effect to negative 21 . Good governance could mitigate the effects of somewhat 
constraining labor regulations, and bad governance could increase the burden of regulations. 
These results combine and harmonize the implications of Ayyagari et al. (2007) and Loayza 
et al. (2010). The former advocated that business environments increase the size of the 
MSME sector either because they enable firms to participate in the market, or because they 
                                                     
21
 For explicative purposes only, if governance takes a threshold value of 0.25 (in model 2A, for example), the 
effects of labor regulation are mitigated.  
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constrain firms’ development by not letting them grow or rapidly exit the market. In turn, 
Loayza et al. (2010) advocated for the interaction of governance with the regulation variables. 
Particularly in the case of labor regulation, this study suggests that the constraining business 
environment theory is more likely to occur in countries that suffer from bad governance22. 
The product-market regulation and its interaction with governance could be interpreted 
in a similar way. For instance, if the mean values of governance for Sample A (	WWWWWX = 0.51) 
and for Sample B (	WWWWWZ = 0.46)23 are inputted in the product-market regulation and its 
interaction with governance, the resulting sign for all models (2A, 2A’, 2B, 2B’) is negative. 
The thresholds of governance values that change the sign in the overall effect of product-
market regulation take lower values (0.17 for model 2A, 0.15 for 2A’, 0.25 for 2B, and 0.20 
for 2B’). The potential implication is that in the case of product-market regulation, the 
resulting sign will remain negative as long as the levels of governance take values between 
the before mentioned thresholds and the maximum value of one. In that range, a streamlined 
product-market regulation might pave the way for a greater contribution to employment by 
MSMEs. This could in part explain why many development institutions have a strong focus 
on issues like credit and other aspects of the product-market regulations when it comes to 
private sector promotion in developing countries. In other words, improving product-market 
regulations is important because they might generate results even with not so good levels of 
governance. In conclusion, for those countries with poor governance (between the values of 
0.20 and 1 in the variable governance, which include most developing countries), it could be 
worth to start tackling the improvement of the business environment by simplifying the 
product-market regulation. 
For instance, Dethier et al. (2010) mentioned that the case for better market entry 
regulation “has now become common wisdom worldwide.” In addition, Straub (2005) 
                                                     
22
 The quality of governance explains the regulatory context; for example, how regulation is enforced, or given 
that a procedure may include several steps or requirements, whether or not it could be completed without serious 
delays, or whether the regulation is applied to all actors in the same way. 
23
 Sample B might have a slightly better level of governance because a bit more than 70 percent of the countries 
composing this sample are upper middle and high income countries. 
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suggested that a better judicial system and access to credit (both also included in product-
market regulation) will make the participation of MSMEs in formal credit markets more 
attractive. This will reduce the reliance of entrepreneurs in informal credit markets (generally 
lacking project screening which might lead to modest or unsuccessful outcomes of the 
financed projects). While Kushnir et al. (2010), You (1995) also supported the importance of 
credit markets, Dethier et al. (2010) stated that access to finance declines with the level of 
GDP. Moreover, Stein et al. (2010) stated “approximately 70 percent of all emerging-market 
MSMEs (roughly 255 million to 310 million enterprises)” do not use any formal credit at all 
even though they want to use it.  
Lastly, at good levels of governance, the sign of the overall effect of product-market 
regulation could turn positive. For countries with good levels of governance it could pay-off 
to strengthen some aspects of the product-market regulation. For example, Straub (2005) 
emphasized the importance of project screening in formal credit markets. Even though these 
measures could be useful only for a restricted number of countries (there are only fourteen 
countries with governance levels inferior to the value of 0.1524 in the sample), strict and 
better designed procedures could help allocating resources more efficiently. More successful 
MSMEs projects could be financed, increasing the contribution to employment by this sector. 
 
2.4.3 The Impact over other Employment Variables 
In Table 2.4, models 3A, 3A’, 3B, and 3B’ present significant coefficients for the 
relationship between employment growth and macroeconomic stability along with the 
interaction term with governance25. The behavior is similar to the case of product-market 
regulation and the MSMEs share of employment. In general, it could be said that despite bad 
governance, macroeconomic stability encourages countries’ firms to register higher growth 
                                                     
24
 The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
25
 Because the IFC’s MSME-CI database provides data exclusively on the size, breakdown, and employment 
contribution of the small enterprise sector, this used additional variables from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys in an attempt to further comprehend the impact of business environments, on employment. 
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rates of employment26 (Appendix 2.14 presents additional descriptive statistics). 
In models 3B and 3B’, tax and product-market regulations have significant roles on 
employment growth. Also, trans and its interaction with governance are significant. 
Regarding the latter, World Economic Forum (2011) stated that as countries move towards 
higher stages of development, boosting innovation is more important.  
White (2005) pointed out not only the importance of creating new jobs, but also of 
decreasing underemployment. Models 4A to 4B’ analyzed the relationship of business 
environment with employment of permanent full time workers in the manufacturing sector. 
First, the variable trans in models 4A and 4A’ is negative and significant without the 
interaction with governance which means that it has a straightforward influence. Those 
countries with ability to cooperate and innovate appear to have more permanent full time 
employees. From model 4A to model 4B’, the variable tax is significant along its interaction 
coefficient27. When the levels of governance are closer to zero, the overall effect of tax 
regulation will take a positive value. This finding reflects the fact presented in Section 2.3 
(Appendix 2.7 – Fig. 2.7.4); high income countries show a more strict tax regulatory 
framework (Appendix 2.14, Table 2.14.2 presents additional statistics). In addition, product-
market regulation and its interaction with governance have significant coefficients in models 
4B and 4B’ which suggest their importance at higher income levels, in particular. The 
variable function is in principle negative but its overall coefficient will take positive or 
negative values when interacted with governance. The analysis of the share of unskilled 
production workers, models 5A and 5B do not provide relevant information except for the 
negative and significant coefficient of tax regulation. 
 
 
                                                     
26
 Meyer-Stamer and Haar (2008) pointed out that in developing countries, SMEs are not correlated with 
economic growth because there is a time lag between enterprise development and macroeconomic stability since 
it takes time for entrepreneurs to recover confidence in the economy. The macroeconomic stability variable in 
this study is a measure over the decade of 2000 (2004 to 2010); therefore, it is able to capture this potential 
time-lag as it appears significant in the model. 
27
 In model 4B’ the interaction with governance is not significant; however, if the interaction term is eliminated 
(as it was tested for all such similar cases), the tax term is no longer significant. 
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2.4.4 IV Procedure for SME Density and MSME Contribution to Employment 
For models 1A and 2A, an instrumental variables procedure was explored in an attempt 
to isolate the exogenous variation in regulation. Based on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2009), Ayyagari et al. (2007), Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008), Beck, 
Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005), Loayza et al. (2010) the following instruments were used for 
the regulatory framework; legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, latitude, and the share of 
Catholic, Muslim and Protestant in consideration of their impact on the quality of; 
government provision of public goods, business transactions, the contracting environment, 
and the level of financial and institutional development28. 
Angrist and Pischke (2010) developed (A-P) first stage F-statistics when there is more 
than one endogenous regressor. While Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap statistics test the 
equation as a whole, the A-P first stage F-statistics, explore whether one of the endogenous 
regressors is under or weekly specified. The Angrist-Pischke X6 for under-identification was 
calculated; nevertheless, since the results are in line with the A-P F-statistics, they are not 
presented. Given the low values of the F-statistics, tests for robust inference were considered. 
Therefore, the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic replaces the Anderson-Canon for under-
identification, and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic replaces the Cragg-Donald for weak 
identification. For over-identification, the Hansen J statistic was analyzed. The Anderson-
Rubin Wald statistic was also calculated to verify the joint significance of the endogenous 
regressors. 
In general, while the Hansen J-statistic is never rejected (suggesting that the instruments 
are valid), the Anderson-Rubin Wald test fails to be rejected in some models (except for 
                                                     
28
 The specific problem that the IV procedure tries to address is the possibility of regulatory variables being 
endogenous (correlated with the error term). Wooldridge (2009) mentioned that because it is not possible to test 
the correlation of the studied variables with the error term, the case has to be made “based on economic 
reasoning or introspection.” There is consistent literature supporting the relationship of the instruments selected 
with institutional designs that are representative of the business environment. Given that the models attempt to 
capture a broad array of business environment measures, it is expected that the error term could contain factors 
other than business environment issues (for example, fortuitous events that foster/constrain the appearance and 
economic focus of regional newly industrialized countries, prediction of technological shifts or breakthroughs, 
etc. that may have an impact on the structural business composition of affected countries). In the literature 
review, there is no evidence of those other hypothetical factors being related to the instruments selected. 
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Model 2A, for example). The individual evaluation of the endogenous regressors provides 
new insights. For instance, in model 1A, it can be verified by the A-P first stage F-statistics 
that the used instruments might be suitable for the regulation of product-market, function and 
labor (for smeden) while tax is weekly specified. Because of the weak specification of one of 
the variables, the results for the whole model might be hampered. 
A result to be highlighted might be found in model 2A where promar and promargov 
are instrumented. The 2SLS coefficient for promargov is negative and significant. 
Additionally, the coefficient of promar alone is also negative strongly suggesting that 
streamlined product-market regulation may contribute to greater shares of employment. The 
role of governance, therefore, will only reduce or augment the impact without changing the 
sign of it. The A-P first stage F-statistics provide satisfactory results, and the other tests 
results suggest that the instruments seem to be valid for the whole equation. In addition, the 
Anderson-Rubin statistic shows that endogenous regressors are jointly significant.  
Overall, new instruments as well as techniques need to be explored. For instance, while 
geographical proximity may play a role for taxation, religion variables have greater impact 
shaping attitudes towards credit (captured in product-market). At the moment, IV-procedures 
for multiple endogenous variables, instrument all of them in the same way. Beck et al. (2005) 
affirmed that “lack of theory and empirical cross-country work on the determinants of the 
size of the SME sector in manufacturing is a significant hurdle in selecting appropriate IV.” 
Results are shown in Table 2.5, and first stage regression results are detailed in Appendix 
2.17.  
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Table 2.3: OLS Results - SMEs’ Densities and MSMEs’ Contribution to Employment (MSME-CI) 
 ln_smeden ln_smeden msmeemplo msmeemplo msmeemplo msmeemplo 
Independent Variables (1A) (1B) (2A) (2A’) (2B) (2B’) 
ln GDPpc 0.377  
(0.229) 
0.442*** 
(0.158) 
-0.0190 
(0.0448) 
-0.0227 
(0.0311) 
0.00445 
(0.0542) 
0.00966 
(0.0463) 
governance 0.129  
(1.432) 
-1.056 
(0.976) 
-0.232 
(0.421) 
-0.265 
(0.321) 
0.794 
(0.524) 
0.686** 
(0.309) 
promar -1.901 
 (2.423) 
-1.548 
(2.588) 
0.485 
(0.741) 
0.394 
(0.673) 
1.233 
(1.199) 
0.804 
(0.844) 
promar_gov  
 
 
 
-2.845* 
(1.445) 
-2.603* 
(1.324) 
-5.025** 
(2.135) 
-4.024** 
(1.625) 
function -0.851  
(3.207) 
2.445 
(2.237) 
-0.200 
(0.378)  
0.376 
(0.428)  
function_gov       
labor -0.743 
 (0.563) 
-1.495*** 
(0.369) 
-0.282* 
(0.166) 
-0.311 
(0.191) 
-0.0168 
(0.110)  
labor_gov 
 
 
 
1.136** 
(0.445) 
1.160*** 
(0.406) 
 
 
 
Tax -2.003** 
 (0.850) 
-2.158** 
(1.023) 
-0.0912 
(0.212)  
-0.310 
(0.202)  
tax_gov       
macro 0.380  
(0.977) 
-0.410 
(1.032) 
-0.00422 
(0.221)  
0.317 
(0.294)  
macro-gov       
Infra -1.467 
 (1.094) 
-1.940 
(1.402) 
0.145 
(0.250)  
-0.0248 
(0.382)  
Trans 1.967*  
(0.995) 
3.521*** 
(1.140) 
-0.157 
(0.265)  
-0.294 
(0.359)  
trans_gov       
Constant -1.200  
(2.405) 
-1.659 
(1.681) 
0.824* 
(0.468) 
0.813** 
(0.350) 
0.389 
(0.518) 
0.294 
(0.490) 
Observations 78 42 90 90 46 46 
R-squared 0.433 0.774 0.246 0.236 0.425 0.368 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 2.4: OLS Results – Other Employment Variables (Enterprise Surveys) 
 empgrowth empgrowth empgrowth empgrowth ln_pfulltw ln_pfulltw ln_pfulltw ln_pfulltw shareuskprodw shareuskprodw 
Ind. Vars. (3A) (3A’) (3B) (3B’) (4A) (4A’) (4B) (4B’) (5A) (5B) 
ln GDPpc 0.661 
(1.165) 
-0.117 
(0.706) 
1.293 
(1.300) 
0.457 
(1.079) 
0.0864 
(0.0959) 
0.143* 
(0.0782) 
0.166 
(0.138) 
0.218 
(0.129) 
-0.0178 
(2.136) 
1.090  
(3.950) 
governance -20.20 
(17.27) 
29.14** 
(11.45) 
-83.96** 
(33.97) 
-60.26** 
(27.55) 
2.641** 
(1.129) 
3.688*** 
(1.315) 
8.691** 
(3.312) 
5.759* 
(3.088) 
-6.468 
(12.45) 
-17.42  
(19.81) 
promar 0.589 
(20.06)  
174.8* 
(90.84) 
162.4* 
(93.30) 
-0.342 
(1.630)  
19.29** 
(8.180) 
12.85 
(8.283) 
40.99 
(25.10) 
25.87  
(44.70) 
promar_gov  
 
 
-277.6* 
(150.7) 
-247.8 
(156.6) 
 
 
 
-36.04** 
(13.04) 
-26.19* 
(14.16) 
 
 
 
 
function -6.313 
(8.361)  
0.417 
(11.43)  
1.059 
(1.211)  
-15.43** 
(6.350) 
-15.01* 
(7.391) 
-26.21 
(28.39) 
-74.96  
(44.19) 
function_gov  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.62** 
(9.981) 
22.68* 
(11.36) 
 
 
 
labor -0.0298 
(3.052)  
-5.795 
(5.571)  
-0.174 
(0.399)  
-1.005 
(0.616)  
-8.595 
(8.320) 
-16.40  
(17.75) 
labor_gov           
tax 1.865 
(7.992)  
-185.3** 
(78.06) 
-150.3** 
(69.48) 
4.150** 
(1.881) 
5.042** 
(2.351) 
6.098** 
(2.495) 
5.159* 
(2.653) 
-38.03* 
(21.66) 
-29.03  
(30.88) 
tax_gov  
 
 
297.2** 
(117.3) 
236.6** 
(106.3) 
-6.811* 
(3.827) 
-9.047** 
(3.934) 
-8.609* 
(4.194) 
-7.145 
(4.576) 
 
 
 
 
macro 40.34** 
(18.41) 
23.49* 
(13.41) 
102.4** 
(38.43) 
91.23** 
(33.39) 
0.719 
(0.626)  
-0.0954 
(1.197)  
6.879 
(14.09) 
16.01  
(24.64) 
macro-gov -89.36*** 
(31.60) 
-54.73** 
(21.81) 
-160.4** 
(67.01) 
-146.3** 
(58.27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
infra 14.12 
(8.832)  
11.02 
(10.67)  
-0.826 
(0.775)  
-0.665 
(1.005)  
3.442 
(18.61) 
16.62  
(30.23) 
trans -74.02*** 
(27.18)  
-153.7** 
(55.68) 
-133.8** 
(53.46) 
-1.297* 
(0.758) 
-1.773*** 
(0.567) 
-1.117 
(1.137)  
-14.04 
(17.79) 
-11.12  
(24.15) 
trans_gov 109.9*** 
(41.12)  
239.3** 
(87.95) 
208.7** 
(86.73)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 14.28 
(12.60) 
-6.754 
(9.790) 
45.32* 
(22.53) 
40.91* 
(20.62) 
2.945** 
(1.380) 
2.074* 
(1.175) 
0.00791 
(1.436) 
-0.117 
(2.024) 
46.13 
(34.55) 
42.45  
(59.27) 
Observations 66 73 32 32 82 92 37 37 77 37 
R-squared 0.266 0.128 0.535 0.488 0.254 0.230 0.547 0.419 0.122 0.199 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 2.5: SMEs’ Density and MSMEs’ Share of Employment – Instrumental Variables 
 ln_smeden ln_smeden ln_smeden msmeemplo msmeemplo 
Independent Variables (1A) (1A) (1A: only tax) (2A) (2A) 
ln GDPpc 0.448 0.467* 0.200 -0.0765 -0.0317 
 (0.318) (0.252) (0.345) (0.0576) (0.0513) 
governance 0.273 -0.436 -1.500 0.457 0.223 
 (1.869) (1.684) (1.661) (0.621) (0.542) 
promar -2.809 -0.298  -0.228 0.111 
 (6.403) (2.732)  (1.387) (1.211) 
promar_gov    -4.920** -2.517 
    (2.360) (1.933) 
function -10.48* -3.245  -0.215 -0.321 
 (6.218) (3.906)  (0.641) (0.655) 
labor -1.640 -0.660  -0.209 -0.261 
 (1.420) (0.599)  (0.190) (0.420) 
labor_gov    0.885 0.379 
    (0.554) (0.946) 
tax -1.322 -3.860 -7.158** -0.0106 -0.0490 
 (4.130) (2.655) (3.462) (0.251) (0.266) 
macro 1.266 0.685 -0.0766 0.167 0.00154 
 (1.848) (1.057) (1.381) (0.262) (0.250) 
infra 0.404 -0.833 -2.676 0.0865 -0.0676 
 (1.531) (1.157) (1.886) (0.351) (0.310) 
trans 1.661 0.894 0.238 -0.0418 0.203 
 (1.761) (1.211) (1.386) (0.319) (0.316) 
Constant -1.340 -1.252 3.116 1.330** 0.896* 
 (4.154) (2.987) (4.859) (0.593) (0.528) 
Observations 66 66 69 75 75 
Angrist-Pischke F (promar) 
p-value 
4.94 
0.0009 
  2.21 
0.0400 
 
Angrist-Pischke F (function) 
p-value 
3.74 
0.0058 
    
Angrist-Pischke F (labor) 
p-value 
3.55 
0.0077 
   0.87 
0.5462 
Angrist-Pischke F (tax) 
p-value 
1.15 
0.3446 
1.14 
0.3561 
1.13 
0.3607 
  
Angrist-Pischke F (promargov) 
p-value 
   4.27 
0.0005 
 
Angrist-Pischke F (laborgov) 
p-value 
    0.89 
0.5308 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 
0.68 
 
1.14 
20.25 
1.13 
20.25 
3.30 
18.30 
2.04 
18.30 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
4.94 
0.4232 
7.92 
0.4414 
8.56 
0.3807 
15.37 
0.0524 
13.76 
0.0883 
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
6.075 
0.1936 
6.742 
0.4562 
9.086 
0.2465 
8.108 
0.3231 
9.703 
0.2060 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
2.11 
0.0514 
1.55 
0.1637 
3.02 
0.0069 
2.06 
0.0495 
0.97 
0.4714 
Instrumented: promar, tax, function, labor tax tax 
promar, 
promargov 
labor, 
laborgov 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Note: Two Stage Least Squares regressions were used. In the first stage, the regression equation estimated is: 
]	
, 
, , J = ^ + 57_ `1 + 56aℎ _ `1 + 5<: _ `1 +
5=_ℎ + 5>b
 + 5I; + 5Kcℎ ad + 5L`
 . When the interaction terms 
	 and 	 were included as endogenous, their respective instruments were also included at the right hand 
of the previous equation. Following a suggestion by Chakravarty (2011) the instruments for the before mentioned variables 
are the predicted values of the first stage interacted with governance (  e ∗ 	,  f ∗ 	 ). 
Detailed variables’ definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2.8. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This study compiled a dataset of cross-country information about the size and employment 
contribution of SMEs as well as the business environment, among other variables, in order to 
determine if larger SMEs sectors are due to competitive business environments. 
Tax and labor regulation support the theory of competitive business environments 
having a positive impact on the number of SMEs in each economy. Labor and product-market 
regulation appear to have a stronger influence over the MSMEs’ share of employment 
depending on the level of governance. It is important to bear in mind that tax regulation is 
more likely to be a constraint for smaller enterprises whilst labor regulation gradually 
becomes more constraining for medium and large enterprises. Product-market regulation 
appears as a clear priority for developing countries because of the constructive effect that may 
have even at inadequate levels of governance. Therefore, in the case of the formal small 
enterprise sector, it will be important to constantly improve the credit channels, market entry, 
insolvency, and trade regulations along with property registration and contract enforcement 
procedures. The evidence suggesting that a larger SME sector may be associated with 
constraining business environments is rather weak, and at any case, more likely to hold for 
countries with poor levels of governance.  
The ability to cooperate seems to have a positive impact particularly on quality type 
variables such as number of permanent full time jobs or employment growth. Therefore, 
policies in favor of SMEs should also pay attention to topics such as fostering collaboration 
among enterprises, universities, and other institutions both public and private. The previous 
findings seem to be reasonable especially when contrasted with the experience of some 
successful East Asian economies.  
One of the main limitations of the study is that the definition of SME varies from 
country to country. The study created a sample including only those countries with similar 
SME definitions. However, the sample size is significantly reduced. Absence of consistent 
and periodical data is another main challenge for the study of the small enterprise sector at the 
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country level. In addition, it is of utmost importance to count with more quality-type data 
such as the contribution of SMEs to GDP, competitiveness, insertion to global value chains, 
etc. While issues such as the improvement of governance may be broadly accepted, changes 
in other aspects of regulation may have political and social implications beyond the scope of 
this study. Even though the instrumental variables for product-market regulation have 
significant results for employment share, this study does not have a strong emphasis on the 
determination of causality. Instead, it pretends to raise awareness about the role that several 
aspects of the business environment may play for the development of the small enterprise 
sector. Additionally, the combination between objective indicators (available only at the 
country level) and subjective indicators (mainly used at the firm level) could help not only 
improve measurement, but also explore and enable more sophisticated analyses. Finally, 
future studies could benefit from identifying the SMEs that have better quality-type 
contributions to the economy (in terms of value added, decent employment generation, etc.) 
and analyzing which aspects of the business environment might foster those SMEs. 
The findings may contribute to guide the streamlining of the business environment. 
Transparency, simplicity, and accessibility, regardless of social or political connections, 
provide opportunities and bring benefits not only to entrepreneurs willing to participate in the 
market but also to society as a whole. 
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Chapter 3  
The Relationship of Investment Climate with Productivity and Profitability: 
An Analysis of Bolivia with Firm Level Data 
3.1 Introduction 
It is estimated that more than 600 million jobs need to be created by 2020 to absorb 
working-age populations, as stated by the World Bank (2012b). Developing countries in 
particular, require tackling not only unemployment but also underemployment and 
informality. Globally, a third of the people who are working are still poor, and about half are 
informal workers according to International Finance Corporation (2013). Unfortunately, the 
number of unemployed worldwide rose by 4.2 million in 2012 to over 197 million,  and there 
is evidence for a reduction in the shift from lower productivity sectors to higher productivity 
ones in developing countries as highlighted by the International Labour Organization (2013).  
Productivity is an issue of utmost importance for the region of Latin America in 
particular. The International Labour Organization (2013), OCDE/CEPAL/CAF (2013), Pages 
(2010b) stated that the region’s productivity is low compared to other regions and its overall 
growth has been modest at best. Moreover, after a decade of growth, the region will have to 
face the challenges of a less favorable macroeconomic environment in the near future. To 
navigate these challenges, the region must take measures regarding informality and structural 
reforms to improve productivity and quality in order to be competitive in the global economy, 
as underlined by Levy (2014), OCDE/CEPAL/CAF (2013).  
Bolivia has the highest level of informality and is one of the countries with the lowest 
productivities in the region according to Machicado and Birbuet (2009), McKenzie and 
Sakho (2010), World Bank (2009)29. In Bolivia, “the burden of regulation, the weakness of 
public institutions, and the lack of perceived benefits” are among the reasons for firms not to 
become formal, and the benefits of formalizing (e.g. tax registration) in profitability appear to 
come mainly from an extended customer base and not from higher mark-ups, lower input 
                                                     
29World Bank (2009) stated that in Bolivia, nearly 80 percent of urban and rural employment belongs to the 
informal sector. 
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prices or better access to credit, as found by the World Bank (2009). In addition, the benefits 
of formalization depend on firm size and the investment climate. For example, the World 
Bank (2009) mentioned that because micro firms seem not to benefit from formalizing, they 
prefer to remain informal in order to avoid costly customs, labor, trade, and tax regulation 
while small firms find the benefits of formalization in easier access to credit and less 
exposure to corruption. Furthermore, Pérez de Rada (2006), World Bank (2009) found that 
access to capital is the main constraint to productivity along with lack of skilled labor, lack of 
quality inputs, and lack of technology. At a macro level, constraints to productivity include 
informality, unfair competition from smuggled goods, low capital accumulation associated 
with high capital costs, inadequate infrastructure, political instability, crime, and cumbersome 
regulations as stated by Muriel and Jemio (2010), Nina and von Vacano (2006), Pérez de 
Rada (2006), World Bank (2009). 
An enabling investment climate is a key factor that may help the private sector to thrive. 
It has been widely highlighted that a streamlined investment climate is conducive to 
improving firms’ competitiveness over time and allows individuals with good ideas to 
participate in the market independently of their gender, ethnic origin, political or social 
connections as underlined by Bloom and Reenen (2006), Gonzales (2012), Mazzucato (2013), 
World Bank (2010). However, deficiencies in the Bolivian investment climate are a recurrent 
issue in the analysis of Bolivian firms’ productivity. 
This study attempts to analyze which aspects of the investment climate are more 
important for firms’ productivity in Bolivia. Using firm level data, the study estimates Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) and subsequently conducts the empirical determination of which 
factors of the investment climate are associated with TFP. At the same time, this study 
explores the impact of the investment climate on firms’ profitability. In addition, this study 
plans to account for several firms and owners’ characteristics among other variables. The 
study uses data from Enterprise Surveys and a unique survey implemented in Bolivia by the 
World Bank. Section 3.2 reviews relevant literature, Section 3.3 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 3.4 presents the results, and conclusions are presented in section 3.5. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
Bolivia is a landlocked country, sparsely populated in a large territory with an area 
approximately the size of the United Kingdom, Germany and France combined. The west is 
characterized by highlands where the departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi are located. 
Between the Andean ridge and the lowlands, lie the valleys comprising the departments of 
Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. The east has an extensive area of lowlands containing 
the department of Santa Cruz along with Beni and Pando towards the northern tropical forest 
region. Morales and Sachs (1989), Sturzenegger (1995) highlighted that while the west, rich 
in minerals, has historically been the economic and political center, the economy has been 
gravitating towards the east, rich in hydrocarbon resources30.  
During the last half of the past century, Bolivia’s economy did not experience a 
remarkable development. A milestone of the period is the 1984-85 hyperinflation, one of the 
most severe in world history. Machicado and Birbuet (2009), Morales and Sachs (1989) 
stated that the unsuccessful development of the Bolivian economy until the hyperinflation 
episode could had been produced by internal and external factors. Some examples of internal 
factors are coup-d’états, lack of continuity of economic policies with sharp alternation 
between populist and non populist policies implemented by military and civilian rulers alike, 
protectionism, subsidies without performance targets, and public enterprises in captive 
markets. External factors included rise in world interest rates, cutoff in lending by 
international capital markets, and decline in commodities’ prices, among others31. In 1985, a 
stabilization program was launched to control hyperinflation and also to introduce structural 
changes in the economy.  
During the 1990s several reforms, in the spirit of the Washington Consensus, continued 
to be introduced. Even though the reforms appeared to be coherent, a recession since 1999 
and deficient implementation produced limited results for the economy according to Antelo 
                                                     
30
 Bolivia lost its coastal territories to Chile during the traumatic war of 1879. The historical diversification of 
Bolivia’s main products is in part explained by the high value added per unit weight required to cover 
transportation costs. Sociopolitical cleavages in Bolivia include; income distribution, ideology, region, and 
ethnicity to some extent as mentioned by Morales and Sachs (1989), Pérez de Rada (2006), Sturzenegger (1995). 
31
 For an analysis from the social perspective see Albó (1992), Grootaert and Narayan (2004). 
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(2000), Barja, Mckenzie, and Urquiola (2005), Faguet (2008), Morales (2011b), Muriel and 
Jemio (2010). As a consequence, the first half of the first decade of 2000 witnessed political 
and social upheaval. Since 2006, a new government started the implementation of a “plural 
economy” with an increased role by the State and focus on growth and redistribution as 
described by Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Publicas (2014), Morales (2011b). Since 
then, the Bolivian economy has been registering good macroeconomic indicators due in part 
to prudence and continuity in the management of economic policy32. However, these results 
could be jeopardized by a productive structure that, while the country experiences favorable 
historical circumstances33, it is still characterized by; reliance on primary goods, institutional 
weakness, low levels of human capital, a huge informal sector, low levels of technological 
innovation, precarious employment, little strategic diversification and limited or inefficient 
industrialization, as highlighted by Chavez (2011), Kaup (2010). In 2012, the country 
registered a population of more than 10 million people and a GDP per capita of 2,576 in 
current US$ (World Development Indicators, 2014). 
In Bolivia, the activities that contribute most to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are 
manufacturing (18.2 percent), agriculture (15.5 percent), and mining and hydrocarbons (11.6 
percent). However, Machicado and Birbuet (2009) argued that the contribution to GDP by 
manufacturing is low compared to other countries in the Latin-American region where 
manufacturing accounts for over 30 percent. While agriculture, wholesale and retail trade as 
well as manufacturing have the largest shares of employment, mining and quarrying, 
electricity, gas and water supply along with financial intermediation are the sectors with the 
highest labor productivities (see Table 3.1). 
 
                                                     
32
 Laserna (2011), Morales (2011a) mentioned that some other positive aspects of the recent Bolivian economic 
policy are conditional grants (targeting the elderly, children and pregnant women) which contribute to reduce 
poverty and increase consumption power. Microfinance is also characterized as having a “world-class 
performance” in Bolivia according to Alaiza (2011), Rhyne (2011). 
33
 The favorable historical circumstances make reference to high commodity prices, support from the majority of 
the population, and majority in the bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly (Chamber of Senators and 
Chamber of Deputies) by the governing party. 
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Table 3.1: Employment, Contribution to GDP, Productivity, and FDI by Sector in 
Bolivia 
Economic 
Sector 
Employment 
 
2005-2007 
(%) 
Employment 
intensity 
2007 
(employees/GDP) 
Share of 
GDP 
2007 
(%) 
Labor 
productivity 
2007 
(Bs.1,000, 1990) 
FDI 
1996-
2001 
2006-
2007 
(million US$) 
Labor intensive 86.3 295.6 53.0 3.4 170.9 137.6 
Agriculture 38.0 428.1 15.5 2.3 0.7 0.7 
Community, 
social and 
personal service 
10.0 548.8 4.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Construction 6.2 415.4 3.0 2.4 84.7 9.6 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
14.5 304.2 8.7 3.3 13.2 56.4 
Private 
households 
2.9 - - - - - 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
3.8 205.9 3.0 4.9 5.6 0.2 
Manufacturing 10.8 110.8 18.2 9.0 66.7 70.7 
Non-labor 
intensive 
13.7 56.5 47.0 17.7 667.0 522.4 
Transport, 
storage and 
communications 
5.8 91.9 11.6 10.9 187.6 81.2 
Real state, 
renting, and 
business 
2.9 61.6 8.7 16.2 5.9 4.7 
Public 
administration 
2.7 61.9 9.6 16.1 0.0 0.0 
Electricity, gas, 
and water supply 
0.3 28.7 2.1 34.8 64.0 10.5 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.5 33.1 3.3 30.2 42.2 7.4 
Mining and 
quarrying 
1.5 24.4 11.6 40.9 367.3 418.6 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Muriel & Jemio, 2010 
Note: Employment share is the average for 2005, 2006, and 2007 (age 10 or more). The 
economic sectors appeared to be classified according to International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) Rev.3.1. 
After 27 years (1980 to 2007) capital per worker has barely changed; furthermore, the 
increase in capital per worker during 1996 to 2000 was not accompanied with an increase in 
aggregate productivity because investments in capital were mainly made in sectors that are 
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not labor intensive as stated by Muriel and Jemio (2010)34. Figure 3.1 also underscores that 
capital formation per worker has not changed significantly during the period 1990 to 2012, 
particularly in the private sector. In addition, Machicado and Birbuet (2009) found that TFP 
had an annual cumulative growth rate of -9.3 percent for the period 1988-2001, and labor 
productivity in manufacturing had a growth rate of -1 percent for the period 1990-2003 
according to Nina and von Vacano (2006).  
Figure 3.1: GDP, GNI and gross capital formation per worker, 1990-2012 (in 2005 US$) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
There is increased agreement that differences in firm-level productivity could also be 
explained to a large extent by differences in the investment climate as suggested by Bastos 
and Nasir (2004), Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005), Nina and von Vacano 
(2006). In Latin America, Jimenez and Landa (2004) stated that changes in employment and 
productivity do not depend exclusively on macroeconomic shocks but also on factors related 
to the investment climate, among others. Likewise, in Bolivia, deficiencies in the investment 
climate are a recurrent issue in the analysis of Bolivian firms’ productivity. For instance, at 
the micro level, it was pointed out that access to capital is the main constraint to productivity 
                                                     
34
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was concentrated particularly in the mining and quarrying sector. In addition, 
Muriel and Jemio (2010) mentioned that there were neither significant spillovers nor significant demand for 
domestic intermediate products. 
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along with lack of skilled labor, lack of quality inputs, and lack of technology according to 
Pérez de Rada (2006), World Bank (2009). At the macro level, constraints to productivity 
include informality, unfair competition from smuggled goods, low capital accumulation 
associated with high capital costs, inadequate infrastructure, political instability, crime, and 
cumbersome regulations as stated in Muriel and Jemio (2010), Nina and von Vacano (2006), 
Pérez de Rada (2006), World Bank (2009)35. Moreover, considering the opinions of Bolivian 
business owners, the most serious obstacles within the investment climate are instability, 
informal sector, access to finance, corruption, and an inadequate workforce as Figure 3.2 
shows (Enterprise Surveys, 2006 and 2010). In addition, relevant aspects of the investment 
climate such as infrastructure (roads), enterprise size, access to markets, and access to raw 
materials affect investment decisions according to Nina and von Vacano (2006).  
Figure 3.2: Most serious obstacle identified by firms (number of firms, 2006 and 2010) 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Enterprise Surveys data for Bolivia. 
Also, Bolivia’s ranking in the World Bank Group’s Doing Business has ample room for 
improvement when compared to average rankings of the world, the Organization for 
                                                     
35
 Muriel and Jemio (2010) argued that given this scenario, business activities were oriented towards non-traded 
goods and small production activities. 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), East Asia & Pacific (EAP), and Latin 
American & Caribbean (LAC) economies. In fact, Bolivia performs slightly better than the 
LAC average ranking on only two indicators; enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency, 
as reported in the World Bank (2014). 
Figure 3.3: Bolivia’s ranking position in Doing Business vis-à-vis average rankings for 
the world, OECD, East Asia and Latin America 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the World Bank Group’s Doing Business 2015. 
A firms’ efficiency in turning inputs into outputs is understood as total factor 
productivity as stated by Saliola and Seker (2011). Total factor productivity took center stage 
since the work of Solow (1957) and not only it has been considered a main factor for 
economic growth but also it explains most of the variation in income per capita across 
countries according to Aiyar and Dalgaard (2005), Saliola and Seker (2011). The efficiency 
of a firm is based on its ability to obtain the maximum output given a set of inputs as well as 
on the ability to use the inputs in optimal proportions considering their respective prices and 
the production technology as described by Coelli, Prasada Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese 
(2005), Farrell (1957). 
Empirical firm-level studies in the case of Bolivia discuss firm performance 
(productivity, and efficiency) in relation to a firms’ characteristics (size, age, location, 
whether or not the firm exports, etc.) and in relation to its behavior across longitudinal 
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periods to analyze the impact of specific policies (market liberalization, for example). 
Machicado and Birbuet (2009), for instance, found that large firms and exporting firms have 
higher productivity. The authors stated that the reasons for productivity gaps are market and 
policy distortions36 which produce resource misallocations and the absence of good quality 
institutions which limits the results of liberalization policies. In turn, Jimenez and Landa 
(2004) determined that the technical inefficiency of Bolivian firms could be a result of factors 
in the supply market and also because of firms’ internal organizational and institutional 
factors. McKenzie and Sakho (2010) conducted a firm-level study about the formalization of 
businesses in the case of Bolivia, which relates profits to detailed measurements of firm 
owners’ characteristics, firms’ characteristics and other variables. This study found that larger 
firms, skilled owners (not based on years of education, but on a detailed assessment of the 
ability to do business), firms that are less likely to be subject to tax control, and higher capital 
stock tend to have higher profits. Given that previous descriptive or empirical firm-level 
studies do not assess in detail the relationship of firm performance with investment climate, 
there is an opportunity for investigating which aspects of the investment climate along with 
firm and owner’s characteristics, among other factors, may be related to firm performance 
(TFP as an economic measurement and profits as a financial measurement). 
Investment Climate (IC) is defined as “the set of location specific factors shaping the 
opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand” 
according to the World Bank (2005) and the business environment, as described by Weiss 
(2013), is a subset of IC. Commander and Svejnar (2007), (2011), Dethier et al. (2010), Reeg 
(2013), White (2005) indicated that several factors are included in the IC which could be 
broadly classified in the following categories; stability, infrastructure, regulation, and 
organizational networks (the latter makes reference to government and non-government 
organizations and arrangements that facilitate the exchange of knowledge, technology, etc. 
                                                     
36
 An example of distortions is government acquisitions from selected firms with subsidized prices that 
happened during episodes with strong import substitution policies along with inadequate implementation of 
State capitalism. 
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This aspect is referred as transformational in this study)37. Variables related to IC in this 
study belong to the above mentioned categories. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
This study uses a dataset from Enterprise Surveys and a second dataset from the Survey of 
Enterprise Productivity implemented in Bolivia by the World Bank. Enterprise Surveys 
conducts a firm-level survey of a representative sample of an economy’s Micro, Small, and 
Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and it covers performance measures as well as an ample range 
of investment climate topics as stated by Enterprise Surveys (2014). In Bolivia, surveys were 
conducted in 2006 and 2010 covering the non-agricultural economy of three main cities and 
surrounding business areas (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba)38. This study uses the 2006 
survey, not only because the second dataset to be analyzed is close in implementation date, 
but also because the attrition rate of the 2010 survey is high, particularly for variables such as 
capital stock39.  
The second dataset (Survey of Enterprise Productivity) is a survey of micro and small 
enterprises designed by David McKenzie & Yaye Seynabou Sakho from the World Bank and 
implemented in March 2007. The survey covered the four largest cities of Bolivia (La Paz, El 
Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba)40. This study focused on those observations belonging to 
urban areas (84 percent of the sample) and for which the respondent was the owner (higher 
accuracy for variables related to owners’ characteristics). The survey includes seven sectors; 
grocery stores, restaurants and food sales, manufacturing of clothing from wool and cloth, 
                                                     
37
 Overlapping with these categories, also four dimensions are highlighted by Haar and Meyer-Stamer (2008), 
Liedholm and Mead (1999), Renko and Haar (2008);  people, markets, technology and networks. 
38
 Samples were selected using stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used; industry, 
establishment size and region. The aim is to obtain unbiased estimates for different subdivisions and for the 
whole population while including all different sectors. 
39 Attrition rates for capital are 33 and 57 percent for 2006 and 2010 respectively. Consequently, for variables 
such as capital stock, 245 out of 613 observations were available in 2006 and only 52 out of 362 observations in 
2010. Eventually, there were only around 25 observations available to conduct a regression analysis in the 2010 
survey given that other variables might be missing as well. 
40
 The sample framework for urban firms is based on a census of all economic establishments conducted in 2005 
which was supplemented with data for transportation sector on all firms that have registered their cars. The 
stratification was implemented at the city level and enterprise size according to McKenzie and Sakho (2010). 
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transportation of passengers and cargo, manufacturing of clothing from camelid wool (llamas 
and alpacas), manufacturing of furniture from wood, and a default category named others.  
An interesting feature of this study is that dataset 1 covers the spectrum of relatively 
larger MSMEs (total average size is 54 employees) while dataset 2 analyzes the smallest 
MSMEs (total average size is 4 employees). The regression analyses are explored for each 
dataset independently (datasets were not combined given their different designs). To the 
extent of the literature review, this study is unique in utilizing open access databases made 
available to the public through Enterprises Surveys and The World Bank Microdata Library 
for this topic in Bolivia. Furthermore, Bolivian establishment censuses or surveys are 
conducted irregularly, the policy for accessing data from the National Statistics Office is 
neither well defined nor client friendly, and unfortunately existing surveys do not capture 
variables related to the investment climate at the firm level. 
 
3.3.1 Estimation of TFP, utility and investment climate for dataset 1 
For the determination of TFP, a Cobb-Douglas production function was used to 
determine the predicted output and obtain the difference with the actual output (g) in line 
with Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), Giroud (2013), Van Beveren (2012). 
Estimations were executed using three (capital (h), labor (`), and materials/intermediate 
goods (b)) and four factors (adding energy and other costs (c_) to the previous three factors) 
of production. The equations below describe the first steps of the process. Lower case letters 
represent variables in logarithm. 
g? = 5<7i h? + 5<7j `? + 5<7k b? 
                                0? = 5<78 + 5<7i2? + 5<7j? + 5<7k? + 
?                                    (3.1) 
g? = 5<6i h? + 5<6j `? + 5<6k b? + 5<6lm c_? 
                            0? = 5<68 + 5<6i2? + 5<6j? + 5<6k? + 5<6lm? + 
?                  (3.2) 
/? = g? − b? − c_? 
/? = 5<<8 + 5<<i h? + 5<<j `? + 
? 
                                    ? = 5<<8 + 5<<i2? + 5<<j? + 
?                                           (3.3) 
59 
 
Subsequently, each one of the coefficients in equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) are in turn 
used in equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) respectively in order to calculate TFP41.  
g? = /?h?nopq`?noprb?nopE 
sa;7? = /? =
g?
h?nopq`?noprb?nopE
 
                         sa;7? = /? = g? − 5<7i h? − 5<7j `? − 5<7k b?        (3.4) 
g? = /?h?notq`?notrb?notEc_?notuv  
sa;6? = /? =
g?
h?notq`?notrb?notEc_?notuv
 
 sa;6? = /?= g? − 5<6i h? − 5<6j `? − 5<6k b? − 5<6lm c_?         (3.5) 
 sa;<? = /? − 5<<i h? − 5<<j `?                                  (3.6) 
Profits () in dataset 1 are calculated subtracting total annual sales minus annual 
labor costs, raw materials and intermediate inputs, energy costs (including transportation and 
communication) and the rental cost of assets. 
? = g? − `_? − b? − c_? − ]_?                                     (3.7) 
Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, and Xu (2006) mentioned that the assessment of 
investment climate variables, particularly when these come from subjective measurements, 
may produce a case of simultaneity bias. For instance, Bastos and Nasir (2004) mentioned 
that some business owners are more proactive for reducing their own business constraints and 
consequently could tend to evaluate some aspects of the IC as less constraining. Similarly, 
other less proactive or less skillful entrepreneurs could exaggerate their evaluation of how 
constraining certain aspects of the IC are. To address this issue, the empirical analysis uses 
mean values of the IC indicators taken for each city across firms with the same 4 digit level 
                                                     
41
 In chapter 3, only one method is used for calculating TFP. On the other hand, chapter 4 uses several methods 
because a high number of observations is available and the analysis is executed for only one sector at the four 
digit level ISIC code. It is important to highlight that the type of data included in dataset 1 has been commonly 
used for estimations of TFP (see Saliola and Seker (2011), for example). Furthermore, all firms included in 
dataset 1 are registered with tax authorities (Servicios de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN)) and they are more likely 
to fit assumptions made about the functional form, constant returns to scale and competitive markets for factor 
inputs needed to calculate TFP. However, in chapter 3, the need to combine industries in order to achieve a 
sufficiently large number of observations for the case of Bolivia is a limitation of this study. For this reason, no 
further attention was devoted to TFP and the analysis of profits (available for both datasets) was included.  
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International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code (main product). There are 41 
different ISIC codes included in the sample, and the variation in IC is expected both at the 
city and the sector level. In this way, given that firms with the same ISIC code are supposed 
to be competitors, the subjective individual influence is diminished by assigning to each firm, 
within the same 4 digit level ISIC code, the mean value of the IC evaluations. 
The final estimations relate the firm performance measurements (TFP and profits) to IC 
variables along with firms’ characteristics (vector w$), owners’ characteristics (vector x$), 
region dummies (^y) and industry dummies (z{). 
 sa;<? = 5<L8 + |}$5<L7 + w$5<L6 + x$5<L< + ^y + z{ + 
?                         (3.8) 
In the case of profits, some variables within the vectors change. 
 ? = 5<M8 + |}$5<M7 + w$5<M6 + x$5<M< + ~y + { + 
?                       (3.9) 
 
3.3.2 Estimation of utility and investment climate for dataset 2 
Dataset 2 allows the measurement of profits, but McKenzie and Sakho (2010) 
recommended against the calculation of TFP because it “relies heavily on assumptions that 
are unlikely to be credible with the types of firms surveyed.42” However, dataset 2 allows for 
more accurate measurements of owners and firms’ characteristics. Profit is measured as 
reported monthly profits based on the findings that “asking firm owners directly for their 
profits (including using business revenues used to pay household expenses) seems to give a 
more reasonable measure than asking for all the ingredients in terms of detailed revenue and 
expenses” according to de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2007). 
IC variables are calculated by using a similar method as the one applied in dataset 1 and 
also by using the values originally registered by each firm individually. In dataset 2, the mean 
                                                     
42
 The calculation of TFP relies on assumptions such as the functional form of the production technology, 
constant returns to scale and competitive markets for factor inputs. At least two reasons might have influenced 
the decision of McKenzie and Sakho (2010) to deem their dataset to be unfit for the calculation of TFP. One of 
them is that 96 percent of the firms included in the dataset have less than 10 workers (80 percent have less than 
5 workers). The second and most important reason is that their dataset includes firms that are not registered with 
the national tax office which makes them to some extent informal (see footnote 47 for the requirements to be 
considered formal in Bolivia). In fact, only 28 percent of the firms count with a NIT (tax identification number). 
These kind of firms are, therefore, less likely to comply with the assumptions for the calculation of TFP. 
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values of the IC indicators are obtained for each city across firms of the same sector. While 
most of the firm and owners’ variables are self-explanatory, it is worth explaining some of 
those variables. For instance, entrepreneurial self-efficacy (enteff) is the first principal 
component of ten questions intended to measure the self-assessed ability to perform certain 
tasks as explained by McKenzie and Sakho (2010). On a four point scale, owners were asked 
to assess their ability to perform ten business tasks. Among the tasks were: sell a new product 
or service to a new client, hire good employees to expand business, estimate costs of a new 
project, resolve a difficult dispute with a client or supplier in another city, price their business 
correctly if they wish to sell it, and acquire new machinery. In the case of Bolivia, McKenzie 
and Sakho (2010) found that enteff explains more adequately business skills than years of 
education. The correlation between years of education and enteff is 0.03 in dataset 2. Another 
measure worth mentioning is the childhood poverty index (povind) which intends to capture 
family wealth before becoming the owner of a business in line with McKenzie and Sakho 
(2010). The index is the first component of mothers years of schooling, the type of house 
floor when the owner was a child, and the frequency with which the household did not have 
enough to eat when the owner was a child (polychoric command in Stata was used given that 
one of the variables is dichotomous). Finally, additional dummy variables capturing 
motivations for going into business were included (business growth (busgro), flexibility in 
schedules (flehor) or flexibility to care for family (carfam)). The equation below details the 
econometric model used for dataset 2. 
? = 5<788 + |}$5<787 + w$5<786 + x$5<78< + y + { + 
?                   (3.10) 
In addition to robust regressions, sensitivity analyses and functional form 
misspecification tests were conducted. As a sensitivity analysis, the method suggested by 
Escribano and Guasch (2012) that goes from general to specific was used for testing the 
behavior of the investment climate variables. Once the statistically significant variables are 
identified, this methodology progressively eliminates the non-significant variables using joint 
significance tests in order to verify if the statistically significant variables of the original 
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models remain significant after this process. In addition to reduce potential multicollinearity, 
the joint significance tests help to check the robustness of the IC variables identified as 
relevant43. 
In this study, the variables commonly considered as part of the investment climate are; 
political and macroeconomic stability (0 ), competition from the informal sector 
(), corruption (
), infrastructure (

), customs and trade 
regulation (), tax rates and tax administration (J), ease of market entry (	), 
regulation of labor (), access to finance (), functioning of courts (
), and 
crime ()44. Refer to Appendix 3.1 for a detailed list of variables and definitions. 
Below, Tables 3.2 to 3.4 present descriptive statistics for dataset 1. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Productivity Variables (dataset 1) 
Variable Obs Mean    Std. Dev.       Min Max 
Y 502 2851665 1.19E+07 1813.769 2.06E+08 
LW 588 54.70578 113.7384 3 1300 
LC 482 262977.2 1080751 453.4424 1.51E+07 
K 229 1391498 8942817 0 9.67E+07 
M 244 914737.3 3450653 117.0486 3.19E+07 
EC 499 80554.82 397166.9 0 5683144 
OC 510 90976.13 414552.5 0 5804068 
Profit 235 994194.7 4450318 57.91833 5.85E+07 
VA 237 1164941 4957556 1403.858 6.34E+07 
Table 3.3: Sectors (dataset 1) 
Industry: Sector       Freq.     Percent   Cum. 
Food 73 33.49 33.49 
Garments 73 33.49 66.97 
Chemicals 28 12.84 79.82 
Non-metallic mineral products 12 5.5 85.32 
Other manufacturing 32 14.68 100 
Total 218 100  
                                                     
43
 As executed and indicated in chapter 2 (footnote 19), the original models include the main components 
identified in the literature review (investment climate, firm characteristics, owner characteristics along with 
other dummies) and the sensitivity analysis by joint significance tests is applied only to the investment climate 
variables. 
44
 The variables eduworker and transform could be considered part of the investment climate. But, because of 
the way they are measured and because they could be influenced by firms’ behavior, they were not considered 
as part of the IC variables strictly. For example, while one firm could invest in R&D or training for their 
workers, the actions of one firm are less likely to change tax regulation. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics (dataset 1) 
Variable Obs Mean    Std. Dev.       Min Max 
TFP3 208 5.409316 1.219159 -0.1425 8.907779 
stability 613 2.886944 0.484144 0 4 
informal 613 2.657333 0.526183 0 4 
corrupt 613 2.719918 0.541931 0 4 
infrastructure        613 1.514198 0.474338 0 3.5 
trade 611 1.400677 0.497068 0 3 
tax 612 1.501127 0.418658 0 4 
opening 613 1.158879 0.48855 0 4 
labor 612 1.241544 0.486966 0 4 
finance 612 1.654912 0.546461 0 3.5 
eduworker 360 2.819444 0.792134 1 4 
courts 612 0.993419 0.472359 0 4 
crime 613 1.476895 0.467301 0 4 
transform 364 0.499782 0.312608 0 0.834499 
domsupply 362 0.478702 0.376514 0 1 
domsale 612 0.911454 0.237408 0 1 
lnage 612 2.839334 0.789859 0.693147 4.672829 
lnsize 609 3.101153 1.196335 1.098612 7.17012 
domown 612 0.879853 0.309662 0 1 
capacityu 365 0.633452 0.237954 0.05 1 
female 602 0.441861 0.497021 0 1 
yearsexp 609 19.84072 11.91717 0 70 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present descriptive statistics for dataset 2. 
Table 3.5: Sectors (dataset 2) 
Industry: Sector       Freq.     Percent   Cum. 
Manuf. of clothing (wool & cloth)          87 18.71 18.71 
Transportation 96 20.65 39.35 
Grocery stores 91 19.57 58.92 
Restaurants and food sales 98 21.08 80.00 
Manuf of furniture (wood) 45 9.68 89.68 
Manuf. of clothing (camelid wool) 39 8.39 98.06 
Others 9 1.94 100.00 
Total 465 100.00  
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics (dataset 2) 
Variable Obs Mean    Std. Dev.       Min Max 
profit 384 242.8442 846.0619 0 15412.94 
stability 465 2.065763 0.28649 1 3 
informal 465 2.10195 0.40875 1.28 3 
corrupt 465 2.186132 0.439506 1.354839 3 
infrastruc~e        465 1.480045 0.594104 0.75 3 
trade 463 1.118159 0.668944 0 2.5 
tax 465 1.515941 0.400149 0 3 
labor 463 0.940932 0.556982 0 2.142857 
finance 465 1.986862 0.256798 1.59375 3 
opening 441 28.27211 51.20039 0 416 
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eduworker 465 1.274361 0.504207 0.466667 3 
courts 463 1.12167 0.661947 0 2.4 
crime 465 2.366973 0.351271 1.655172 3 
qualinput 451 1.472284 1.162759 0 3 
smallmarket        438 2.047945 0.949519 0 3 
tech 437 1.796339 1.122001 0 3 
transform 461 0.056399 0.230942 0 1 
distancecity 465 8.767721 34.87025 0.073791 242.306 
age 463 13.05616 12.87322 1 119 
size 465 3.486022 5.963278 0 89 
female 465 0.533333 0.499425 0 1 
eduowner 465 9.131183 4.992451 0 24 
moedu 465 0.148387 0.355866 0 1 
enteff 328 -1.17E-09 1 -2.18952 2.31584 
busgro 456 0.910088 0.28637 0 1 
flehor 455 0.81978 0.384794 0 1 
carfam 457 0.824945 0.38043 0 1 
povind 440 0.808458 1.304615 -0.87062 5.702762 
ageowner 461 42.29718 12.05497 18 75 
married 465 0.668817 0.471146 0 1 
Finally, Appendix 3.2 presents a summary of the methodology described in a diagram. 
 
3.4 Results 
The results of the production function estimation suggest that elasticity values are 0.18 
for capital, 0.35 for labor, and 0.54 for raw materials and intermediate goods (see Table 3.7, 
model 1). Models 4 to 6 use total labor cost instead of total number of workers. 
Table 3.7: Production Function (dataset 1) 
 y y va y y va 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
k 0.177***  
(0.0360)        
0.0881***  
(0.0315)         
0.309***  
(0.0461)         
0.146*** 
(0.0309)        
0.0604**  
(0.0292)          
0.204*** 
(0.0466)    
lw 0.353*** 
(0.0725)          
0.217***   
(0.0666)         
0.899***  
(0.101)                                                                                
   
lc 
   
0.376***  
(0.0615)         
0.297***  
(0.0498)         
0.762*** 
(0.0692)    
m 0.541***   
(0.0525)    
0.450*** 
(0.0488)  
0.459***  
(0.0517)     
0.374***  
(0.0439)            
 
ec 
 
0.307*** 
(0.0545)                                
 0.292*** 
(0.0454)                
 
Constant 3.287***   
(0.340)         
2.807***  
(0.256)          
5.409***   
(0.377)         
1.739***   
(0.274)         
1.690***   
(0.233)         
1.426*** 
(0.483)    
Observations 212 212 208 211 211 207 
R-squared 0.882 0.908 0.640 0.897 0.921 0.708    
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Previous estimations in the case of Bolivia, such as Jimenez and Landa (2004), have 
found elasticity values of 0.36 for capital, 0.52 for labor (qualified and non-qualified 
workers), and 0.19 for energy and water costs. The increased elasticity for capital, labor, and 
energy costs in Jimenez and Landa (2004) could be attributed to the fact that the cost of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs is not included in the production function estimation. 
Moreover, Saliola and Seker (2011) conducted estimations of factor elasticity values for 51 
developing countries with Enterprise Surveys data and found that the “average elasticity 
values across countries are 0.10 for capital, 0.46 for labor, and 0.54 for materials” which are 
in line with the findings of this study.  
TFP measurements based on models 1 to 3 of Table 3.7 are summarized in Table 3.8 
below. sa;< will be used as the dependent variable in the subsequent regression analyses. 
Table 3.8: TFP Measurements (dataset 1) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.        Min Max 
TFP1 212 3.287417 .6825865 1.709524    6.211578 
TFP2 212 2.807244 .6039502 1.328503 5.072075 
TFP3 208 5.409316 1.219159 -.1424983 8.907779 
The estimation results for TFP in relation to investment climate using dataset 1 are 
presented in Table 3.945. Findings suggest that the availability of an adequately educated 
workforce has a positive relationship with TFP. Access to finance and competition by the 
informal sector are also statistically significant throughout the models. Higher productivity is 
associated with access to finance (procedures and cost to obtain credit) being assessed as not 
constraining firms’ operations. On the other hand, the evaluation of the informal sector as a 
severe obstacle is associated with higher productivity. Based on data from Schneider, Buehn, 
and Montenegro (2011), the average size of the informal economy in Bolivia was 66.1 
percent for the period 2005-2007. Even by this conservative measure, Bolivia has the largest 
informal sector in Latin America. Therefore, it is probable that most firms, regardless of their 
characteristics, tend to evaluate this aspect as a constraint. At the level of firms’ 
characteristics, the findings suggest that more experience, having better capacity utilization, 
or being foreign owned are related to higher productivity. Finally, conducting R&D, 
                                                     
45
 Before executing the regression analysis, the examination of correlations among all the studied variables 
indicates the existence of weak correlation coefficients. A couple in the order of 0.5 and the rest are much lower. 
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introducing new products and production process () is statistically significant and 
related to higher values of TFP. 
In Table 3.9, Models 5 to 8 present estimation results after a Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) was executed over the investment climate variables. Results suggested the 
retention of three components. Only one of them (1) is statistically significant in all models. 
Principal component 1 ( 1 ) is composed mainly by infrastructure, tax, opening, and 
finance46. The fact that the previous factors are grouped under one component confirms that 
regulations seem to behave in packages as stated by Loayza et al. (2010). For instance, the 
ease of market entry and access to finance are often found as part of what is called product-
market regulations. Lastly, variables representing firms and owners’ characteristics remain 
significant in all models, from 1 to 8. 
The estimations for profits in relation to IC and other variables are presented in Table 
3.10. Findings suggest that absence of corruption and better access to finance are associated 
with higher firms’ profits. Nevertheless, significance is reduced when controlling by 
industrial sector. Other variables that appear strongly statistically significant are firm age, 
firm size and whether or not the firm is foreign or domestically owned. Results indicate that 
more experienced, larger in size and foreign owned enterprises tend to have higher profits. To 
a lower degree, the regulation of market entry and the availability of an adequately educated 
workforce appear as significant in some models. When using only the principal components 
of all IC variables, Principal component 1 (infrastructure, tax, opening, and finance) seems to 
be more consistently associated with higher profits, particularly after joint significance tests 
are conducted. These tests will be discussed later in more detail. Firms’ age, size, and type of 
ownership are not sensitive to the utilization of principal components and remain significant 
in all models. 
Finally, the estimations for profits in relation to investment climate and other variables 
using dataset 2 are presented in Table 3.11. Results suggest that political and macroeconomic 
stability, adequate infrastructure, and ease of market entry regulation are related to higher 
                                                     
46
 Principal component 2 is mainly represented by stability, informal, corruption, and crime while principal 
component 3 is constituted by trade, labor, and courts. 
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profits. At the same time, the consideration of informality as a constraint is also related to 
firms with higher profits (models 1 to 4) 47 . However, the principal components of the 
investment climate variables are not statistically significant in models 5 to 8. The education 
of workers appears to be negatively related to profits. But, this variable is no longer 
significant when considering the principal components of IC (models 5 to 8). Workers with 
low educational levels are commonly found among microenterprises. It is important to bear in 
mind that Dataset 2 is focused on the lower end of the firm size distribution; the total average 
size is 4 employees. To a lesser degree, access to finance, labor and tax regulation appear as 
significant, especially after conducting joint significance tests. At the firms’ characteristics 
level, it is observed that those firms larger in size tend to have higher profits. Among the 
owners’ characteristics, the aspect that appears as statistically significant is entrepreneurs’ 
efficacy throughout all models. In the model including the principal components of IC 
variables (model 8), results suggest that variables such as female, and carfam (motivation for 
starting a business was to care for family), and ageowner are negatively related to profits. 
Also, married owners are associated with higher profits. Most firms in dataset 2 were 
probably not created with the original intention to grow and, therefore, they may not be 
particularly concerned with obstacles imposed by the IC. 
In general, several of the statistically significant variables behave in the same way 
regarding their association with productivity and profitability. For example, the variables for 
firms’ age suggest that as firms accumulate experience, they tend to register higher profits 
and productivity. The variable is not significant in the case of firms smaller in size (dataset 2). 
Reeg (2013) mentioned that the learning process during the survival years might not always 
manifest itself in terms of growth in size, but it can be expressed in terms of higher 
productivity, profitability, and other measures of firm performance.  
Particularly for formal small, medium and large firms, the availability of an educated 
workforce appears as a significant aspect affecting both firms’ productivity and profits. Reeg 
                                                     
47
 To be formal in Bolivia, firms must register with the municipal government (Alcaldia) to obtain a municipal 
business license, with the tax authorities (Servicios de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN)) to get a tax identification 
number (NIT), and with the registry of commerce (Fundempresa). Also, firms with employees must register 
them for health benefits with the National health system (CNS), social security with the pension fund, and 
registering them with the Labor Ministry as detailed by McKenzie and Sakho (2010). 
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(2013) highlighted that workers’ education affect absorptive capacity which, in turn, is 
important for technology adoption and innovation. However, Schmidt (2010) suggested that 
higher levels of innovation may not always lead to higher profitability because firms need to 
cover the cost of R&D without always properly benefiting from patents. At any case, this 
study suggests that a better educated workforce could positively affect productivity and 
profitability via absorptive capacity, efficiency in tasks, better client reach, etc. Moreover, 
Jimenez and Landa (2004) suggested that an adequately educated workforce in Bolivia may 
contribute to increased productivity as long as firms invest in technology and other forms of 
capital accumulation.  
Access to finance has a significant relationship with productivity and profits, 
particularly for dataset 1 (SMEs and large firms). The coefficient for corruption has the same 
sign in all models, but it is only statistically significant in the case of profits in dataset 1. 
Lower levels of corruption can allow SMEs and large firms to have higher profits. In the 
results, informality appears to be a constraint to small, medium and large firms’ productivity 
and to microenterprises’ profits. Foreign owned enterprises display higher productivity and 
profits in the case of small, medium and large firms. For micro and some small enterprises 
(Dataset 2), a better entrepreneur efficacy is strongly associated with higher profits.  
On the other hand, there is an important difference regarding the relationship between 
firm size and productivity as well as profits. Findings suggest a positive and significant 
relationship of firm size on profits. Nevertheless, firm size presents a negative sign, although 
the coefficient is not significant, regarding its relationship with productivity. Enterprise 
Surveys (2013) found evidence that in Latin America, larger firms have higher labor 
productivity, but it is small firms that improved productivity at a higher rate during the last 
decade. Moreover, the study specified that large firms in the region moved from positive 
productivity growth rates to negative growth rates from 2006 to 2010. In addition, Tybout 
(2000) suggested that for narrow sector analyses, it is difficult to find systematic variation 
between labor or capital productivity and firm size. 
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Table 3.9: TFP and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 1) 
 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3  TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability -0.0610 -0.210 -0.210 0.0124 ic1 -0.196*** -0.189** -0.178** -0.160* 
 (0.144) (0.145) (0.148) (0.182)  (0.0740) (0.0732) (0.0825) (0.0873) 
informal 0.288** 0.259** 0.260** 0.227* ic2 -0.0345 -0.0687 -0.0642 -0.0534 
 (0.118) (0.110) (0.111) (0.128)  (0.0617) (0.0605) (0.0625) (0.0645) 
corrupt -0.136 -0.147 -0.148 -0.313 ic3 0.0135 0.00398 -0.00656 -0.0578 
 (0.143) (0.141) (0.141) (0.216)  (0.0611) (0.0618) (0.0688) (0.0771) 
infrastructure -0.182 -0.0774 -0.0772 -0.234      
 (0.173) (0.176) (0.187) (0.215)      
trade 0.183 0.195 0.196 0.125      
 (0.142) (0.148) (0.148) (0.164)      
tax -0.00804 0.161 0.163 0.406*      
 (0.206) (0.199) (0.205) (0.227)      
opening 0.0604 -0.114 -0.114 -0.192      
 (0.159) (0.166) (0.166) (0.185)      
labor -0.165 -0.205 -0.204 -0.296      
 (0.185) (0.170) (0.180) (0.201)      
finance -0.320** -0.335** -0.336** -0.238      
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.132) (0.145)      
courts    -0.157      
    (0.204)      
crime    0.319      
    (0.209)      
eduworker 0.281** 0.249** 0.249** 0.188* eduworker 0.271** 0.254** 0.257** 0.170 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.103) (0.111)  (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.113) 
transform -0.463* -0.502* -0.502* -0.565* transform -0.344 -0.391 -0.398 -0.411 
 (0.279) (0.289) (0.291) (0.304)  (0.263) (0.272) (0.274) (0.274) 
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domsupply  0.0384 0.0390 -0.0405 domsupply  -0.00646 -0.00697 -0.00324 
  (0.225) (0.225) (0.254)   (0.227) (0.228) (0.263) 
domsale  0.367 0.366 0.167 domsale  0.388 0.389 0.217 
  (0.334) (0.336) (0.376)   (0.323) (0.327) (0.367) 
age  0.549*** 0.550*** 0.590*** age  0.527*** 0.521*** 0.537*** 
  (0.142) (0.144) (0.150)   (0.136) (0.136) (0.142) 
size  -0.0664 -0.0666 -0.120 size  -0.0532 -0.0522 -0.101 
  (0.0870) (0.0888) (0.0956)   (0.0854) (0.0870) (0.0935) 
domown  -1.005** -1.004** -1.057*** domown  -0.896** -0.903** -0.937** 
  (0.402) (0.405) (0.375)   (0.402) (0.409) (0.369) 
capacityu  0.669* 0.668* 0.726* capacityu  0.733** 0.742** 0.789** 
  (0.346) (0.348) (0.368)   (0.328) (0.334) (0.359) 
female  -0.160 -0.160 -0.266 female  -0.178 -0.180 -0.272 
  (0.185) (0.187) (0.204)   (0.180) (0.182) (0.191) 
yearsexp  -0.0526 -0.0529 -0.0659 yearsexp  -0.0929 -0.0888 -0.102 
  (0.0952) (0.0957) (0.106)   (0.0923) (0.0920) (0.0993) 
_Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.00909 0.0671 _Iregion_2(LPZ)   0.0967 0.103 
   (0.228) (0.245)    (0.225) (0.239) 
_Iregion_3(SRZ)   -0.00104 0.172 _Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.0798 0.114 
   (0.254) (0.295)    (0.246) (0.269) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant 5.301*** 4.817*** 4.817*** 4.871*** Constant 4.800*** 3.899*** 3.822*** 4.316*** 
 (0.555) (0.983) (1.079) (1.151)  (0.346) (0.826) (0.850) (0.923) 
Observations 201 196 196 196 Observations 201 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.114 0.255 0.255 0.315 R-squared 0.082 0.219 0.220 0.270 
Jointly significant (IC) No Yes No No Jointly significant (IC) No No No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0645 0.0442 0.0552 0.1329 Prob. > chi2 0.0659 0.0593 0.1635 0.3285 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
When eduworker and transform are included as part of the IC, the IC variables are jointly significant in almost all models. 
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Table 3.10: Profit and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 1) 
 lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit  lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability 0.592** 0.0635 0.0989 0.0419 ic1 -0.290*** -0.211*** -0.142 -0.137 
 (0.295) (0.174) (0.174) (0.230)  (0.109) (0.0775) (0.0916) (0.0954) 
informal 0.0690 0.0687 0.0896 0.134 ic2 -0.112 -0.136* -0.0988 -0.102 
 (0.215) (0.112) (0.111) (0.130)  (0.118) (0.0745) (0.0811) (0.0847) 
corrupt -0.866*** -0.457*** -0.435*** -0.290 ic3 0.279** 0.0676 0.117 0.101 
 (0.263) (0.161) (0.160) (0.221)  (0.116) (0.0757) (0.0761) (0.0796) 
infrastructure 0.0166 0.155 0.284 0.175      
 (0.280) (0.169) (0.180) (0.229)      
trade 0.424 -0.0508 -0.0221 -0.160      
 (0.260) (0.161) (0.153) (0.181)      
tax -0.0559 0.279 0.425* 0.444      
 (0.337) (0.229) (0.230) (0.275)      
opening 0.0796 -0.322* -0.267 -0.345*      
 (0.262) (0.174) (0.164) (0.190)      
labor 0.158 -0.0785 -0.0845 -0.315      
 (0.290) (0.189) (0.191) (0.241)      
finance -0.621** -0.363** -0.339** -0.226      
 (0.244) (0.144) (0.144) (0.174)      
courts    0.477*      
    (0.260)      
crime    -0.0332      
    (0.205)      
eduworker 0.200 0.266** 0.276** 0.200 eduworker 0.139 0.268** 0.270** 0.207 
 (0.189) (0.132) (0.134) (0.138)  (0.188) (0.134) (0.136) (0.139) 
transform 1.156** -0.189 -0.146 -0.0817 transform 1.317** -0.164 -0.112 -0.0982 
 (0.510) (0.379) (0.381) (0.403)  (0.520) (0.380) (0.381) (0.392) 
domsupply  0.319 0.375 0.286 domsupply  0.367 0.409 0.326 
  (0.299) (0.299) (0.367)   (0.296) (0.296) (0.365) 
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domsale  0.602 0.576 0.345 domsale  0.537 0.507 0.286 
  (0.451) (0.429) (0.515)   (0.453) (0.434) (0.507) 
visitbytax  -0.0688 -0.0440 -0.129 visitbytax  -0.0651 -0.0451 -0.119 
  (0.213) (0.216) (0.226)   (0.213) (0.215) (0.224) 
age  0.709*** 0.712*** 0.724*** age  0.696*** 0.703*** 0.692*** 
  (0.157) (0.156) (0.163)   (0.151) (0.150) (0.158) 
size  1.278*** 1.259*** 1.232*** size  1.273*** 1.259*** 1.219*** 
  (0.105) (0.106) (0.115)   (0.102) (0.103) (0.111) 
domown  -0.934** -0.953** -0.879** domown  -0.863** -0.860** -0.780** 
  (0.411) (0.395) (0.406)   (0.392) (0.380) (0.362) 
capacityu  0.0809 0.142 0.0839 capacityu  0.238 0.265 0.135 
  (0.386) (0.387) (0.411)   (0.376) (0.374) (0.396) 
female  -0.275 -0.243 -0.216 female  -0.213 -0.178 -0.228 
  (0.206) (0.207) (0.221)   (0.207) (0.210) (0.218) 
yearsexp  0.0161 0.0133 -0.000841 yearsexp  -0.00450 -0.0135 -0.0301 
  (0.122) (0.117) (0.130)   (0.121) (0.117) (0.129) 
_Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.0877 -0.211 _Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.222 -0.228 
   (0.268) (0.282)    (0.263) (0.265) 
_Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.567* 0.498 _Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.284 0.272 
   (0.343) (0.384)    (0.333) (0.350) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant 10.79*** 6.023*** 5.084*** 5.447*** Constant 10.18*** 4.592*** 4.596*** 5.237*** 
 (0.935) (1.160) (1.322) (1.527)  (0.560) (1.012) (1.059) (1.215) 
Observations 227 219 219 218 Observations 226 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.131 0.619 0.628 0.647 R-squared 0.083 0.609 0.615 0.630 
Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes Yes No Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0007 0.0155 0.0422 0.1228 Prob. > chi2 0.0036 0.0137 0.1025 0.1574 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
When eduworker and transform are included as part of the IC, the IC variables are jointly significant in almost all models. 
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Table 3.11: Profit and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 2) 
 
lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
 
lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Independent Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability -1.235* -1.482*** -1.488** -1.507** ic1 -0.206 -0.144 -0.144 -0.124 
 (0.638) (0.559) (0.659) (0.703)  (0.158) (0.151) (0.176) (0.176) 
informal 2.172*** 2.105*** 1.970** 1.993** ic2 -0.105 -0.138 -0.0498 0.00491 
 (0.776) (0.669) (0.784) (0.861)  (0.170) (0.151) (0.179) (0.178) 
corrupt -0.787 -0.645 -0.523 -0.525 ic3 0.0176 -0.0382 -0.0144 0.00406 
 (0.482) (0.420) (0.533) (0.584)  (0.107) (0.0946) (0.112) (0.113) 
infrastructure -1.207*** -1.325*** -1.385*** -1.345***      
 (0.293) (0.252) (0.304) (0.361)      
trade 0.0906 0.157 -0.103 -0.102      
 (0.294) (0.285) (0.311) (0.388)      
tax 1.342** 1.403*** 1.645*** 1.469      
 (0.623) (0.531) (0.600) (0.929)      
labor -0.729* -0.839** -0.538 -0.492      
 (0.419) (0.375) (0.444) (0.460)      
finance -0.887* -0.821* -0.580 -0.581      
 (0.498) (0.445) (0.499) (0.633)      
opening 0.00403*** 0.00261** 0.00214* 0.00221*      
 (0.00146) (0.00116) (0.00125) (0.00127)      
courts    0.0952      
    (0.277)      
crime    0.284      
    (0.960)      
eduworker -1.141*** -1.051*** -0.880** -0.851** eduworker -0.284 -0.250 0.0226 -0.0747 
 (0.293) (0.266) (0.340) (0.384)  (0.228) (0.207) (0.250) (0.254) 
transform 0.387 0.365 0.327 0.336 transform 0.368 0.355 0.474 0.229 
 (0.434) (0.416) (0.427) (0.431)  (0.474) (0.451) (0.409) (0.438) 
qualinput 0.0708 0.0595 -0.00315 -0.000614 qualinput 0.0431 0.0359 -0.0186 -0.0256 
 (0.0587) (0.0536) (0.0634) (0.0641)  (0.0615) (0.0571) (0.0691) (0.0700) 
smallmarket -0.0792 -0.0207 -0.0577 -0.0534 smallmarket -0.108 -0.0445 -0.0532 -0.0920 
 (0.0639) (0.0580) (0.0845) (0.0858)  (0.0696) (0.0628) (0.0847) (0.0908) 
tech 0.0513 0.0317 0.000245 -0.000553 tech 0.0889 0.0701 0.0476 0.00188 
 (0.0668) (0.0582) (0.0663) (0.0670)  (0.0682) (0.0609) (0.0707) (0.0664) 
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lndistancecity  -0.00769 0.0937 0.0893 lndistancecity  0.00124 0.0792 0.0870 
  (0.0971) (0.0973) (0.0986)   (0.0945) (0.0953) (0.0973) 
age  0.000615 0.00627 0.00622 age  0.00163 0.00467 0.00757 
  (0.00438) (0.00577) (0.00576)   (0.00420) (0.00539) (0.00549) 
lnsize  0.775*** 0.648*** 0.644*** lnsize  0.791*** 0.710*** 0.683*** 
  (0.0812) (0.103) (0.105)   (0.0854) (0.108) (0.108) 
female   -0.437** -0.434** female   -0.264 -0.392* 
   (0.207) (0.208)    (0.207) (0.211) 
lneduowner   -0.219* -0.212 lneduowner   -0.158 -0.209 
   (0.130) (0.129)    (0.124) (0.126) 
enteff   0.172** 0.170** enteff   0.213*** 0.205*** 
   (0.0708) (0.0712)    (0.0752) (0.0735) 
busgro   0.411 0.406 busgro   0.226 0.327 
   (0.250) (0.253)    (0.250) (0.267) 
flehor   -0.191 -0.190 flehor   -0.205 -0.182 
   (0.187) (0.189)    (0.181) (0.187) 
carfam   -0.233 -0.229 carfam   -0.276* -0.384** 
   (0.158) (0.159)    (0.158) (0.165) 
povind   -0.0305 -0.0288 povind    -0.0797 
   (0.0634) (0.0641)     (0.0680) 
ageowner   -0.0127* -0.0120 ageowner    -0.0174** 
   (0.00750) (0.00779)     (0.00768) 
married   0.265* 0.262* married    0.358** 
   (0.152) (0.153)     (0.159) 
_Iregion_2(CBBA) 0.364 0.470 0.520 0.606 _Iregion_2(CBBA) 0.193 0.253 0.273 0.306 
 (0.349) (0.309) (0.345) (0.396)  (0.239) (0.228) (0.264) (0.280) 
_Iregion_3(LPZ) 1.260*** 1.503*** 1.546*** 1.540*** _Iregion_3(LPZ) 0.00505 0.0534 0.288 0.227 
 (0.477) (0.421) (0.501) (0.586)  (0.274) (0.246) (0.274) (0.276) 
_Iregion_4(SRZ) 1.701*** 1.737*** 1.779*** 2.023** _Iregion_4(SRZ) 0.102 0.00554 0.135 0.254 
 (0.547) (0.498) (0.546) (0.809)  (0.424) (0.400) (0.471) (0.495) 
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.219*** 6.213*** 6.460*** 5.624** Constant 5.185*** 3.931*** 4.166*** 5.134*** 
 (1.270) (1.191) (1.314) (2.683)  (0.549) (0.514) (0.738) (0.814) 
Observations 303 301 206 206 Observations 303 301 218 206 
R-squared 0.251 0.416 0.530 0.531 R-squared 0.143 0.317 0.390 0.432 
Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Jointly significant (IC) No No No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob. > chi2 0.6153 0.7357 0.8772 0.8955 
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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In addition to the inclusion of several variables and the PCA analyses, other sensitivity 
analyses were conducted to support the findings. For example, two input methods were 
executed for the missing observations of variables used in the calculation of TFP in dataset 1. 
With the aim of increasing the number of observations, the first method calculated ratios of 
sales to capital, intermediate goods, and other costs. Then, median values of those ratios were 
obtained within each 4 digit level ISIC code. Finally, values of capital, intermediate goods, 
and other costs were estimated based on the information of the ratios and sales. The second 
method conducted a linear interpolation/extrapolation. This method was also conducted 
within a 4 digit level ISIC code. Results for the latter are presented in Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
in Appendix 3.3. Because dataset 2 is not used to calculate TFP, no input procedure was 
implemented. Overall, the results are robust to this sensitivity analysis. 
In addition, functional form misspecification tests were conducted and the results are 
summarized in Appendix 3.4. A Ramsey RESET test and a Link test were executed on all 
models that use Principal Components Analysis for the IC variables. The results of the tests 
by both methods suggest that there are no functional form misspecification problems. 
Appendix 3.5 summarizes the results of the Principal Components Analysis for investment 
climate variables in dataset 1 and dataset 2. It is worth noting that with two different datasets 
of the same country, the PCA analysis suggests the retention of three components in the 
investment climate variables. Moreover, several variables contribute more strongly to the 
same component in both datasets. For instance, trade regulation, labor regulation and 
functioning of courts belong to exactly the same component in both datasets. Finance and 
ease of market entry also contribute to the same component. Corruption, informality and 
crime behave in a similar way. These results contribute to findings where it is suggested that 
regulation is interrelated. 
Finally, and as robustness checks, joint significance tests were conducted. Based on the 
methodology described by Escribano and Guasch (2012), this study tested the joint 
significance of investment climate variables that did not appear as statistically significant in 
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the models. The analyses were executed by levels considering; owners’ characteristics, firms’ 
characteristics, investment climate, and other variables. In every step, if the analyzed 
variables were determined to be not significant as a group, they were eliminated from the 
model after conducting complementary functional form misspecification tests. The tests and 
results of this process are detailed in Appendix 3.6. In general, the findings suggest that the 
variables which were previously found as statistically significant continue to be so after 
excluding the non-significant variables. Moreover, the investment climate variables that 
remain in the models are all jointly statistically significant. There is only one exception 
corresponding to the case of profits and IC variables in micro and small enterprises (PCA for 
IC in dataset 2). The results of the estimations, after joint significance tests were carried out, 
are presented from Tables 3.12 to 3.14. Even though robust regressions were used in all 
models, heteroskedasticity tests are also provided in Appendix 3.7. Lastly, an instrumental 
variables procedure was explored, but no significant results were found. All the process and 
results of the IV procedure, including the calculation of an ethnic fractionalization variable 
for Bolivia, are presented in Appendix 3.8. 
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Table 3.12: TFP and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 1) – After Joint Significance Tests 
   TFP3 TFP3    TFP3 TFP3 
Independent Vars.   (3) (4) Independent Vars.   (7) (8) 
informal   0.114 0.0556 ic1   -0.206*** -0.180** 
   (0.0994) (0.108)    (0.0710) (0.0714) 
finance   -0.377*** -0.325***      
   (0.114) (0.122)      
eduworker   0.261*** 0.183* eduworker   0.258** 0.180* 
   (0.0977) (0.103)    (0.100) (0.105) 
transform   -0.540** -0.572** transform   -0.478* -0.536** 
   (0.256) (0.262)    (0.257) (0.259) 
age   0.454*** 0.461*** age   0.472*** 0.467*** 
   (0.115) (0.119)    (0.118) (0.122) 
domown   -0.818** -0.818** domown   -0.744** -0.756** 
   (0.345) (0.329)    (0.338) (0.316) 
capacityu   0.682** 0.643* capacityu   0.727** 0.727** 
   (0.317) (0.338)    (0.306) (0.328) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant   4.302*** 4.508*** Constant   3.822*** 4.316*** 
   (0.650) (0.662)    (0.850) (0.923) 
Observations   204 204 Observations   201 201 
R-squared   0.198 0.239 R-squared   0.193 0.237 
Jointly significant (IC)   Yes Yes Jointly significant (IC)   Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2   0.0039 0.0296 Prob. > chi2   0.0042 0.0123 
IC + eduworker, transform   Yes Yes IC + eduworker, transform   Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2   0.0002 0.0016 Prob. > chi2   0.0007 0.0025 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 3.13: Profit and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 1) – After Joint Significance Tests 
  
 lnprofit lnprofit    lnprofit lnprofit 
Independent Vars.   (3) (4) Independent Vars.   (7) (8) 
corrupt   -0.363*** -0.233* ic1   -0.223*** -0.219*** 
   (0.129) (0.135)    (0.0678) (0.0729) 
opening   -0.130 -0.277*      
   (0.127) (0.153)      
finance   -0.335*** -0.237*      
   (0.123) (0.133)      
courts    0.270      
    (0.169)      
eduworker   0.228* 0.173 eduworker   0.227* 0.176 
   (0.127) (0.126)    (0.132) (0.129) 
age   0.719*** 0.689*** age   0.684*** 0.643*** 
   (0.122) (0.126)    (0.121) (0.126) 
size   1.221*** 1.180*** size   1.270*** 1.202*** 
   (0.0939) (0.101)    (0.0946) (0.100) 
domown   -0.909*** -0.902** domown   -0.850** -0.818** 
   (0.350) (0.355)    (0.372) (0.350) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant   7.109*** 6.920*** Constant   5.325*** 5.803*** 
   (0.782) (0.824)    (0.709) (0.716) 
Observations   230 229 Observations   227 227 
R-squared   0.626 0.645 R-squared   0.614 0.634 
Jointly significant (IC)   Yes Yes Jointly significant (IC)   Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2   0.0002 0.0050 Prob. > chi2   0.0012 0.0029 
IC + eduworker   Yes Yes IC + eduworker   Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2   0.0003 0.0097 Prob. > chi2   0.0022 0.0080 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 3.14: Profit and Investment Climate Variables (dataset 2) – After Joint 
Significance Tests 
 lnprofit  lnprofit lnprofit 
Independent 
Variables (4) 
Independent 
Variables (7) (8) 
stability -1.525** ic1 -0.185 -0.146 
 (0.597)  (0.156) (0.155) 
informal 1.744*** ic2 -0.0306 -0.00171 
 (0.634)  (0.164) (0.164) 
infrastructure -1.369*** ic3 -0.0283 -0.0239 
 (0.251)  (0.103) (0.104) 
tax 1.549***    
 (0.527)    
labor -0.722**    
 (0.314)    
finance -0.952**    
 (0.405)    
opening 0.00209*    
 (0.00114)    
eduworker -0.778*** eduworker 0.00174 -0.00920 
 (0.280)  (0.238) (0.244) 
lnsize 0.663*** lnsize 0.682*** 0.669*** 
 (0.0866)  (0.102) (0.101) 
female -0.357** female -0.321* -0.336* 
 (0.170)  (0.185) (0.183) 
enteff 0.201*** enteff 0.210*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0648)  (0.0696) (0.0692) 
carfam -0.224* carfam -0.305** -0.347** 
 (0.133)  (0.144) (0.146) 
ageowner -0.00860 ageowner  -0.00788 
 (0.00533)   (0.00599) 
married 0.180 married  0.250* 
 (0.136)   (0.136) 
industry dummies Yes industry dummies  Yes 
Constant 6.131*** Constant 4.044*** 4.224*** 
 (1.143)  (0.542) (0.572) 
Observations 242 Observations 241 239 
R-squared 0.476 R-squared 0.371 0.378 
Jointly significant (IC) Yes Jointly significant (IC) No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0000 Prob. > chi2 0.6928 0.8084 
IC + eduworker Yes IC + eduworker No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0000 Prob. > chi2 0.7550 0.8595 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
80 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This study assessed the association of the investment climate with firm performance. Firm 
performance was evaluated with TFP as an economic measure and profits as a financial 
measure using two datasets separately. Dataset 1 comes from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys and mainly covers small, medium, and large enterprises (upper side of the firm size 
distribution). Dataset 2 uses the World Bank Microdata Library’s Survey of Enterprise 
Productivity and is representative of micro and some small enterprises (the lower side of the 
firm size distribution). This allows a balanced assessment of the Bolivian firm sector. 
After considering the main constraints of the investment climate that Bolivian firms 
have to face, as detailed in the literature review, the empirical models were structured and 
each one of the involved variables was calculated. To avoid simultaneity bias, this study 
implemented a method that considers the mean value of investment climate assessments 
within each 4 digit level ISIC code. In addition to IC, the estimations consider a wide array of 
variables related to owners and firms’ characteristics. Principal Components Analysis for the 
IC variables was also explored and used for executing the estimations. 
Findings suggest that access to finance, conducting transformational activities (R&D, 
introducing new products and new production processes), and an adequately educated 
workforce are strongly associated with higher productivity. Longer experience in the market 
(and not necessarily larger size), better capacity utilization, and foreign ownership are also 
related to higher TFP. These findings might have particular relevance for formal small, 
medium, and large enterprises as they were obtained from the analysis of dataset 1.  
The analysis of profits was conducted both with dataset 1 and dataset 2. Results for 
formal small, medium, and large enterprises highlight the relationship between profits and 
better access to finance, a streamlined regulation of market entry as well as less corruption. 
For microenterprises, it seems that political and macroeconomic stability along with better 
infrastructure, labor regulation, and access to finance are associated with higher profits. The 
analysis of both datasets indicates that larger firms tend to have higher profits. While foreign 
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ownership is related to higher profits in formal small, medium and large enterprises, it is the 
entrepreneurs’ efficacy that has a positive relationship with profits in microenterprises. 
Adequately educated workforce and market entry regulation present different signs 
between dataset 1 and dataset 2 in the case of profits. These results are reasonable because 
these datasets analyze opposite ends of the firm size distribution. While an educated 
workforce and streamlined market entry regulation are expected to be important concerns for 
formal small, medium and large enterprises, these two aspects are less likely to be identified 
as constraints by most microenterprises captured in dataset 2. Evaluations of informality and 
tax regulation as constraining aspects of the investment climate are associated with 
microenterprises displaying higher profits. However, the principal components of investment 
climate variables in the case of microenterprises are not jointly statistically significant. 
Several firms in dataset 2 were probably not created by entrepreneurs seizing an opportunity, 
seeking better performance, or growth in their businesses. Therefore, it is possible that those 
firms might not be particularly concerned with obstacles imposed by the IC. 
One of the limitations of the study of investment climate and firm performance at the 
country level is the scarce availability of good quality data. While firm level surveys 
conducted by the National Statistical Institute of Bolivia do not make an assessment of 
investment climate variables, there are small sample sizes and high attrition rates (particularly 
for variables such as capital) in publicly available firm level databases provided by 
institutions such as the World Bank Group. Better quality data captured over longer periods 
of time (longitudinal data) may allow more sophisticated measurements of productivity. In 
turn, sector specific studies could enable more accurate findings. Also, future studies could 
benefit from analyzing causal relationships and the impact of reforms differentiated by 
sectors. 
The study showed that certain aspects of the investment climate are important for better 
firm performance. Reforms of the investment climate should consider impacts differentiated 
by size and sector. Nevertheless, there appear to be aspects that are common to different firm 
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performance measures and firm size. For example, the availability of a well educated 
workforce and access to finance, among others. The main obstacles identified by firms in 
Bolivia indicate that given political and macroeconomic stability, firms start to focus on 
issues more relevant for firm performance. At the same time, it seems that there is still ample 
room for improving internal organizational and institutional aspects of firms in Bolivia. For 
instance, the study found that foreign owned firms tend to be more productive. As firms 
address internal issues and strive to be more competitive, it is possible that additional light 
would be shed upon more specific aspects of the investment climate that need reform. 
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Chapter 4  
Investment Climate and Business Performance: An Empirical Analysis of 
Latin America with Firm Level Data 
4.1 Introduction 
Even though Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is a quite diverse region of the world, it 
has some common cultural, social, political and economic characteristics. For instance, at the 
economic level, the region has been growing for an extended period of time, but the pace of 
growth is slow and makes the region poorer in comparison to developed countries and peer 
countries which are growing faster in other regions of the world. One of the causes that has 
been repeatedly highlighted as stifling economic development in the region is the limited 
improvement of productivity as mentioned by Astorga (2010), Busso et al. (2012), H. L. Cole, 
Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz (2005), Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010), Ibarrarán et al. 
(2009), International Labour Organization (2013), Levy (2014), OCDE/CEPAL/CAF (2013), 
Pages (2010a). 
Productivity and its growth is generally attributed to improvements in factors of 
production such as capital and labor as well as processes or inputs used by firms as suggested 
by Busso et al. (2012), Parente and Prescott (2000). In addition, Banerjee and Duflo (2005), 
Busso et al. (2012), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) contributed to the increasing evidence that 
productivity growth is also affected by the allocation of resources across firms; productive 
resources should move from low productivity firms to high productivity firms. At any case, 
there seems to be an agreement that factors of production are mainly affected by barriers, or 
distortions in the investment climate which prevent the betterment of productivity as 
underlined by the above mentioned studies along with Bastos and Nasir (2004), H. L. Cole et 
al. (2005), Dethier et al. (2010), Dollar et al. (2005), Escribano and Guasch (2012), 
Fafchamps (2010), Hall and Jones (1999), Ibarrarán et al. (2009). 
Consequently, this study attempts to make a contribution to the body of literature on the 
relationship of productivity, as well as other measures of business performance, with 
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investment climate. While there are a number of studies addressing the issue of productivity, 
Busso et al. (2012), Ibarrarán et al. (2009) mentioned that research related to LAC is scarce, 
focused on a few countries, and based on data from different sources which may not use the 
same methodologies and collection times. Furthermore, few of them make an in-depth 
analysis of the investment climate, specifically. A related work to this study was conducted 
by Dollar et al. (2005) considering four countries in Asia48, and to some degree Escribano 
and Guasch (2012) which considers four countries in Central America49. To the extent of the 
literature review, there are no studies exploring the relationship of investment climate and 
business performance using an empirical methodology and comparable data for the LAC 
countries analyzed in this study. Enterprise Surveys50 (ES) data collected in the years 2006 
and 2010 for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay is 
used in this research.  
Results suggest that the investment climate matters, and this study tries to determine 
which aspects of the investment climate are related to higher productivity and other firm 
performance measures to guide efforts for reform, or future research. The following section 
reviews relevant literature studying some of the interactions among economic growth, 
productivity, and investment climate. After describing the data and the methodologies in 
section 4.3, results are presented and discussed in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
The LAC region has been consistently growing over the last decade while some inequality 
indicators have improved. The average growth rates of GDP for the period 2003-2013 
registered values of 5.1, 3.7, and 3.6 percent for the eight countries analyzed in this study, for 
developing countries in the region, and for the entire region, respectively51 . Moreover, 
                                                     
48
 The study was based on random surveys in Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan. 
49
 The analysis used information for Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (2001 and 2002) and Costa Rica 
(2002, 2003 and 2004); however, they only had information on investment climate variables for a single year. 
50
 Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World Bank. 
51
 World Development Indicators. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
85 
 
between 2003 and 2012, the people at the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution in 
LAC saw their incomes increasing at an average growth rate per year of around 5 percent 
which is the highest among all regions of the world as mentioned by Cord, Genoni, and 
Rodriguez Castellan (2015).  
Nevertheless, growth rates of GDP are not high enough and this makes the region 
increasingly poor compared to developed nations and peer countries that are growing faster in 
other regions of the world. As Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010) mentioned, “it is well 
known that Latin America income per capita grows systematically more slowly than in the 
rest of the world [sic].” For example, in the period 1950-2000 “no Latin American country 
has made any significant progress in catching up to the United States” whereas a number of 
East Asian countries (that had initial income levels similar or lower than countries in the 
LAC region in 1950) have made “substantial catch-up” as found by H. L. Cole et al. (2005). 
Furthermore, Busso et al. (2012) determined that in “1955, GDP per capita in Latin America 
relative to the US was 28 percent. In 2005, it was 19 percent.” Also, Cord et al. (2014) found 
evidence of stagnation or even reversal (Mexico and some Central American countries) in the 
reduction of inequality in the region for the period 2010-2012.  
Additionally, a persistent problem with the distribution in the quality of education and a 
more adverse macroeconomic scenario with less favorable terms of trade as stated by Cord et 
al. (2014), present severe challenges for the region and for the wellbeing of their vulnerable 
sectors in particular. Therefore, sluggish progress is not enough to secure sustainable 
development in the LAC region. 
 
4.2.1 Economic Growth and Productivity 
Economic growth and the differences in income per capita across countries are 
explained to a large extent by differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as underlined by 
Aiyar and Dalgaard (2005), Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010), Landmann (2004), Saliola 
and Seker (2011), among others. Landmann (2004) highlighted that sustained TFP growth 
 has allowed developed nations to eradicate mass pov
became more relevant since the seminal work of Solow in 1957, and 
defined it as the efficiency of a firm for converting inputs into outputs. 
Farrell (1957) highlighted that this efficiency is based both on the ability to ma
of a set of inputs and on the ability to use the inputs in optimal proportions considering prices 
and technologies. 
Unfortunately, the LAC region registers 
the improvements over time 
Labour Organization (2013), OCDE/CEPAL/CAF (2013), Pages (2010a)
region’s productivity gap is even more severe when analyzed by sectors. 
demonstrates that average annual growth of labor productivity has lagged behind East Asia 
and developed economies particularly in the period 1975
services sectors. A similar situation is found for the period 1990
industry and services sectors. 
Figure 4.1: Labor Productivity 
Source: Pages (2010a) 
Furthermore, Figure 4.2 
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that even though LAC’s labor productivity has been increasing, the rate of its improvement is 
low compared to the rates of improvement displayed in regions such as East Asia, or Central 
and South-Eastern Europe.  
Figure 4.2: Labor Productivity in Europe, East Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Source: International Labour Organization (2013) 
Astorga (2010) analyzed the six largest economies of LAC for the period 1900-2004 
and estimated that had the investment in machinery and equipment (factor accumulation) 
been 5.5 percent per year higher over the century, it would have produced an extra 1.2 
percentage points of GDP per head growth per year (“a more than two-fold increase in real 
income for the average Latin American by 2000”). However, Daude and Fernández-Arias 
(2010) conducted a study covering the period 1960-2005 and suggested that low growth in 
GDP could largely be “attributed to a negative gap in TFP growth, rather than to differences 
in the pace of factor accumulation.” In other words, even though the efforts for factor 
accumulation were not so distant from the rest of the world (except East Asia until around 
1997), TFP in the LAC region has consistently been growing at a much slower rate than in 
other growing regions and countries of the world. While the LAC region is not converging to 
the production possibility frontier52, the rest of the world (East Asia, and countries with 
similar incomes in 1960) has been following a convergent pattern. Furthermore, Daude and 
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 Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010) consider United States as the frontier. 
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Fernández-Arias (2010) estimated that LAC’s productivity is about half its potential53, and 
stated that the slow growth of productivity is widespread across LAC countries, except for 
Brazil and Chile which exhibited some degree of convergence. 
Machicado, Rioja, and Saravia (2012) established that “low agricultural productivity 
delayed the beginning of the industrialization process in Paraguay and Bolivia by about 100 
years” compared to Chile; however, in the long run, it is the non-agricultural sector what 
determines the speed of convergence54. On the side of countries close to the technological 
frontier and with adequate economic conditions, De Michelis, Estevão, and Wilson (2013) 
suggested that “concerns about slow TFP growth may be less pressing as long as labor 
growth remains strong.”  It is worth noting that the great recession originated around 2007, 
slowed growth rates of GDP in the LAC region, but it seems that it did not severely 
influenced growth of TFP in the region vis-à-vis the rest of the world55. 
 
4.2.2 Productivity and Resource Misallocation 
In addition to the ability of making the best use of a set of inputs, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2005), Busso et al. (2012), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) highlighted that productivity growth is 
also affected by the allocation of resources across firms. Busso et al. (2012) explained that in 
a constraining investment climate, productive firms are “smaller than they would be in an 
undistorted economy” which, in turn, lowers aggregate TFP. Daude and Fernández-Arias 
(2010) added that along with impediments to technological improvement at the firm level, it 
is also important to assess the impediments in the economy to allocate productive factors to 
the most productive firms. The extensive misallocation found by Busso et al. (2012) in the 
LAC region is “a symptom of lack of fair competition for resources.” Productivity and good 
quality products are crucial to determine the global competitiveness of firms in the region, as 
pointed out by Levy (2014), OCDE/CEPAL/CAF (2013).  
                                                     
53
 The researchers calculated “what would have been the evolution of LAC income per capita if its historical 
production inputs had been applied with US productivity at each point in time?” It is a thought experiment 
despite the potential indirect effects between factor accumulation and productivity growth. 
54
 Study considered Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. 
55
 The region had enjoyed almost a decade of favorable terms of trade. 
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4.2.3 Productivity and Investment Climate 
As Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010) expressed, it seems clear that one of the main 
challenges of the LAC region is to close the productivity gap. Variations in the investment 
climate across locations can explain to a large extent variations in firm-level productivity as 
indicated by Bastos and Nasir (2004), Dollar et al. (2005), Hall and Jones (1999), Nina and 
von Vacano (2006), Parente and Prescott (2000). The World Bank (2005) defined the 
investment climate as “the set of location specific factors shaping the opportunities and 
incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand.”  
The study of institutional arrangements intensified since the last quarter of the past 
century and it is often studied at the intersection of economic history and economic theory. 
The microeconomics of institutions had an early focus on agrarian institutions. Main insights 
came from game theory and contract theory, and only a part of it was empirical, as mentioned 
by Besley and Jayaraman (2010). Most of the evidence support fair competition as an 
important factor for productivity improvement. On the other hand, Raybaut and Sosthe 
(2002) stated that economists such as Joseph Schumpeter overemphasized monopolistic 
structures. However, Raybaut and Sosthe (2002) believed that the previous emphasis 
overshadowed the fact that institutional and organizational behavior allowing some firms to 
have higher technological and commercial efficiency than others, was, in the words of 
Schumpeter, “absent in the cases of pure competition and pure monopoly.” Moreover, Arena 
and Paul-Marie (2002) stated that the focus on major innovations as source of productivity 
improvement, do not generally consider alternative sources such as learning by doing, 
learning by using, and other cumulative changes that also play a role in technological change. 
H. L. Cole et al. (2005) found that lowering competition reduces productivity, a view 
that dates back at least to the work of Adam Smith in 1776. For example, a firm fails to 
produce at the minimum cost when a government impedes the entry of more efficient firms in 
order to protect low-efficiency producers who support the government politically. H. L. Cole 
et al. (2005), in accordance with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008b), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), argued that political elites are often found 
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among the leading groups preventing competition in Latin America, and provided evidence 
that the LAC region has more barriers than successful countries in Europe and Asia.  
Additionally, the allocation of resources did not always follow the best interests of 
productivity and economic growth. For example, Bardhan (2010) argued that in “South 
America, in contrast with many parts of North America, property rights in land were often 
bestowed on people who were politically influential but not necessarily good farmers.” In 
conclusion, Busso et al. (2012) mentioned that in a well-functioning economy, more 
productive firms should be able to expand their production, hire more labor and deploy 
capital, and win markets; nevertheless, it is possible that an inadequate investment climate 
distorts the “allocation of resources across firms, reducing the output that can be attained with 
existing capital and labor” in the LAC region. 
Busso et al. (2012) stated that most of the evidence analyzing the investment climate is 
focused on developed economies. Some of the main factors within the investment climate 
influencing the productivity gap and other measures of firm performance are; infrastructure, 
availability of financial capital (liquidity constraint), ease of market entry, training, high cost 
of adjusting and building up the workforce, macroeconomic stability, corruption, crime, 
corporate governance, intensity of innovation, quality certification, barriers to trade (tariffs, 
quotas, or multiple exchange systems), informality, tax regulations, presence of large 
subsidized state-owned enterprises, and location advantages, among others as stated by 
Adhikari and Yamamoto (2007), Astorga (2010), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 
(2010), Besley and Jayaraman (2010), Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004), Busso et al. (2012), H. L. Cole et al. (2005), Escribano and Guasch (2012), 
Ibarrarán et al. (2009), Levy (2012), Nina and von Vacano (2006), Pfefferman, Kisunko, and 
Sumlinski (1997). These factors were classified as international competitive barriers, and 
domestic barriers by H. L. Cole et al. (2005). 
Among the above mentioned factors, there are some that deserve particular attention. 
For example, one of the factors that was frequently mentioned and analyzed more in-depth 
for the region was the regulation of the labor market. H. L. Cole et al. (2005), Heckman and 
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Pagés (2003), Kaplan (2008) suggested that the overall cost of LAC labor market regulations 
are similar to those incurred in OECD countries. These costs are mainly destined to provide 
job security measures rather than social security. Specifically, H. L. Cole et al. (2005) 
established that LAC has higher dismissal costs than Europe, Asia, or the United States which 
constrains productivity and adaptation of new technologies as well as reallocation of workers 
from less productive to more productive enterprises. Given the existence of large informal 
sectors in the region, in practice, labor regulation benefits only a reduced sector of the 
working population. Betcherman (2014) found that labor regulation could have an equalizing 
effect among covered workers, but groups like youth, women, and the less skilled are found 
to be disproportionately outside coverage and benefits. If coupled, for example, with clear 
targets of employment generation, making labor regulation more flexible in the region could 
bring positive impacts.  
Other recurrent factors associated with productivity gaps are the financial markets and 
tax regulations. For instance, Busso et al. (2012) mentioned that “financial markets in Latin 
America are underdeveloped and leave many firms underserved.” In addition, Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) explained that distortions in the financial markets benefit and divert resources 
to low productivity firms which could be better used for the expansion of high productivity 
firms. Regarding tax regulation, Busso et al. (2012) made a comprehensive analysis of the 
LAC region and concluded that “high taxes and poor enforcement creates strong incentives 
for tax evasion.” Furthermore, several tax collection agencies tend to strengthen enforcement 
over the most visible enterprises, large firms. Large firms have higher labor productivity, but 
it is small firms that are improving productivity at a faster rate as stated by Enterprise 
Surveys (2013) 56 . Noncompliance with taxes by micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) is equivalent to a subsidy to some less productive firms as noted by Busso et al. 
(2012). In spite of the tax burden, it is expected that the most productive firms in the region 
comply with the tax regulation.  
Last but not least, the regulation of trade is frequently cited among the factors 
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 Unfortunately, large firms moved from positive productivity growth rates to negative ones from 2006 to 2010. 
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constraining productivity. H. L. Cole et al. (2005) advocated for the elimination of trade 
impediments such as quotas. More productive firms, in need of more and better resources, 
could be constrained by trade regulations when expanding abroad, receiving supplies, or 
making investments in technology. Economic integration in the LAC region has suffered 
several setbacks through the years because of frequent and abrupt political changes as 
highlighted by Basnet and Sharma (2013)57. Trade regulation is analyzed in more detail here 
because this study focuses part of its analysis on a sector related to the Textile and Clothing 
(TC) industry. The Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) regulated trade in TC from 1974 until 
1994. In 1995, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) replaced MFA and established 
the gradual removal of quotas by 2005 as indicated by Keane and te Velde (2008). The 
elimination of the quota system in 2005 contributed to reduced trade protection and reduced 
opportunities for firms with lower marginal productivity of capital and labor to find refuge. 
Therefore, countries have fewer incentives to rely on lower wages, for example, to remain 
competitive and make up for lower productivity as stated by Dollar et al. (2005). In fact, 
South American countries have been facing increased competition from leading TC exporting 
countries since the 1990s according to Terra (2003). 
H. L. Cole et al. (2005) stated that the most relevant factors in the investment climate 
must work through TFP and need to have been in place for a relatively long period of time. 
Even though “long-run determinants of economic success are factors that are changing slowly 
over time” as stated by Hall and Jones (1999), it is expected that these factors present 
variability in their characteristics across countries. 
 
4.2.4 Wages, Profits and Investment Climate 
In addition to productivity, this study explores the relationship between average wage 
rates and gross profit per employee with the investment climate. As the perceptions of 
investment climate change across locations, their influence on firm performance is not only 
                                                     
57
 The authors claim that efforts date back to 1960 when the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
going through several 1990s regional trade agreements such as MERCOSUR to the currently more than 14 trade 
agreements in the region.  
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circumscribed to improvements in productivity. Streamlined investment climates that are 
conducive to higher productivity can also allow employees and business owners to harvest 
benefits in forms of higher wages and profits. 
Dollar et al. (2005) stated that a relevant assumption for executing the above mentioned 
analysis is that labor markets are competitive and labor does not move across and within 
countries in the region. These are strict assumptions; nevertheless, labor markets in Latin 
America are still far from being adequately integrated as it will be discussed in section 4.3.2.2. 
Dollar et al. (2005), McKenzie and Sakho (2010), Reeg (2013) highlighted that firm 
characteristics such as size, adequately educated workforce, and age, among others, are 
determinants of wages and profits. Dethier et al. (2010) explained that for countries in the 
middle of the per capita income range, crime and corruption show as important constraints. 
As countries overcome basic limitations of infrastructure, finance, and stability, firms can 
change the focus of their concerns towards more administrative or bureaucratic issues. The 
pervasive effects of corruption in administrative or bureaucratic issues might be stronger over 
frequent or daily activities that define revenues. On the other hand, while investment 
decisions on capital and technology could also be affected by corruption, these activities are 
executed with less frequency. 
This study does not call for the elimination of all regulation. It is certain that a number 
of regulations in the investment climate are in place to secure standards of social protection, 
working conditions, product quality, enhanced incentives to innovate and invest, etc. 
Furthermore, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) found that regulation could 
have a positive impact when it is adequately and consistently enforced.  
In addition, if preferential support to some sectors or industries is unavoidable, at least 
it must be associated with clear targets for the improvement of productivity, employment, or 
other firm performance measures that justify the support of specific firms. te Velde (2013) 
stated that support to capitalists “must be conditioned towards increasing productivity and 
upgrading, in order to be beneficial for industrial policies.” Subsequently, support could be 
eliminated progressively, such that supported firms would eventually be able to compete in 
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an investment climate free of distortions.  
Burgess (2010) highlighted that the “challenge for the future is to identify precisely 
which elements of the industrial environment are important for encouraging industrialization 
and growth in a changing world.” This study attempts to analyze the relationship between 
productivity and other firm performance indicators, and the investment climate along with 
other explanatory variables such as firms’ characteristics, city population, and distance to 
markets, among others. One contribution of this study is to determine what aspects of the 
investment climate are associated with higher productivity, average wage rates and gross 
profit per employee to guide efforts for reform and future research.  
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
As previously mentioned, evidence for LAC is scarce, focused on a few countries, and based 
on data from different sources which may not use the same methodologies and collection 
times. Busso et al. (2012), in a study from the Department of Research of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, highlighted that “only a subsample of countries in Latin America collects 
establishment-level data and, of those, even a smaller number make data available to 
researchers.” This study uses data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys which provides 
firm-level data of representative samples in an economy and it covers performance measures 
as well as an ample range of investment climate indicators as described by Enterprise Surveys 
(2014). In most countries in the LAC region, comparable surveys were conducted in 2006 
and 2010 covering the non-agricultural economy of the main cities and surrounding business 
areas. Enterprise Surveys (2014) indicated that all “surveys share a common instrument. They 
also used a similar sample design involving the selection of a stratified random sample of 
establishments from each country.” The importance of counting with standardized 
comparable information for these kind of studies was highlighted by Escribano and Guasch 
(2012), Ibarrarán et al. (2009)58.  
The limitation of the data is that it is focused on firms with more than 5 employees 
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 Their research had to use data from 2003 which probably constrained their use of a wider array of variables. 
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which belong to the formal sector. This is relevant given the large informal sector and the 
large share of microenterprises in the LAC region. However, there are no adequate datasets 
covering microenterprises, or the informal sector for all the studied countries. Finally, another 
limitation is that panel data is composed of around 20 percent of the surveyed firms (those 
firms surveyed in both periods of time). Nonetheless, the used database constitutes the best 
source considering the purposes of this study. Data cleaning was conducted including a post-
estimation of outliers’ procedure for all major variables.  
 
4.3.1 Estimation of Total Factor Productivity 
Reeg (2013) highlighted the challenges of considering the impact of different factors at 
different times on heterogeneous groups of firms. To address this concern, this study 
conducts its analysis for firms in the same sector (four digit level ISIC Code). The analysis of 
the data suggests that the sector with the highest number of observations is ISIC 1810; 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, except animal fur apparel59. This sector is followed by ISIC 
1541 (manufacture of bakery products) and ISIC 2520 (manufacture of plastic products) each 
with substantially fewer observations. The survey follows a stratified random sample 
procedure which indicates the economic importance of the sector with the largest number of 
observations60 in the region. Furthermore,  Adhikari and Yamamoto (2007), Keane and te 
Velde (2008) indicated that TC industry has been important in economic and social terms. 
For example, in the short run, it provides employment, especially for women61, and in the 
long run, it provides an opportunity, given low market entry barriers, to enhance dynamic 
effects and to foster industrialization. Moreover, in a recent study, Rodrik (2013) found 
unconditional convergence in labor productivity within manufacturing industries62 .  The 
possibility of conducting the analysis for a separate sector constitutes an advantage of this 
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 United Nations (2002) 
60
 In addition, Escribano & Guasch (2012) highlighted the importance of “keeping as many observations as 
possible to benefit from the law of large numbers and the central limit theorems.”  
61
 The authors pointed out that while TC industry provides higher wages in comparison to agriculture or 
domestic services, there is bias against women in terms of working conditions and remuneration within TC. 
62
 The author does not find aggregate convergence potentially because of the small share of manufacturing 
employment in low-income countries. 
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study over studies such as Escribano and Guasch (2012) who suggested the procedure but 
could not implement it because of data limitations. Lastly, Dollar et al. (2005) underlined that 
by pooling data across countries, it can be assumed that the analyzed sectors (ISIC 1810 for 
productivity) would be in the same cone of diversification in all the studied countries. In 
other words, the analyzed sector would expand in all economies as an adequate investment 
climate allows the accumulation and proper allocation of productive resources. This is a 
plausible assumption given the role of TC industry in most processes of economic 
development and industrialization described by Keane and te Velde (2008) and also given the 
common occurrence of shifts of labor from agriculture to other sectors, such as TC, as 
economies grow. 
With ISIC 1810 selected, the next step was to analyze the data available for the region 
to decide on the countries for inclusion in the estimations. Based on Astorga (2010), Dollar et 
al. (2005), the selection criteria was to consider countries within the LAC region with relative 
economic importance and homogeneity in the sector for analysis. Issues such as the share of 
exports, imports, and economic growth were explored to help select the countries. For 
example, it was found that there is a distinctively higher economic relevance of TC industries 
in Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama compared to 
most countries in South America. In addition, countries like Mexico may also exhibit 
distinctively different behavior given its trade agreements and proximity to major markets in 
North America. Appendix 4.1 provides more detail about the selection process. As a result of 
this process, the countries selected for this study are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 
Foster et al. (2008), Giroud (2013), Van Beveren (2012) explained the calculation of 
TFP using a Cobb-Douglas production function to determine the predicted output. 
Subsequently, the difference between the actual output and the predicted output is obtained. 
Value added (/) is the amount of sales (g) minus the cost of intermediate (b) inputs and 
electricity (c). The estimated coefficients of capital (5i) and labor (5j) are obtained from 
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equation 4.1. Then, these coefficients are used in equation 4.2. Models assume price-taking 
firms where technology is embodied in factors of production as explained by Boldrin and 
Levine (2008), Lucas (1988), Vollrath (2015). Lower case letters represent variables in 
logarithm. 
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                   sa;? = /? = g? − 5=7i h? − 5=7j `? − 5=7k b? − 5=7l c? 
sa;? = /? − 5=7i h? − 5=7j `? 
%+-$ = ($ − $ − ..$                                                         (4.2) 
Several methods were used for calculating TFP. Escribano and Guasch (2012) 
determined that to obtain reliable empirical investment climate effects, “robust empirical 
results using several productivity measures” should be found. Consequently, this study 
conducted estimations of TFP by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalized 
Estimated Equation (GEE), Random Effects (RE), Fixed Effects (FE), Levinsohn and Petrin 
(LP), and a non-parametric method (Stochastic) considering only one sector at the four digit 
level ISIC code.  
In the case of the estimation by OLS, pooled data was used and the procedure does 
not need further explanation. For the panel data estimations by GEE, RE, and FE, robust 
cluster estimators were used for the last two. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) built upon the 
study of Olley and Pakes (1996) for developing a method “conditioning out serially 
correlated unobserved shock to the production technology.” The method of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) relied on the variable investment to control the potential correlation between input 
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levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity process; however, investment is a variable 
with limited availability in firm-level data. Additionally, Escribano and Guasch (2012) 
emphasized the requirement of at least two years of firm level data on investment. Thus, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) developed a method which uses intermediate inputs, a variable 
more commonly available in datasets. This study uses the LP method with value added and 
considering electricity as the proxy. Lastly, the non-parametric approach (Stochastic) is 
useful for strongly unbalanced panel data and requires the standard assumption of free 
disposal and constant returns to scale as stated by Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010), 
Ibarrarán et al. (2009)63.  
 
4.3.2 Investment Climate and Firm Performance 
Investment climate variables are constructed as city averages based on previous studies 
such as Dollar et al. (2005), Escribano and Guasch (2012). The average representation of a 
city can help to obtain measurements of investment climate that avoid simultaneity bias and 
may represent more accurately the overall assessment of the investment climate in a location. 
For instance, less productive firms could evaluate the investment climate in a less favorable 
way while more productive firms may interpret the investment climate as more favorable in 
certain aspects. In addition, some sectors may have to face more constraining regulation in 
comparison to others. Therefore, a city average across sectors may provide a more accurate 
assessment. There are 30 cities from eight different countries in the sample. Two sets of 
investment climate variables were constructed. In the first set, in the case of productivity, city 
averages were calculated considering all sectors except the analyzed sector (ISIC 1810) 
which was excluded in order to further reduce potential simultaneity bias. The second set, 
used for the study of wages and profits, calculated city averages considering all sectors. The 
investment climate (_ ) includes the following variables; political stability (0 ), 
                                                     
63
 As a robustness check, several measurements of capital were used. In addition to the standard variable of net 
book value of machinery, vehicles, and equipment after depreciation, two other measures were used. One of 
them includes the value of land and buildings and the other alternative tested is based on the estimated re-
purchase value of machinery. Results do not present significant variation. 
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electricity and transportation ( 

 ), competition from the informal sector 
(), corruption (
), customs and trade regulation (), tax rates and tax 
administration (J), business licensing and permits (	), labor regulations (), 
availability of financial resources for firms’ operations (), functioning of courts 
(
 ), and crime, theft and disorder ( )64 . It is important to highlight that all 
investment climate measures, except finance which is based on an objective indicator, reflect 
the degree to which a certain aspect of the investment climate constitutes an obstacle to the 
operations of an establishment65.  
The analyses of the investment climate and firm performance are made for the full 
sample and also for a sample containing only those private firms that are domestically owned 
and have less than 100 employees (MSMEs). The cut-off of 100 employees was taken 
because it is the most common threshold for defining an MSME in middle and low income 
countries according to Gonzales et al. (2014). The cut-off of 100 employees is also in line 
with the average threshold for defining an MSME in the eight analyzed countries included in 
this study66. Additionally, Dollar et al. (2005) mentioned that the city averages indicators of 
investment climate will be exogenous as long as the most productive firms do not concentrate 
in those cities that have favorable investment climates. Even though firm mobility in Latin 
America might not be common practice, analyzing only those firms that are hundred percent 
domestically owned and are not so big in size, allows for a sample that has less probability of 
choosing their location based on an evaluation of investment climate conditions in different 
cities. In accordance with the data characteristics and the literature review, all variables are 
used in their logarithmic forms. 
 
                                                     
64
 An aspect that was not included as part of the investment climate in this study are the institutional 
arrangements that encourage cooperation in organizational networks, also called transformational in other 
studies. Data related to this aspect was not collected in the 2006 version of the survey. 
65
 Lower values indicate that a regulation or other particular aspect of the investment climate does not represent 
an obstacle to firms’ operations. Conversely, higher values indicate the variable represent an obstacle. 
66
 The methodology described by Gonzales et al. (2014) considered different sectors and variables as used in the 
national MSME definitions in order to obtain single values for each threshold (micro, small, medium and large). 
The average value for the MSME threshold in the eight analyzed countries is 128 employees. 
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4.3.2.1 Productivity and investment climate 
The final estimations relate the firm performance measurements (TFP, average wage 
rate, and gross profit per employee) to investment climate (vector |}$) variables along with 
firms’ characteristics (vector w$ ) and others (vector x$ ). The equation below is the 
econometric model for the analysis of TFP and investment climate. 
sa;? = 5=<8 + _?5=<7 + ?5=<6 + ?5=<< + 
?                                   (4.3) 
It is expected that the regulation of labor, tax, trade and finance will appear as 
significant given the evidence found in the literature review. For instance, Bartelsman et al. 
(2010), based on an analysis of Latin America and Europe and Central Asia, suggested that 
medium and large firms could be affected more severely by “stringent labour regulations and 
skill shortage, as well as by cumbersome tax administration and custom procedures.” 
Consequently, more robust results are expected for the sample including large firms than for 
the sample including only domestic MSMEs. On the contrary, medium and large firms are 
expected to be less constrained by crime, corruption, informal competition, and finance.  
Dethier et al. (2010) mentioned that access to finance is often cited among the most 
severe constraints; however, Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2006) found that access to 
finance is “particularly problematic for less productive firms.” Infrastructure is another aspect 
commonly found as relevant in similar studies. Dethier et al. (2010) determined that 
infrastructure has a significant impact on enterprise productivity, electricity being the most 
severe constraint. Furthermore, Escribano and Guasch (2005) estimated that infrastructure 
explains 9 percent of firm-level productivity in a detailed study for Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua. Bartelsman et al. (2010) indicated that poor infrastructure (transport and 
electricity) seems to be more constraining to the operations of large firms in particular.  
It is also expected that firms’ characteristics such as a better educated workforce, better 
capacity utilization and more experience in the market will have a positive influence on 
productivity. 
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4.3.2.2 Wages, profits and investment climate 
Subsequently, estimations were executed for average wage rates (1), and gross profit 
per employee (_) considering all sectors. Average wage rates were calculated as 
total labor cost (including wages, salaries, bonuses, etc.) in the last fiscal year divided by the 
number of full time employees (permanent and temporary). In turn, gross profit per employee 
was calculated as total annual sales minus total annual labor cost and total annual cost of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs. Below, equations 4.4 and 4.5 specify the econometric 
models. 
1? = 5==8 + _?5==7 + ?5==6 + ?5==< + ?                                   (4.4) 
_? = 5==8 + _?5==7 + ?5==6 + ?5==< + ?                           (4.5) 
Dollar et al. (2005) stated restricted labor mobility and capital outflows as important 
assumptions for these models. Geographical barriers (long distances, ecosystems, etc.), and 
cultural reasons (lack of mobility), among other factors, still restrict to some extent the ease 
of labor movement across countries in the LAC region67. Nevertheless, most of the analyzed 
countries registered rather low levels of limitation to capital outflow (except Argentina) as 
detailed in the results of Schindler (2009). At any case, capital mobility is less likely to 
happen when considering the second sample of domestic MSMEs. Also, Dollar et al. (2005) 
cautioned that not all sectors would expand rapidly in the presence of an adequate investment 
climate because of competitive advantage. To account for this, sector dummies are included 
in the models.  
To the extent of the literature review, evidence pointing to specific aspects of the 
investment climate in relation to wages and profits found limited results. Commander and 
Svejnar (2007) did not find a significant effect of their cost of finance variable on revenue in 
a dataset for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Bartelsman et al. (2010), based on an analysis 
of Latin America and Europe and Central Asia, found that medium and large businesses are 
relatively less affected by finance (access and cost), crime, corruption and the informal sector. 
                                                     
67
 For instance, Rodriguez Vignoli (2004) mentioned that migration intensity among LAC countries is, in 
general, low compared to high-income countries. 
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Fafchamps (2010), with evidence from Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Africa, stated that 
courts play a less important role in the functioning of markets, in general, than it is often 
assumed. But, this study considers the functioning of courts as a necessary requisite in the 
investment climate, and it is included in all the estimations of firm performance. 
On the side of the variables that are often mentioned as significant, it is expected that 
firm characteristics will positively influence both average wage rates and profit per employee. 
For example, Dollar et al. (2005) found that worker and firm characteristics are highly 
significant determinants of wages. McKenzie and Sakho (2010), in a study of Bolivia, found 
that larger firms with higher capital stock tend to register higher profits. Hallward-Driemeier 
et al. (2006) found corruption has a strong influence on sales growth in the case of China. 
Reeg (2013) highlighted that older firms have been exposed to learning processes which 
allows them to generally display better firm performance. Also, Reeg (2013) stated that an 
important element for more innovative and better performing firms is to count with an 
adequately educated workforce because it increases absorptive capacity. On the other hand, 
Schmidt (2010) argued that high levels of innovation do not always lead to higher 
profitability as the costs of R&D need to be covered. In this study, it is expected that higher 
educational levels in the workforce positively influence profits and wages because of better 
absorptive capacity, client reach, and execution of tasks, among others.  
Table 4.1 below presents descriptive statistics for the main variables. Appendix 4.2 
presents a list of variables and their summary description. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Y 689 2688857 8066210 2737.085 1.09E+08 
L 689 111.3904 249.218 0 2100 
K 689 845801 8805140 0 1.76E+08 
M 689 1148029 3366678 0 3.79E+07 
E 689 32185.5 117291.5 0 1360281 
VA 689 1508643 5280598 604.5713 8.65E+07 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
age 689 20.48911 14.96547 2 127 
eduworker 689 3.301887 0.708347 1 4 
capacityu 689 0.728955 0.20244 0 1 
stability 689 1.936096 0.48934 0.950549 2.869792 
infrastructure 689 1.54942 0.2007 0.475309 2.098592 
informal 689 2.129869 0.291799 1.375887 2.694149 
corrupt 689 2.125076 0.438076 1.123595 3.015244 
trade 689 1.198944 0.304664 0.457364 1.68993 
tax 689 1.863574 0.383392 1.051948 2.497934 
opening 689 1.337827 0.244095 0.713235 1.688822 
labor 689 1.657676 0.365579 1.043269 2.5 
finance 689 20.2075 6.830276 4.243902 29.56513 
courts 689 1.340536 0.356768 0.642105 2.289855 
crime 689 1.564287 0.146674 1.316708 2.070423 
d_market 689 5941.872 1876.861 3100 8900 
d_port 689 180.7257 249.0699 0 1000 
population 689 6873831 4410891 518200 1.56E+07 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 presents the results for the estimations of the production function. Except for 
models 5 and 6, the rest of the models provide coefficients that are close in value to each 
other. One of the main reasons for the discrepancy in values is that the estimations for models 
5 and 6 (FE and LP) are based only on the firms with data for both periods of time (balanced 
panel). Only around 20 percent of the observations count with data for both periods. In 
addition, Cameron and Trivedi (2009) pointed out that coefficients tend to approach in value 
(particularly RE and FE) for cases in which T (periods of time) is large. Appendix 4.3 
presents more detail as for the potential reasons behind the differences in the value of the 
coefficients. It is worth noting that the coefficients for capital and labor in model 7 (non-
parametric approach) are similar to the estimates in models 1 to 4. These findings are in line 
with the results found by  Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010).  
Dollar et al. (2005) mentioned that “the higher return to capital, other things equal, 
should lead to faster accumulation and growth for the typical firm” in sectors that are 
expanding. In this first stage, the estimated coefficients are useful for calculating TFP which 
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will be used in the subsequent analyses. 
Table 4.2: Production Function Estimation Results 
 va va va va va va va 
Ind. Vars. (1) 
(OLS) 
(2) 
(GEE) 
(3) 
(RE) 
(4) 
(RE) 
(5) 
(FE) 
(6) 
(LP) 
(7) 
(Stochastic) 
k 0.254*** 0.248*** 0.233*** 0.300*** 0.0810 0.0166 0.220*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0314) (0.0327) (0.0416) (0.0597) (0.0931) (0.0307) 
l 0.800*** 0.799*** 0.809*** 0.794*** 0.648*** 0.557*** 0.800*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0463) (0.0458) (0.0873) (0.208) (0.0612) (0.0435) 
BOL*k    -0.0453    
    (0.0631)    
CHI*k    -0.0202    
    (0.0560)    
COL*k    -0.126***    
    (0.0389)    
ECU*k    -0.0932    
    (0.0724)    
PAR*k    0.0678    
    (0.159)    
PER*k    -0.109**    
    (0.0479)    
URU*k    -0.116    
    (0.0795)    
BOL*l    -0.343*    
    (0.195)    
CHI*l    0.00303    
    (0.164)    
COL*l    0.153    
    (0.111)    
ECU*l    0.0138    
    (0.204)    
PAR*l    -0.508    
    (0.464)    
PER*l    0.0669    
    (0.128)    
URU*l    0.230    
    (0.246)    
Constant 6.951*** 6.999*** 7.126*** 7.153*** 9.383***  8.106*** 
 (0.295) (0.259) (0.281) (0.275) (0.991)  (0.328) 
Observations 674 674 674 674 674 669 674 
R-squared 0.629    0.161   
Number of idpanel  591 591 591 591  591 
lnsigma2 
_cons 
      2.014 
(1.934) 
ilgtgamma  
_cons 
      2.321 
(2.015) 
mu 
_cons 
      -6.857 
(19.48) 
eta 
_cons 
      -0.153 
(0.160) 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 4.3 presents the results for the main estimation. Models 1 to 4 provide results 
for the full sample and models 5 to 8 show the results when considering only domestic 
MSMEs. Overall, several aspects of the investment climate seem to be associated with higher 
TFP. Results suggest that investment climate variables such as tax regulation, finance, labor 
regulation, and trade regulation, in particular, have a significant relationship with TFP.  
Before proceeding with the analysis of the statistically significant variables, the 
existence of positive signs in some investment climate variables deserves some explanation. 
Negative signs in the coefficients of all investment climate variables were expected. However, 
labor, infrastructure, trade, and corruption present positive signs. There are some reasons 
that could explain finding positive signs in these variables.  
First, the issues that the variables represent are particularly constraining for the LAC 
region compared to other regions of the world. Consequently, most firms across the region 
will tend to exaggerate when they evaluate those variables as a constraint. Meyer and 
Vandenberg (2013) found that LAC along with Middle East and North Africa are by far the 
two regions in the world where labor regulation is considered a severe constraint68. Calderon 
and Serven (2010), Perrotti (2011) determined the existence of an infrastructure gap in the 
LAC region compared to other industrial and developing regions69. For example, in terms of 
quantity, Calderon and Serven (2010) found that the LAC region has fallen behind not only 
East Asia but also the rest of middle income countries in electricity generation capacity and 
road density. Furthermore, the authors found that “road density is below the LAC-wide norm 
in the Andean countries and in the Southern Cone 70 . In contrast, road density in the 
Caribbean is similar to that of East Asia.” In the case of regulation of trade, Duran Lima, 
Lafleur, and Pellandra (2011), Mejido Costoya, Utting, and Carrión (2010) mentioned that 
the LAC region has been moving from protectionism to more open trade regimes in the last 
                                                     
68
 In an index where more severe constraints are represented by higher values, LAC has an index of 19.93 
whereas OECD countries and all countries in the world have indexes of 10.15 and 12.01, respectively. 
69
 Perrotti (2011) established that “LAC would need to spend 7.9% of GDP annually (again, assuming 3.9% 
average annual GDP growth) between 2006 and 2020” to reach the levels of per capita infrastructure stock of 
the selected East Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong) by 2020. 
70
 The authors defined Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay as the Southern Cone. 
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five decades71. However, practical aspects of this regulation may represent severe constraints. 
The monopoly or monopsony power exercised by traders, high number of days to clear 
shipments, high monetary cost of complying with all the procedures, etc. are examples of 
practical constraints imposed by trade regulation. Francis, Amin, and Rodriguez Mesa (2014) 
found that firms in the LAC region spend more time dealing with regulations than firms in 
other developing regions72. They also found that small Caribbean countries, which tend to 
rely more on trade, spent less time dealing with regulations. Lastly, corruption still seems to 
be widespread in most LAC countries as stated by Canache and Allison (2005), Margolis 
(2015), The Economist (2015). 
Second, bearing in mind that some firms manage to operate and be productive despite 
the above constraints, it is important to remember that investment climate variables are 
evaluations made by firms as to the degree that each variable represents a constraint to their 
operations. The investment climate variables that are statistically significant and have 
positive signs could be signaling areas for improvement. The investment climate variables 
that are statistically significant and have negative signs represent the aspects that are strongly 
related to having more productive firms. Thus, these aspects could be considered as priority 
conditions for allowing firms to operate and be more productive.  
Returning to the variables that show stronger statistical significance in the analysis, it 
was mentioned before that tax regulation, finance, labor regulation, and trade regulation have 
a significant relationship with TFP.  
A negative sign for finance and tax suggest that business friendly regulations of tax 
and finance tend to be evaluated as not constraining towards firms’ operations, and they are 
related to higher productivity in firms. Since the variable finance represents whether or not 
firms count with capital for conducting their operations, a negative sign indicates that an 
investment climate where firms count with readily available capital for conducting their 
operations could be associated with having more productive firms. In turn, tax rates and tax 
                                                     
71
 Mejido Costoya (2011) mentioned that in the last decade trade has been articulated attempting to combine 
solidarity principles with more orthodox market-oriented approaches. 
72
 Francis et al. (2014) specified that the time spent dealing with regulations has actually increased in 12 out of 
15 countries sampled in 2006 and 2010. 
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administration that do not constitute a constraint in the investment climate are related to 
higher productivity levels. If tax regulation is not identified as a constraint by most 
productive firms, it is an area where efforts for enforcement will not affect most productive 
firms, but it could positively influence productivity overall because it will put the pressure for 
complying on less productive firms. With stricter tax compliance, there is an incentive to 
liberate productive assets from less productive firms. 
While firms with higher productivity tend to be associated with investment climates 
where availability of finance and tax regulation are not identified as constraints, higher 
productivity is also associated with constraining labor and trade regulations. As discussed 
before, the LAC region has some of the most demanding labor regulations in the world. 
Therefore, rather than suggesting that firms with higher productivity are to be found in 
investment climates with severe regulation of labor, the results indicate that this is an area 
where improvement is demanded. Likewise, the regulation of trade is an area identified with 
statistical significance as a constraint to higher productivity. There is some evidence that 
trade regulation is important, but some firms manage to be productive despite regulation 
being a constraint. For example, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) found that scale efficiency 
gains are small and not correlated with trade liberalization. Wong (2009) analyzed trade 
openness and productivity in Ecuador and found a positive and significant relationship 
between trade openness and export oriented manufacturing industries in the years after 
reforms (mid 1990s), but decreased productivity after 2000. The study argued that increased 
aggregate productivity could be the result of most productive firms producing output and 
slight increases in own-plant’s productivity. 
Informality and infrastructure appear to have a less consistent and lower statistically 
significant relationship with productivity. Informal appears to have larger coefficients for the 
sample considering only domestic MSMEs whereas the association of infrastructure and 
productivity has higher coefficients for the full sample which includes larger enterprises. 
Based on data from Schneider et al. (2011) where estimates for the size of the informal 
economy in 162 countries are provided, it was found that from the eight analyzed countries in 
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this study only Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay register sizes of informal economies that are 
larger than the world average. 
Firm characteristics have a statistically significantly strong relationship with 
productivity. Those firms with more experience in the market, with workers registering 
higher average educational attainment, and with better capacity utilization display higher 
productivity. Among the country dummies, Peru shows itself consistently significant across 
the analyzed models. Peru has probably taken more advantage and developed a distinctive 
textile industry based on indigenous and Andean designs.   
The joint significance of investment climate variables was tested in all models, and 
the results indicate that all investment climate variables are jointly statistically significant. 
Additionally, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) procedure was conducted over the 
investment climate variables. The results suggest the retention of three principal components 
which are also jointly statistically significant. Results are not included for the sake of brevity. 
Furthermore, results are also robust to different measurements of TFP, to the inclusion 
of additional control variables, and to the estimation over two sets of samples (a full sample 
and a sample including only domestically owned firms with less than 100 employees)73. 
These results are in line with the findings of Escribano and Guasch (2012) who stated that “it 
does not matter what particular TFP measure is used or what particular estimation procedure 
is considered, as long as we are controlling or conditioning on the relevant firm level 
investment climate information.” In addition, the previous findings suggest that an industry’s 
potential (in this case, apparel) to contribute to long-run growth and development depend not 
only upon the firms’ characteristics, but also on investment climate adequacy confirming the 
observations of Keane and te Velde (2008). 
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 In addition, the analysis was executed considering only firms with more than 10 employees (most common 
threshold for microenterprises both in the sample and in the world) and less than 50 employees (most common 
threshold for small enterprises both in the sample and in the world) results presented were broadly maintained. 
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Table 4.3: Productivity and Investment Climate (ISIC 1810: Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel) 
 Full sample Only domestic MSMEs 
 tfp_re tfp_lp tfp_lp tfp_stch tfp_re tfp_lp tfp_lp tfp_stch 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
stability -3.872 -3.494 -4.129 -3.878 -2.028 -2.249 -2.833 -2.059 
 (3.318) (3.671) (3.675) (3.320) (3.174) (3.312) (3.223) (3.158) 
infrastructure 1.680* 2.752** 2.788** 1.735* 1.390* 2.060** 2.190** 1.427* 
 (0.958) (1.132) (1.102) (0.961) (0.843) (1.031) (0.941) (0.843) 
informal -4.210* -4.629* -5.810** -4.284* -5.314* -3.130 -5.916** -5.337** 
 (2.536) (2.672) (2.688) (2.529) (2.717) (2.816) (2.747) (2.709) 
corrupt 2.831 0.351 1.934 2.778 1.651 -0.0383 1.626 1.650 
 (3.727) (3.700) (3.781) (3.712) (4.205) (4.014) (4.024) (4.181) 
trade 1.392* 2.098*** 2.498*** 1.449** 1.314 1.728** 2.301*** 1.368* 
 (0.729) (0.738) (0.767) (0.728) (0.826) (0.806) (0.818) (0.824) 
tax -5.658** -9.082*** -8.964*** -5.833** -5.009* -7.755** -7.782*** -5.149* 
 (2.720) (3.269) (3.073) (2.724) (2.731) (3.240) (2.936) (2.728) 
opening -1.985 -2.412 -2.634* -2.012 -1.683 -1.696 -2.224 -1.706 
 (1.434) (1.551) (1.515) (1.431) (1.529) (1.519) (1.520) (1.524) 
labor 7.635** 12.12*** 11.78*** 7.837*** 8.513*** 10.34*** 11.45*** 8.651*** 
 (3.034) (3.758) (3.432) (3.033) (3.203) (3.997) (3.445) (3.197) 
finance -2.588* -3.939** -3.816*** -2.648* -2.112 -3.022** -3.147** -2.160* 
 (1.353) (1.537) (1.457) (1.352) (1.301) (1.484) (1.329) (1.296) 
courts -2.241 -3.405 -3.016 -2.280 -1.810 -3.112 -2.802 -1.857 
 (1.850) (2.208) (2.069) (1.848) (1.767) (2.174) (1.935) (1.762) 
crime -1.938 -1.496 -1.877 -1.922 -2.426 -0.831 -1.707 -2.386 
 (1.841) (2.032) (1.790) (1.831) (2.087) (2.336) (2.008) (2.075) 
distance_market -1.943 -2.667 -2.415 -1.955 -1.465 -1.876 -1.723 -1.469 
 (2.593) (2.598) (2.612) (2.580) (2.577) (2.506) (2.431) (2.555) 
distance_port 0.0684 0.0141 0.0472 0.0675 0.00478 -0.0161 -0.00177 0.00455 
 (0.0701) (0.0775) (0.0774) (0.0701) (0.0646) (0.0683) (0.0665) (0.0642) 
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population 0.0672 0.124 0.0126 0.0646 -0.227 0.0626 -0.233 -0.229 
 (0.318) (0.339) (0.334) (0.317) (0.310) (0.334) (0.309) (0.308) 
age 0.172***  0.375*** 0.182*** 0.221***  0.317*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0651)  (0.0742) (0.0651) (0.0750)  (0.0796) (0.0749) 
eduworker 0.215***  0.217*** 0.216*** 0.244***  0.204*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0599)  (0.0647) (0.0597) (0.0687)  (0.0705) (0.0685) 
capacityu 0.193*  0.320** 0.201* 0.279**  0.319** 0.282** 
 (0.113)  (0.137) (0.113) (0.114)  (0.128) (0.115) 
BOL -0.201 0.336 0.390 -0.179 0.541 -0.276 0.578 0.535 
 (1.370) (1.419) (1.426) (1.362) (1.388) (1.391) (1.346) (1.377) 
CHI -2.303 -3.411 -3.024 -2.342 -1.605 -2.614 -2.146 -1.624 
 (2.179) (2.666) (2.544) (2.185) (1.959) (2.457) (2.210) (1.956) 
COL 1.246 3.195 3.514 1.363 2.830 2.752 4.184** 2.901 
 (2.175) (2.167) (2.251) (2.162) (2.084) (1.881) (1.896) (2.057) 
ECU 0.196 2.377* 1.721 0.271 0.700 1.693 1.627 0.743 
 (1.195) (1.300) (1.241) (1.185) (1.275) (1.222) (1.172) (1.260) 
PAR -1.643 -1.085 -1.343 -1.633 -0.736 -1.203 -1.003 -0.754 
 (1.490) (1.703) (1.611) (1.486) (1.491) (1.633) (1.514) (1.484) 
PER 3.016** 5.781*** 5.861*** 3.156** 3.486** 4.241*** 5.302*** 3.574** 
 (1.281) (1.467) (1.338) (1.273) (1.415) (1.593) (1.384) (1.405) 
URU -1.124 -2.373 -1.658 -1.152 -0.154 -2.167 -1.113 -0.196 
 (1.823) (2.174) (2.076) (1.826) (1.627) (1.970) (1.796) (1.623) 
Constant 32.79 46.95* 44.50* 33.27 30.82 36.88 39.20 31.16 
 (24.87) (25.57) (25.01) (24.76) (25.28) (25.71) (23.99) (25.09) 
         
Observations 635 674 635 635 489 520 489 489 
Number of idpanel 560 591 560 560 441 468 441 441 
Jointly significant (IC vars) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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In Table 4.4, the analysis turns to the results of the estimations executed for average 
wage rates, and gross profit per employee. In general, the assessment of the regulation of 
trade as a serious constraint is associated with firms that have higher average wages and 
profits per employee. The behavior of this variable is similar to the one described in the case 
of productivity. Given that trade regulation (along with labor regulation, infrastructure and 
corruption) is evaluated as a severe constraint compared to other regions, it is expected that 
this variable shows a positive sign. This variable is statistically significant both in the full 
sample and in the sample with domestic MSMEs. Some firms manage to have higher wages 
and profits despite this constraint, but the argument that should not be missed is that the 
productivity, wages and profits are low (and growing slow) compared to other growing 
regions in the world. Are those constraining regulations protecting uncompetitive and self-
satisfied firm owners? This study argues that tackling these constraints could contribute to 
foster the catching up process of the LAC region.  Ease of market entry seems to be related to 
higher profits per employee. The variables representing firms’ characteristics are all 
statistically significant and with the expected signs. Enterprises with more experience, larger 
in size, with better educated workers, and better capacity utilization are associated with 
higher average wages and higher gross profits per employee across all models and samples. 
In this case, additional variables such as distance to ports and distance to markets appear to 
be significant in some models. It seems that being close to major ports is related to lower 
average wages, particularly for the sample including large firms. Port cities are more likely to 
face competitive pressures and deregulation which, in some cases, may lead to lower wages 
and longer working hours74. On the other hand, being close to a major market (United States 
of America) seems to have a positive influence in gross profits per employee. It is possible 
that firms located close to major markets tend to be relatively bigger in size. Lastly, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Paraguay appear to have lower wages and profits than the other analyzed 
countries, especially for larger firms. 
                                                     
74
 However, He (2003) based on an analysis of foreign manufactures in China suggested that “a lower wage is 
not attractive if it is associated with lower labour productivity.” 
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Table 4.4: Average Wage Rates and Gross Profit per Employee in Relationship to Investment Climate (all sectors) 
 Full sample Only domestic MSMEs 
     profit_emp profit_emp     profit_emp profit_emp 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability -0.463 0.210 -0.198 0.150 -0.181 0.370 0.0657 0.259 
 (0.856) (0.838) (1.094) (1.069) (0.874) (0.855) (1.177) (1.159) 
infrastructure -0.0826 -0.137 0.141 0.0268 -0.155 -0.180 0.109 0.0460 
 (0.265) (0.259) (0.324) (0.312) (0.290) (0.284) (0.357) (0.343) 
informal 0.139 0.325 1.171 1.362 -0.899 -0.499 0.196 0.561 
 (0.754) (0.735) (1.030) (1.007) (0.828) (0.810) (1.157) (1.143) 
corrupt 1.351 0.785 1.939* 1.591 0.934 0.558 1.226 0.947 
 (0.840) (0.813) (1.162) (1.150) (0.885) (0.859) (1.227) (1.218) 
trade 0.827*** 0.829*** 0.851** 0.947*** 0.666** 0.683** 0.808** 0.894** 
 (0.259) (0.250) (0.358) (0.341) (0.289) (0.281) (0.390) (0.376) 
tax -0.327 -0.111 -1.000 -0.687 0.565 0.654 0.159 0.197 
 (0.760) (0.740) (0.975) (0.943) (0.856) (0.842) (1.097) (1.081) 
opening -0.688 -0.627 -1.471** -1.487** -0.544 -0.505 -1.260* -1.260* 
 (0.469) (0.458) (0.608) (0.600) (0.523) (0.519) (0.663) (0.655) 
labor -0.347 -0.384 0.266 0.124 -0.114 -0.257 0.584 0.378 
 (1.124) (1.092) (1.403) (1.371) (1.274) (1.247) (1.580) (1.557) 
finance -0.254 0.0267 -0.611 -0.492 -0.0117 0.228 -0.311 -0.259 
 (0.465) (0.452) (0.590) (0.586) (0.518) (0.512) (0.652) (0.647) 
courts 0.540 0.490 0.377 0.312 0.714 0.613 0.461 0.297 
 (0.552) (0.537) (0.694) (0.676) (0.619) (0.605) (0.775) (0.763) 
crime -0.365 -0.386 -0.497 -0.533 -0.753 -0.703 -0.832 -0.672 
 (0.462) (0.450) (0.658) (0.634) (0.497) (0.486) (0.698) (0.678) 
age 0.109*** 0.0797*** 0.114*** 0.0861*** 0.0893*** 0.0656*** 0.0917*** 0.0744** 
 (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0213) (0.0207) (0.0327) (0.0323) 
size 0.174*** 0.158*** 0.239*** 0.226*** 0.167*** 0.151*** 0.175*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0237) (0.0239) 
eduworker 0.254*** 0.109*** 0.247*** 0.190*** 0.214*** 0.0836*** 0.190*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0233) (0.0285) (0.0311) (0.0218) (0.0245) (0.0306) (0.0333) 
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capacityu 0.0807*** 0.0953*** 0.196*** 0.205*** 0.0991*** 0.110*** 0.194*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0288) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0305) (0.0301) (0.0495) (0.0497) 
distance_market -0.584 -0.384 -2.204** -2.039** -0.169 -0.0416 -1.778* -1.676 
 (0.748) (0.729) (0.999) (0.978) (0.769) (0.753) (1.054) (1.039) 
distance_port 0.0566*** 0.0394** 0.0188 0.00394 0.0353* 0.0229 -0.0149 -0.0192 
 (0.0188) (0.0184) (0.0248) (0.0243) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0273) (0.0270) 
Population 0.0633 0.0228 -0.00382 -0.0264 -0.0523 -0.0682 -0.135 -0.122 
 (0.0714) (0.0697) (0.0955) (0.0941) (0.0769) (0.0750) (0.105) (0.104) 
BOL -2.038*** -2.025*** -2.098*** -2.065*** -1.358** -1.504*** -1.405* -1.572** 
 (0.516) (0.509) (0.695) (0.680) (0.577) (0.570) (0.775) (0.766) 
CHI 1.083* 1.111* 1.707** 1.834** 1.082 1.116* 1.608* 1.570* 
 (0.604) (0.588) (0.747) (0.728) (0.664) (0.647) (0.837) (0.819) 
COL -0.760 -0.617 -1.470* -1.314* -0.132 -0.153 -0.866 -0.942 
 (0.565) (0.549) (0.781) (0.768) (0.564) (0.539) (0.823) (0.816) 
ECU -1.384*** -1.239*** -1.840*** -1.754*** -0.867* -0.845* -1.293** -1.335** 
 (0.458) (0.447) (0.604) (0.590) (0.497) (0.479) (0.659) (0.650) 
PAR -1.464*** -1.302*** -1.488*** -1.378*** -0.814* -0.804* -0.565 -0.701 
 (0.379) (0.374) (0.525) (0.516) (0.427) (0.422) (0.593) (0.589) 
PER -0.638 -0.745 -0.278 -0.266 -0.451 -0.640 -0.0945 -0.180 
 (0.598) (0.580) (0.768) (0.764) (0.682) (0.669) (0.860) (0.854) 
URU 0.829* 0.798* 0.904 0.744 0.963* 0.890* 0.821 0.532 
 (0.459) (0.448) (0.574) (0.559) (0.508) (0.498) (0.644) (0.631) 
Year  0.265***  0.0125  0.258***  -0.00743 
  (0.0274)  (0.0365)  (0.0315)  (0.0424) 
Industry dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 11.32 9.594 27.16*** 25.90*** 9.120 7.653 25.11** 23.99** 
 (7.371) (7.182) (9.792) (9.597) (7.710) (7.573) (10.40) (10.25) 
Observations 5,362 5,362 5,714 5,714 3,844 3,844 4,071 4,071 
Number of idpanel 4,612 4,612 4,896 4,896 3,321 3,321 3,507 3,507 
Jointly significant (IC vars) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob. > chi2 0.0265 0.0001 0.0085 0.0011 0.0117 0.0000 0.0030 0.0005 
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.
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Additionally, an instrumental variables procedure (IV) was explored. In addition to 
address the possibility of investment climate variables being endogenously determined, the 
IV procedure attempts to address potential reverse causality between performance and 
investment climate evaluations. Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad (2010) mentioned that a way 
of measuring impact “when treatment has not been randomly assigned is by using the 
instrumental variable (IV) method.” According to Acemoglu et al. (2009), Ayyagari et al. 
(2007), (2008), Beck, Demirguc-kunt, et al. (2005), Loayza et al. (2010) variables such as the 
legal origin of business law, ethnic fractionalization, religion fractionalization, and latitude 
could have shaped the current investment climate through  their influence on issues such as 
the quality of government provision of public goods, business transactions, the contracting 
environment, and the level of institutional development. Because the models attempt to 
capture a broad array of investment climate measures, it is expected that factors remaining in 
the error term might not be associated with the instruments selected. At the same time, the 
firm performance measures are not expected to present a reverse causality case with respect 
to the selected instruments. 
In general, the IV procedure shows satisfactory results when an overall indicator of the 
investment climate (ic) is instrumented (table 4.5). In addition, when each investment climate 
variable is instrumented individually, the regulation of trade and the regulation of labor 
maintain their original signs and remain statistically significant after the IV procedure 
(Appendix 4.4). Similar results were found regarding the overall impact of investment 
climate (ic) on wages and profits (table 4.6). The individual analysis of the investment 
climate variables with an IV procedure indicates that the regulation of trade and market entry 
may have a statistically significant impact on average wage rates and profits per employee. 
The statistics assessing the appropriateness of the selected instruments and other aspects 
of the IV procedure show satisfactory results for the previous findings. First stage regression 
results and other additional information are detailed in Appendix 4.4. 
 
115 
 
Table 4.5: IV Procedure – TFP (IC: overall indicator and PCA) 
 xtivreg ivreg2 
 tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ic -5.610** -5.035***  -6.122** -4.740**  
 (2.376) (1.894)  (2.970) (2.135)  
ic1 (pca1)   -0.445   0.0417 
   (1.008)   (1.194) 
ic2 (pca2)   0.154   0.0878 
   (0.651)   (0.500) 
ic3 (pca3)   -0.318   -0.437 
   (0.274)   (0.319) 
distance_market -0.553 -0.612 0.0420 -0.702 -0.898 1.286 
 (1.677) (1.664) (3.556) (2.376) (2.206) (4.356) 
distance_port 0.132** 0.121** 0.0782 0.139* 0.111* 0.0761 
 (0.0559) (0.0477) (0.0787) (0.0734) (0.0624) (0.0678) 
population 0.584*** 0.546*** 0.328 0.622*** 0.532*** 0.156 
 (0.181) (0.154) (0.413) (0.204) (0.174) (0.494) 
age 0.154** 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0606) (0.0602) (0.0662) (0.0653) (0.0661) 
eduworker 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0598) (0.0605) (0.0624) (0.0621) (0.0656) 
capacityu 0.166 0.168 0.188* 0.141 0.149 0.183 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.144) (0.136) (0.126) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.81 12.87 1.002 14.35 14.99 -7.934 
 (15.21) (15.14) (28.41) (20.27) (19.04) (34.61) 
Observations 619 619 619 619 619 619 
Idpanel / R-squared 545 545 545 0.228 0.244 0.265 
F-statistic 13.67 13.89 12.54 14.83 21.95 38.84; 7.19; 40.33 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic1)      27.69 
p-value      0.0000 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic2)      5.01 
p-value      0.0256 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic3)      18.59 
p-value      0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM    27.05 41.02 3.838 
p-value    0.0000 0.0000 0.0501 
Cragg-Donal Wald F    98.89 60.77 17.613 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F    14.83 21.95 2.461 
Stock-Yogo critical values(10%)    16.38 9.08 not available 
Hansen J statistic    0.000 1.659 0.000 
p-value    e.e.i. 0.4362 e.e.i. 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F    8.00 2.89 2.89 
p-value    0.0048 0.0350 0.0350 
Instrumented ic ic ic1 ic2 ic3 ic ic ic1 ic2 ic3 
Instruments 
latitude latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Note: Two Stage Least Squares regressions were used. In the first stage, the regression equation estimated is: 
_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 + 56ℎ ∗ 
 + 5<	 ∗ 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 . The investment 
climate is measured by an overall indicator (ic), and by the three components identified after the PCA analysis (ic1, ic2, and ic3). The 
variable latitude is the distance south if the earth’s equator. The interactions of latitude with ethnic fractionalization (ethnicfr) and religious 
fractionalization (religionfr) were also considered. Fractionalization reflects the probability that two random individuals from a given 
country will not share a common characteristic such as ethnicity or religion. Data for fractionalization comes from Dahlberg, Holmberg, 
Rothstein, Hartman, and Svensson (2015) based on Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).  
 
 
116 
 
Table 4.6: IV Procedure - Wages and Profits (IC: overall indicator and PCA) 
     profit_emp profit_emp 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ic -6.965**  -4.920  
 (2.800)  (3.741)  
ic1 (pca1)  -0.760***  -0.915*** 
  (0.192)  (0.289) 
ic2 (pca2)  0.248  0.979* 
  (0.397)  (0.591) 
ic3 (pca3)  -0.165*  -0.299** 
  (0.0994)  (0.137) 
age 0.0921*** 0.0889*** 0.100*** 0.0955*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0186) (0.0302) (0.0291) 
size 0.174*** 0.164*** 0.246*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0166) (0.0157) 
eduworker 0.153*** 0.121*** 0.228*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0242) (0.0382) (0.0334) 
capacityu 0.0826** 0.0913*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0298) (0.0489) (0.0482) 
distance_market 1.105 -1.518 0.274 -4.008** 
 (0.972) (1.361) (1.215) (1.917) 
distance_port 0.196*** 0.0511 0.123 -0.0747 
 (0.0670) (0.0602) (0.0906) (0.0885) 
population 0.598*** 0.300*** 0.392 0.0869 
 (0.190) (0.104) (0.256) (0.156) 
year 0.209*** 0.268*** 0.0450 0.104*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0282) (0.0479) (0.0399) 
Country dummy yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.629 16.30 7.988 41.58** 
 (7.279) (13.11) (8.851) (18.52) 
Observations 5,263 5,263 5,577 5,577 
R-squared 0.248 0.357 0.199 0.217 
Angrist-Pischke F 36.12 325.46; 15.73; 141.03 36.44 376.69; 16.49; 175.64 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000; 0.0001; 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000; 0.0000; 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 35.39 16.24 35.65 16.50 
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donal Wald F 46.32 31.73 48.10 31.03 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 36.12 5.68 36.44 5.77 
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Hansen J statistic e.e.i. - e.e.i. - 
p-value     
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 7.76 6.93 1.85 4.06 
p-value 0.0054 0.0001 0.1744 0.0068 
Instrumented ic ic1 ic2 ic3 ic ic1 ic2 ic3 
Instruments 
latitude latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
latitude latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Note: Two Stage Least Squares regressions were used. In the first stage, the regression equation estimated is: _;  1 2 3 =
^ + 57
 + 56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 + 
. The investment climate is measured by an overall indicator (ic), and by 
the three components identified after the PCA analysis (ic1, ic2, and ic3). The variable latitude is the distance south if the earth’s equator. The 
interactions of latitude with ethnic fractionalization (ethnicfr) and religious fractionalization (religionfr) were also considered. Fractionalization 
reflects the probability that two random individuals from a given country will not share a common characteristic such as ethnicity or religion. Data for 
fractionalization comes from Dahlberg et al. (2015) based on Alesina et al. (2003).  
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4.5 Conclusions 
This study attempts to contribute to the literature on investment climate and its relationship 
with firm performance indicators such as productivity, average wages, and gross profits per 
employee. To the extent of the literature review, this is the first study exploring these issues 
with firm level data for the countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Uruguay in the region of Latin America. This study is unique given its in-depth focus on 
investment climate variables, the utilization of standardized panel data, and the focus on a 
specific sector for the study of productivity in relation to the investment climate. 
Results suggest that the investment climate matters. The robust statistical significance 
of several variables in the investment climate which are related to higher productivity and 
other firm performance measures may indicate aspects where efforts for reform and more 
detailed studies should be focused. Overall, it seems that streamlined tax, labor, and trade 
regulations along with the availability of capital (finance) are associated with higher firm-
level productivity. Variables such as informality and infrastructure also appear as relevant 
factors although with less statistical significance. While tax regulation should be maintained 
as a non-constraining aspect of the investment climate, labor and trade regulations have 
ample room for improvement. In addition, a business friendly regulation of market entry is 
related to higher profits per employee. The instrumental variables procedure conveys further 
support for these findings. Finally, firm characteristics such as experience in the market, 
larger size, a better educated workforce and better capacity utilization consistently appear as 
significant for all performance measures throughout the models. 
Streamlining the investment climate is securing business friendly conditions where 
firms can reach higher productivity, higher wages, and higher profits per employee. The 
simplification of procedures could be accompanied with efforts for implementing 
eGovernments. Gallo, Giove, Millard, Kare, and Thaarup (2014) identified privacy and data 
sharing legislative requirements and implementation costs as key obstacles. Furthermore,  
Rodrik (2007) argued that lack of political will and/or lack of capacity of some leaders both 
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in public and private institutions are also obstacles, particularly for middle income countries. 
In addition to leadership, Bardhan (2010) mentioned that inadequate institutional 
frameworks and regulations persist because of the distributional conflicts underlying potential 
change. There are winners and losers from reforms and it is important to understand those 
outcomes for conducting policy reform. In addition, it is important to recognize the 
interrelationship of regulations when conducting reforms. Duran Lima et al. (2011) found that 
for trade reforms to benefit the poor, they need to be accompanied by reforms on labor 
regulations that secure workers mobility, among other aspects. Therefore, reforming the 
investment climate requires a systemic comprehension of all interrelationships. At the 
macroeconomic level, Bardhan (2010) observed that compared to Latin America, a more 
egalitarian distribution of wealth encouraged most social groups in East Asia to endure 
reforms and to isolate extreme political wings of labor and other movements. 
Future research could benefit from richer data in terms of balanced dynamic panels 
that could enable further studies into causality. At the moment, most panel data is strongly 
unbalanced and available only for a few periods of time. Also, more data disaggregated at the 
city, or regional level along with more variables featuring objective measures of the 
investment climate at the firm level would be highly useful. New areas for research may 
include studies in the services sector given their non-tradable and heavily regulated 
environment. In addition, the interaction among investment climate variables and the effect of 
certain reforms differentiated by industry are issues that deserve more attention. Finally, an 
increased look into location, availability of inputs and arrangements that foster cooperation 
could be worth exploring within the investment climate. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
According to Besley and Jayaraman (2010), the shape of institutions are a response to 
information constraints, transaction costs, and enforcement difficulties in an uncertain world. 
Fafchamps (2010) stated that institutions contribute to the well functioning of markets, but in 
the absence of formal institutions, informal institutions appear. He argued that in the latter the 
poor remain poor because informal institutions are mainly based on trust, reputation, 
information sharing and discrimination. Alonso and Garcimartin (2013), Sachs (2005) 
highlighted that human institutions should be designed in the light of reason precisely to 
control the irrational side of human behavior, reduce discretional decisions, and limit 
opportunism.  
An institutional arrangement characterized by a streamlined investment climate 
positively affects the incentives to invest, and the allocation of productive resources across 
and within firms. This, in turn, fosters private development measured in terms of number of 
enterprises, employment opportunities and performance indicators such as TFP, profits, and 
wages, among others. The study of a streamlined investment climate is important not only 
because of the previous reasons, as essential as they are, but also because an adequate 
institutional arrangement appears to be crucial for economic development more broadly. 
One important aspect in the success of developed countries is the establishment of 
institutions, shaped through centuries, which secured private-property rights and the rule of 
law, among others characteristics. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008a) described 
the origins of British economic supremacy on institutional changes executed as early as the 
middle of the seventeen century. The civil war (1642-51) and the Glorious Revolution (1688) 
limited the power of the monarchy and increased the role of the parliament which was 
translated into greater security on property rights, fundamental for the expansion of financial 
markets. Subsequent reforms (1832, 1867-84) increased participation in voting, reformed 
education, included redistributive measures, and reformed the civil service. As early as 1871, 
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the British state started a civil service open to public examination, and meritocratic. 
Hence, the importance of a streamlined business environment where all individuals 
have an equal opportunity to participate in the market independently of their gender, ethnic 
origin, political or social connections. If skills and talent are distributed among all the 
population in a country, nurturing and providing opportunities for only a small portion of that 
population is detrimental for the society as a whole. 
At the cross country level, the specific findings of this study suggest that business 
friendly tax and labor regulation are related to larger number of SMEs in an economy. In turn, 
the share of employment by MSMEs is influenced by product-market regulation75 (significant 
after an instrumental variables procedure) and the regulation of labor. While tax regulation 
appears to be an immediate concern for smaller formal enterprises, labor regulation is 
increasingly a concern as firms grow in size. The interactions with governance variables 
indicate that product-market regulation reforms could have a positive influence even in 
countries with bad levels of governance. Lastly, the ability to cooperate appears as 
significantly influencing quality type variables such as the number of permanent full time 
jobs or employment growth. 
At the firm level, and in the case of Bolivia, access to finance and transformational 
activities (R&D, new products and new processes) are associated to higher productivity, 
particularly for formal small, medium, and large enterprises. While higher profits of these 
enterprises are influenced by access to finance, market entry, and corruption, higher profits of 
microenterprises are related to political and macroeconomic stability, access to finance, labor 
regulation, and infrastructure. Foreign ownership is related to higher profits in formal small, 
medium and large enterprises, and the entrepreneurs’ efficacy has a positive relationship with 
profits in microenterprises. In the case of the eight analyzed countries in Latin America, the 
overall results suggest an association between higher productivity and streamlined tax, labor, 
and trade regulation along with access to finance. Lastly, business friendly market entry 
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 Product market regulation is composed by ease of market entry, exit, access to credit, well functioning of 
judiciary system, and trade. 
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regulation is related to higher profits. 
Among firms’ characteristics, longer experience in the market, better capacity 
utilization, foreign ownership, larger size (only for profits) and a better educated workforce 
appear as significant throughout the models and measurements of firm performance. 
There are interrelations among the investment climate variables. For example, Dethier 
et al. (2010) indicated that successful reforms on certain regulation, trade for example, will in 
turn put pressure for reform in issues such as the protection of capital. Also, trade 
liberalization reforms may need to be accompanied by flexible labor regulation to allow labor 
movement from less competitive sectors to more competitive ones. Furthermore, the results 
of Chapter 3, which used two different datasets for Bolivia, found that the PCA analysis 
suggested the retention of three components in the investment climate variables. Trade 
regulation, labor regulation and functioning of courts belong to exactly the same component 
in both datasets. Access to finance and ease of market entry belong to the same component. 
And, a similar situation happens with corruption, informality and crime. In addition, the PCA 
in Chapter 2, and the PCA in Chapter 4 also group access to finance, and market entry in the 
same component. Once again, the regulation of trade and labor are together in the same 
component according to the PCA in Chapter 4. These results contribute to previous findings 
indicating that regulations appear to behave in packages. 
A number of regulations in the investment climate are in place to secure standards of 
social protection, working conditions, product quality, enhanced incentives to innovate and 
invest, etc. Furthermore, as stated by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2005), regulation can have 
a positive impact when adequately and consistently enforced. Shleifer (2005) suggested that 
potential areas for deregulation in developing countries are those where competition and 
market discipline could do a more effective job than courts. Eventually, the simplification of 
procedures could be accompanied with increased efforts for electronic exchange of data 
within and across institutions. The twenty first century provides unprecedented Information 
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and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and opportunities for managing big datasets76 . 
Gallo et al. (2014) mentioned privacy and data sharing legislative requirements along with 
implementation costs as main obstacles towards implementing eGovernment and reducing 
administrative burden. In addition,  Rodrik (2007) argued that lack of political will and/or 
lack of capacity of leaders both in public and private institutions could also play a role, 
particularly in lower and middle income countries. 
Bardhan (2010) highlighted the distributional conflicts underlying potential change. 
There are winners and losers from reforms and it is important to understand those outcomes 
for conducting policy reform. For instance, Burgess (2010) stated that deregulation can 
magnify policy and institutional disadvantages; “states with poor investment climate were 
relatively worse off after liberalization, and states with better investment climate are better 
off.” The author confirmed that reform is not distribution-neutral, and this is one of the 
reasons for “backward” states, cities, or regions to often be reluctant and present opposition 
to change.  
In relation with the previous point, the interrelations among regulations must be 
recognized when conducting reforms. Duran Lima et al. (2011) found evidence that trade 
reforms have been associated with increases in poverty in regions with constraining labor 
regulation. As it was mentioned previously, for trade reforms to benefit the poor, they need to 
be accompanied by reforms on labor regulations that secure labor mobility, among other 
aspects. Therefore, reforming the investment climate requires a systemic comprehension of 
all interrelations.  
Another policy aspect to consider for streamlining the investment climate is the 
presence of inequality. Bardhan (2010) compared East Asia with Latin America and observed 
that a more egalitarian distribution of wealth seems to ease the way for reform. Bardhan 
(2010) argued that during the last quarter of the past century the distribution of wealth in 
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 OECD (2009) highlighted improvements on responsiveness, exponential multiplication of dissemination and 
exchange of information, and the elimination of time and space limits through the possibility of “24 hours 7 
days a week” access to services. 
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large parts of East Asia has been made more egalitarian through land reform, widespread 
expansion of education, and basic health services. The author argued that this allows 
obtaining the support of most social groups (isolating extreme political wings of labor 
movements, for example) for enduring short term sacrifices, pursuing stability and 
coordinating growth-promoting institutions and policies. 
Finally, Fafchamps (2010) suggested an incremental approach to upgrade institutions 
instead of direct elimination of informal institutions. And, Bardhan (2010) emphasized that 
the payoffs of adherence to a certain institutional arrangement depend upon the adherence by 
others. To conclude, Bartelsman et al. (2010) highlighted that the investment climate may 
have different effects within countries and industries. Certainly, local context and case 
specificity are of utmost importance for achieving the right outcomes. 
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Appendices 
Chapter 1  
Chapter 2  
Appendix 2.1: Examples of MSMEs’ Definitions 
Table 2.1.1: Institutions and Studies’ MSME definitions 
 
The World Bank 
SME Department 
White (2005) 
International 
Labour 
Organization 
Beck et al. 
(2003) 
EUROSTAT OECD 
 
Employees Assets 
(US$) 
Sales 
(US$) 
Employees Employees Employees Employees 
Micro < 
10 
< 
10,000 
< 
100,000 
< 
5 
< 
4 
< 
10 
< 
5 
Small < 
50 
< 
3million 
< 
3million 
< 
20 
< 
100 
< 
50 
< 
100 
Medium < 
300 
< 
15million 
< 
15million 
< 
50 
< 
500 
< 
250 
< 
500 
Large > > > > > > > 
Table 2.1.2: Japan, MSME Definition – Differentiated by Industrial Sector 
 
Japan77 
 
Manufacturing Wholesale Trade Retail trade Services 
 
Employees Assets Employees Assets Employees Assets Employees Assets 
Micro < 
20 
 < 
5 
 < 
5 
 < 
5 
 
Small     
Medium < 
300 
<JPY 
300million 
< 
100 
<JPY 
100million 
< 
50 
<JPY 
50million 
< 
50 
<JPY 
50million 
Large > > > > > > > > 
Table 2.1.3: Bolivia, MSME Definitions 
 Bolivia 
Vice Ministry of MSEs 
Bolivia 
Ministry of Labor (2001) 
 Employees Employees Sales Assets 
Micro < 
10 
< 
10 
< 
1.35*(Min.Wage) 
< 
350*(Min.Wage) 
Small < 
20 
< 
20 
< 
4.50*(Min.Wage) 
< 
180*(Min.Wage) 
Medium <50    
Large >    
 
 
                                                     
77
 Japan’s Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law & A Brief Introduction of SME Policies of Japan (2009). 
Trade, Investment, and Tourism Division. Industrial Development Department. JICA. 
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Appendix 2.2: Variables Used to Measure Business Environment in Some Selected 
Countries 
Table 2.2.1: Business Environment Variables Used in Several Studies 
Measurement of Business Environment 
Cross-Research Comparison 
Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2004) 
Loayza et al. 
(2010) 
Christensen and 
Goedhuys 
(2004) 
Ayyagari et al. 
(2007) 
 
IFC’s 
Doing Business 
Relevant 
Identified 
Aspects 
Cost of 
Business 
Registration 
Firm entry  Cost of Entry Starting a 
business (1) 
Market entry 
 Labor markets  Labor Market 
Regulation 
Employing 
workers (na) 
Labor markets 
 Fiscal burden Fiscal burden of 
government 
 Paying taxes (7) Fiscal burden 
 Trade barriers Trade policy  Trading across 
borders (8) 
Trade policy 
 Financial 
markets 
Banking and 
finance 
Credit Registry Getting credit 
(5) 
Financial 
markets 
Cost of Contract 
Enforcement 
Contract 
enforcement 
 Cost of Contract 
Enforcement 
Enforcing 
contracts (9) 
Enforcing 
contracts 
Cost and 
Efficiency of 
the Insolvency 
Process 
Bankruptcy 
regulation 
 Bankruptcy Resolving 
Insolvency (10) 
Insolvency 
Regulation 
Protection of 
Property Rights 
 Property Rights Property Rights Registering 
property (4) 
Property rights 
  Regulation Regulatory 
Environment 
  
 (Governance) Global 
Corruption 
Report 
Institutional 
Development 
 
 Governance 
  Government 
intervention in 
the economy  
   
  Monetary 
policy 
   
  Black market 
activity 
   
  Capital 
flows and 
foreign 
investment 
 Protecting 
investors (6) 
 
    Dealing with 
construction 
permits (2) 
Dealing with 
construction 
permits 
    Getting 
electricity (3) 
Getting 
electricity 
     Business 
sophistication 
and Innovation 
Additional variables and controls 
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Appendix 2.3: Main Areas and Mechanism of the Business Environment 
Figure 2.3.1: Factors Affecting Firms at the Macro Level 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Figure 2.3.2: Possible Mechanisms for a Higher Share of SMEs in the Economy in Relation 
to the Business Environment 
Ambiguous Prediction
(BE and SME)
Easy entry and exit, sound contract enforcement, 
effective property rights registration, and access 
to external finance. Also, there is a sense of 
innovation and business sophistication.
Costly entry and exit, rigid labor and 
administrative regulations. Restricted access 
to external finance.
or
Thriving and vibrant SME sector
 High turnover that sees a high rate of entry of 
new and innovative firms
 Growth of successful firms unconstrained by rigid 
regulations 
 Exit of unsuccessful ones 
A large SME sector
 Many small enterprises that are either not 
able to grow or do not have incentives to 
grow beyond a certain size 
Can also 
foster
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Appendix 2.4: Calculation of Regulation/Business Environment Indexes 
Table 2.4.1: Detail for the construction of Each Index 
Indicators Source Weight Variable Principal Component 
Starting a Business - Procedures (number) WB_DB78 0.25 
entry 
promar 
Starting a Business - Time (days) WB_DB 0.25 
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) WB_DB 0.25 
Starting a Business - Paid-in Min. Capital (% of income 
per capita) 
WB_DB 0.25 
Registering Property - Procedures (number) WB_DB 1/3 
regprop Registering Property - Time (days) WB_DB 1/3 
Registering Property - Cost (% of property value) WB_DB 1/3 
Getting Credit - Strength of legal rights index (0-10) WB_DB 0.25 
credit Getting Credit - Depth of credit information index (0-6) WB_DB 0.25 5Aiii  Private sector credit FI_EFW79 0.25 
5Aiv  Interest rate controls/Negative real interest rates) FI_EFW 0.25 
Trading Across Borders - Documents to export (number) WB_DB 1/18 
trade 
Trading Across Borders - Time to export (days) WB_DB 1/18 
Trading Across Borders - Cost to export (US$ per 
container) 
WB_DB 1/18 
Trading Across Borders - Documents to import (number) WB_DB 1/18 
Trading Across Borders - Time to import (days) WB_DB 1/18 
Trading Across Borders - Cost to import (US$ per 
container) 
WB_DB 1/18 
FI_EFW_4Aii  Mean tariff rate FI_EFW 1/6 
FI_EFW_4Bi  Hidden import barriers FI_EFW 1/6 
HF_IEF_trade freedom HF_IEF80 1/3 
Enforcing Contracts - Time (days) WB_DB 1/3 
enfcontract Enforcing Contracts - Cost (% of claim) WB_DB 1/3 
Enforcing Contracts - Procedures (number) WB_DB 1/3 
Resolving Insolvency - Time (years) WB_DB 1/3 
insolv Resolving Insolvency - Cost (% of estate) WB_DB 1/3 
Resolving Insolvency - Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) WB_DB 1/3 
Dealing with Construction Permits - Procedures (number) WB_DB 1/3 
construct 
function 
Dealing with Construction Permits - Time (days) WB_DB 1/3 
Dealing with Construction Permits - Cost (% of income 
per capita) 
WB_DB 1/3 
Getting Electricity - Procedures (number) WB_DB 1/3 
getelec Getting Electricity - Time (days) WB_DB 1/3 
Getting Electricity - Cost (% of income per capita) WB_DB 1/3 
HF_IEF_labor freedom HF_IEF 1 labor labor 
Paying Taxes - Payments (number per year) WB_DB 0.075 
tax tax Paying Taxes - Time (hours per year) WB_DB 0.075 
HF_IEF_Fiscal_Freedom HF_IEF 0.85 
WGI_cc (control of corruption) WGI_WB
81
 
1/3 
Governance Governance WGI_rl (rule of law) WGI_WB 1/3 
WGI_va (voice and accountability) WGI_WB 1/3 
GCI 2nd pillar: Infrastructure GCR_WE
F82 
0.80 
Infrastructure Infrastructure Broadband Internet subscriptions/100 pop. GCR_WEF 
0.10 
Internet users/100 pop. GCR_WE
F 
0.10 
                                                     
78
 Stands for World Bank’s Doing Business. 
79
 Stands for Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World. 
80 Stands for Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. 
81
 Stands for the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
82
 Stands for World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. 
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GCI 3rd pillar: Macroeconomic environment GCR_WE
F 
1 Macro. Stab. Macro. Stab. 
University-industry collaboration in R&D GCR_WE
F 
1/3 
Trans. Transformational Government procurement of advanced tech products GCR_WEF 
1/3 
State of cluster development GCR_WE
F 
1/3 
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Appendix 2.5: Correlations Before and After Principal Components Analysis 
Table 2.5.1: Correlations between Regulation Variables – Before PCA 
        start trade insolv credit regprop enfcontract Construct getelec labor tax Gov2000 
start 1.0000           
trade 0.619*** 1.0000          
insolv 0.539*** 0.631*** 1.0000         
credit 0.623*** 0.672*** 0.551*** 1.0000        
regprop 0.344*** 0.447*** 0.349*** 0.515*** 1.0000       
enfcontract 0.465*** 0.446*** 0.480*** 0.544*** 0.427*** 1.0000      
construct 0.356*** 0.415*** 0.286*** 0.334*** 0.165** 0.0950 1.0000     
getelec 0.247*** 0.457*** 0.287*** 0.368*** 0.293*** 0.135* 0.411*** 1.0000    
labor 0.341*** 0.268*** 0.314*** 0.416*** 0.195** 0.233*** 0.212*** 0.200*** 1.0000   
Tax -0.0188 -0.136 -0.154* 0.0534 0.123 -0.0777 -0.0521 -0.0232 0.135* 1.0000  
gov2000 0.568*** 0.791*** 0.648*** 0.616*** 0.367*** 0.483*** 0.363*** 0.438*** 0.305*** -0.205*** 1.0000 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Table 2.5.2: Correlations between Regulation Variables – After PCA 
        promar function labor tax regulation Gov2000 Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3 
promar 1.0000         
function 0.474*** 1.0000        
labor 0.394*** 0.244*** 1.0000       
tax -0.142 -0.0429 0.135* 1.0000      
regulation 0.620*** 0.449*** 0.857*** 0.366*** 1.0000     
gov2000 0.774*** 0.481*** 0.305*** -0.205*** 0.387*** 1.0000    
Principal component 1 0.924*** 0.204** 0.583*** -0.104 0.676*** 0.658*** 1.0000   
Principal component 2 0.333*** 0.943*** -0.0421 -0.0453 0.271*** 0.419*** 0 1.0000  
Principal component 3 -0.0580 -0.0343 0.288*** 0.920*** 0.516*** -0.338*** 0 1.05e-08 1.0000 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Appendix 2.6: Principal Components Analysis – Regulation Variables 
Table 2.6.1: PCA Regulatory Variables 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs            124 
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors         3 
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params 27 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.21814      3.03296 0.4218       0.4218 
Factor2 1.18518      0.10354            0.1185       0.5403 
Factor3 1.08164      0.22251            0.1082       0.6485 
Factor4 0.85912      0.16611            0.0859       0.7344 
Factor5 0.69302      0.16820            0.0693       0.8037 
Factor6 0.52482      0.07247            0.0525       0.8562 
Factor7 0.45235      0.02694            0.0452       0.9014 
Factor8 0.42540      0.12597            0.0425       0.9440 
Factor9 0.29944      0.03854            0.0299       0.9739 
Factor10 0.26090 . 0.0261       1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 3649.79 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances83 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
start 0.8066   -0.0177   -0.1732 0.3190  
trade 0.8281   -0.0619    0.0875 0.3027  
insolv 0.7839   -0.1809   -0.1396 0.3333  
credit 0.8043    0.1674   -0.0608 0.3214  
regprop 0.6245    0.3816    0.0510 0.4617 
enfcontract 0.6495   -0.0588   -0.4415 0.3798  
construct 0.5510   -0.1793    0.5585 0.3523  
getelec 0.4984   -0.1221    0.6386 0.3289  
labor 0.4761    0.3867   -0.2213 0.5747  
tax -0.1725    0.8801 0.2335 0.1412  
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
start 0.7844 0.2303 -0.1121 0.3190 
trade 0.6813 0.4739 -0.0919 0.3027 
insolv 0.7217    0.2796 -0.2602 0.3333 
credit 0.7647 0.2914 0.0947 0.3214 
regprop 0.5937 0.2635 0.3411 0.4617 
enfcontract 0.7566 -0.0670 -0.2079 0.3798  
construct 0.2100 0.7737 -0.0712 0.3523 
getelec 0.1382 0.8075 0.0073 0.3289 
labor 0.5833 -0.0421 0.2885 0.5747  
tax -0.1040 -0.0453 0.9198 0.1412 
 
                                                     
83
 Orthogonal rotation rather than oblique is generally used for the construction of indices. 
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Appendix 2.7: Regulation Around the World (Lower values represent less constraining 
regulation)84 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
84
 HINC: High Income Countries, ECA: East Europe and Central Asia, EAP: East Asia and Pacific, LAC: Latin 
America and Caribbean, SA: South Asia, MNA: Middle East and North Africa, and SSAFRICA: Sub Saharan 
Africa. 
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Appendix 2.8: Variables and Definitions 
Indicator Description Source / Observations 
smeden Number of SMEs per 1000 people 
(includes only small and medium enterprises) 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 
Country Indicators (MSME-CI) provides 
both the latest global snapshot and historic 
data back 20 years on the number of MSMEs 
in 132 world economies. In this study, the 
latest snapshot (mainly presenting 
information for the first decade of the 
century) was used. Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/msmecountryindicators   
msmeemplo Measures the participation of micro, small 
and medium enterprises in the economy. It is 
the share of the MSME sector in the total 
labor force. 
empgrowth Annualized growth of permanent full-time 
workers expressed as a percentage. Annual 
employment growth is the change in full-
time employment reported in the current 
fiscal year from a previous period. For most 
countries the difference between the two 
fiscal year periods is two years. However, for 
some countries the interval is three years. 
Hence, an annualized measure is used. T 
IFC’s Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Enterprise Surveys provide the world's most 
comprehensive company-level data in 
emerging markets and developing 
economies. Business data are available on 
130,000 firms in 135 countries. The survey is 
applied in all countries under a unique 
criterion regarding the size of the enterprises. 
Small sized firm are defined to have 5-19 
workers, and a medium sized firms are 
defined as the ones with 20-99 workers. 
Available at:  
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
pfulltw Average number of permanent full time 
workers. Permanent, full-time employees are 
defined as all paid employees that are 
contracted for a term of one or more fiscal 
years and/or have a guaranteed renewal of 
their employment contract and work 8 or 
more hours per day. 
uskprodw Proportion of unskilled workers out of all 
production workers. Unskilled production 
workers are workers (up through the line 
supervisor level) engaged in fabricating, 
processing, assembling, inspecting, 
receiving, storing, handling, packing, 
warehousing, shipping (but not delivering), 
maintenance, repair, product development, 
auxiliary production for plant‘s own use 
(e.g., power plant), recordkeeping, and other 
services closely associated with these 
production operations. Also, these workers 
are unskilled in that it is not required that 
they have special training, education, or skill 
to perform their job. 
start Measures the burden of the regulation of 
entry. It includes: the number of procedures, 
time in days, cost (% of income per capita), 
and paid-in minimum capital (% of income 
per capita) that a start-up must bear before it 
becomes legally operational.  
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
Methodology based on Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2002) 
regprop Measures the burden of the registering 
property regulation. It includes: 
The procedures (number), time (days), and 
cost (% of property value) to register a 
property. The costs are related to official 
transfer of a property from a seller to a 
buyer, including all fees, taxes, duties and 
other payments to notaries and registries as 
required by the law. The costs are computed 
relative to the value of the property.  
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
 
credit Measures the burden of the regulation of Doing Business Data. International Finance 
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 credit. It includes: the strength of legal rights, 
depth of credit information, share of private 
sector credit in the economy, interest rate 
controls/negative real interest rates. 
The strength of legal rights index measures 
the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate 
lending. 
The depth of credit information index 
measures rules and practices affecting the 
coverage, cope and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a public 
credit registry or a private credit bureau. 
The private sector credit measures the extent 
to which government borrowing crowds out 
private borrowing. Is calculated as the 
government fiscal deficit as a share of gross 
saving. If the deficit data are not available, 
the calculation is based on the share of 
private credit to total credit extended in the 
banking sector. 
The interest rate controls / negative real 
interest rates assesses if interest rates are 
determined by the market, stable monetary 
policy, and positive real deposit and lending 
rates. 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
Methodology based on Djankov, McLiesh & 
Shleifer (2007). 
Economic Freedom of the World. Fraser 
Institute. 
trade Measures the burden of the regulation of 
trade. It includes: 
Documents (number), time (days), and cost 
(US$ per container) to export and import.  
Mean tariff rate which represents the 
unweighted mean of tariff rates. Countries 
not imposing tariffs are better ranked. As the 
mean tariff rate increases, countries are 
assigned lower ratings. The rating will 
decline toward zero as the mean tariff rate 
approaches 50%. 
The non-tariff trade barrier is a subjective 
measure that assesses if non-tariff barriers 
significantly reduce the ability of imported 
goods to compete in the domestic market. 
Trade freedom is an objective measure 
capturing the severity of tariff and non tariff 
barriers affecting both imports as well as 
exports. 
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
Economic Freedom of the World. Fraser 
Institute. 
Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage 
Foundation. 
enfcontract Measures the burden of the enforcing 
contracts regulation. It includes: 
The procedures (number), time (days), and 
cost (% of property value) to enforce a 
contract. 
Legal costs incurred in dispute resolution. 
Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim. 
Three types of costs are recorded: court 
costs, enforcement costs and average 
attorney fees.  
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
Methodology based on Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2003) 
insolv Measures the burden of the regulation for 
closing a business. It includes: 
The time (years), cost (% of estate), and 
recovery rate (cents on the dollar) that it 
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
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takes to close a business. The costs are a 
percentage of the estate (i.e. all the money 
and property that a firm owns). Specifically, 
it includes all legal court costs and other fees 
that are incurred when closing a limited 
liability company.  
 
construct Measures the burden of the regulation for 
obtaining construction permits. It includes: 
The procedures (number), the time (days), 
and the cost (% of income per capita) to 
obtain a construction permit. 
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
 
getelec Measures the burden of the regulation 
forgetting electricity. It includes: 
The procedures (number), the time (days), 
and the cost (% of income per capita) to 
obtain a electricity. 
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
 
labor Measures the burden of the regulation of 
labor. Considers aspects of the legal and 
regulatory framework of a country’s labor 
market. It accounts, and assigns an equal 
weight to the: ratio of minimum wage to the 
average value added per worker, hindrance to 
hiring additional workers, rigidity of hours, 
difficulty of firing redundant employees, 
legally mandated notice period, and 
mandatory severance pay. 
Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage 
Foundation. 
tax Measures the burden of the tax regulation. It 
includes: 
The payments (number per year), and time 
(hours per year) to comply with the 
regulation. 
In addition the fiscal freedom is a measure of 
the tax burden imposed by government. It 
includes both the direct tax burden in terms 
of the top tax rates on individual and 
corporate incomes and the overall amount of 
tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  
Doing Business Data. International Finance 
Corporation. The World Bank Group. 
Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage 
Foundation. 
governance Governance consists of the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. It includes: 
Voice and Accountability captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
World Governance Indicators. The World 
Bank Group. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/in
dex.asp 
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infra From the second pillar of the Global 
Competitiveness Report, evaluates a well-
developed transport and communications and 
infrastructure network. It includes: 
Besides the second pillar evaluation, the 
broadband Internet subscriptions/100 pop., 
and the internet users/100 population. 
Global Competitiveness Report. World 
Economic Forum. 
macro From the third pillar Macroeconomic 
Environment of the Global Competitiveness 
Report, it evaluates the stability of the 
macroeconomic environment. 
Global Competitiveness Report. World 
Economic Forum. 
trans From the Innovation and Business 
Sophistication pillars of the Global 
Competitiveness Report, it aims to capture 
the ability of actors to cooperate. It includes 
subjective measures for: 
The university-industry collaboration in 
R&D, the government procurement of 
advanced technology products, and the state 
of cluster development. 
Global Competitiveness Report. World 
Economic Forum. 
GDPpc GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant US$. In this sample the variable is 
an average for the decade of 2000s. The 
intention is to control for the economic 
settings of each economy. 
The World Bank based on World 
Development Indicators data. 
Legal Origin Indicates the type of legal system in the 
country. It considers English Common law, 
French Civil Law, and German Civil Law. 
La Porta et al. (2008) 
Religion Indicates the dominant religious group in the 
country. It considers Muslims, Protestants, 
and Catholics. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
It is the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals in a country will not 
speak the same language. 
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of a country, 
scaled between zero and one. 
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Appendix 2.9: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.9.1: Descriptive Statistics – Sample A 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
smeden 87 4.087201 6.957562 .0556654 59.33802 
msmeemplo 102 41.60412 21.43036 1.76125 92.82653 
empgrowth 92 4.816432 5.532006 -11.3667 26.0556 
pfulltw 122 65.07049 55.35954 9.4 341.1 
shareuskprodw 91 32.42088 13.09702 10 83.5 
promar 109 .2535229 .0918619 .056617 .5106055 
function 160 .1473813 .0665807 .0236293 .3864555 
labor 148 .5063718 .2110312 0 1 
tax 149 .2857315 .1128775 .036364 .6345206 
macro 122 .4432825 .1633356 0 1 
infra 122 .5956357 .2554757 .0568218 .9898122 
trans 122 .5478582 .189619 .0633403 .8910916 
GDPpc 160 6632.563 9943.72 111.8476 51161.05 
governance 156 .5065515 .2250551 .0087978 .9773704 
 
Table 2.9.2: Descriptive Statistics – Sample B 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
smeden 47 3.023668 3.377139 .0556654 17.39806 
msmeemplo 52 40.9682 20.73425 1.76125 78 
empgrowth 36 5.355023 4.902021 -1.47143 26.0556 
pfulltw 42 78.95714 53.40797 17.6 270.7 
shareuskprodw 42 29.58571 14.06248 10 83.5 
promar 52 .2324203 .079811 .056617 .3978431 
function 57 .1445077 .0677503 .0297417 .3855187 
labor 56 .5182845 .2077903 0 .9460347 
tax 56 .3052747 .1158987 .0836956 .6345206 
macro 56 .4015437 .1460928 .1259975 .7551542 
infra 56 .5484791 .2519613 .07338 .8961928 
trans 56 .5090541 .1941707 .0633403 .8435464 
GDPpc 57 9377.051 12088.05 211.4699 51161.05 
governance 56 .4551776 .2344763 .0087978 .834048 
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Appendix 2.10: Correlation of Dependent Variables and GDPpc 
Table 2.10.1: Correlations between MSMEs’ Densities and Shares with GDPpc 
 smeden persme permicro GDPpc 
GDPpc 0.258** 0.0418 -0.0417 1.0000 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Table 2.10.2: Correlations between Dependent Variables and GDPpc 
 smeden msmeemplo empgrowth Pfulltw shareuskprodw GDPpc 
smeden 1.0000      
msmeemplo 0.334*** 1.0000     
empgrowth -0.0387 0.0189 1.0000    
pfulltw -0.0285 -0.208* 0.0254 1.0000   
shareuskprodw 0.171 -0.0324 -0.0327 0.134 1.0000  
GDPpc 0.258** 0.274*** 0.0351 0.144 -0.149 1.0000 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Table 2.10.3: Correlations between All Variables 
 Smeden msme emplo emp growth pfulltw shareuskprodw promar function labor tax macro infra trans GDPpc Gov 
Smeden 1.0000              
Msmeemplo 0.334*** 1.0000             
Empgrowth -0.0387 0.0189 1.0000            
Pfulltw -0.0285 -0.208* 0.0254 1.0000           
shareuskprodw 0.171 -0.0324 -0.0327 0.134 1.0000          
Promar -0.355*** -0.335*** -0.0115 -0.163 0.124 1.0000         
Function -0.0857 -0.189* -0.162 -0.00282 -0.0033 0.546*** 1.0000        
Labor -0.187* 0.00268 0.0919 0.0779 -0.0902 0.431*** 0.283*** 1.0000       
Tax 0.0110 0.132 -0.00307 0.0324 -0.131 -0.125 -0.0585 0.0887 1.0000      
Macro -0.352*** -0.295*** -0.239** -0.0383 0.165 0.631*** 0.457*** 0.207** -0.175* 1.0000     
Infra -0.191* -0.258** 0.138 -0.29*** 0.142 0.835*** 0.506*** 0.342*** -0.353*** 0.597*** 1.0000    
Trans -0.103 -0.186* -0.0542 -0.36*** 0.0528 0.677*** 0.483*** 0.283*** -0.315*** 0.543*** 0.855*** 1.0000   
GDPpc 0.258** 0.274*** 0.0351 0.144 -0.149 -0.716*** -0.396*** -0.27*** 0.308*** -0.495*** -0.864*** -0.77*** 1.0000  
Governance -0.133 -0.264*** -0.0530 -0.105 0.0979 0.763*** 0.511*** 0.324*** -0.280*** 0.538*** 0.866*** 0.725*** -0.803*** 1.00 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Appendix 2.11: RESET Test for Functional Form Misspecification 
(1A) lnsmeden 
The restricted model will be: 
lnsmeden = β8 + β7 ln GDPpc + β6gov+β<promar+β=function+β>labor+βItax+βKmacro 
+βLinfra+βMtrans + u 
The estimation results are: 
 = 78, ]6 =0.4325 
The unrestricted estimated model will be: 
lnsmeden = β8 + β7 ln GDPpc + β6gov+β<promar+β=function+β>labor+βItax+βKmacro 
+βLinfra+βMtrans + δ7lnsmedenf 6 + δ6lnsmedenf < + u 
The estimation results are: 
 = 78, ]
6 =0.4974 
We have the same dependent variable for both models. Therefore, we can apply a joint 
hypothesis test. 
H8 ∶  δ7 = 0 , δ6 = 0 
H7 ∶  H8 is not true 
With a 1% significance level, q = 2, and n − k − 3 = 78 − 11 − 3 = 64, the critical value 
is: c ≅ 4.98 
In order to calculate the F statistic we use the following equation: 
F =
R²³6 − R³6q
1 − R²³6 n − k − 3
                                    F =
0.4974 − 0.4325
2
1 − 0.4974
78 − 11 − 3
= 4.13            F = 4.13 
Since F < , H8  fails to be rejected. Therefore, this result suggest that there is no a sort of 
functional form problem. 
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Similar procedures were taken for models 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. For the 
sake of brevity the detailed calculations are not presented. The Table below summarizes the 
results. 
Table 2.11.1: Summary RESET Test 
Model Significance level Critical value (c) F statistic 
1A 1% 4.98 4.13 
1B 5% 3.34 0.521 
2A 5% 3.15 0.0589 
2B 5% 3.32 0.5676 
3A 5% 3.23 0.689 
3B 1% 6.36 5.31 
4A 5% 3.15 0.669 
4B 5% 3.49 1.33 
5A 5% 3.15 0.058 
5B 5% 3.42 2.83 
 
Appendix 2.12: Summary Results for Heteroskedasticity Tests 
The Stata’s Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was executed for 
every model under the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: Constant variance 
Table 2.12.1: Summary results 
Model F-statistic (F) p-value (p) 
1A 30.03 0.0000 
1B 3.00 0.0912 
2A 0.05 0.8195 
2B 1.27 0.2651 
3A 2.40 0.1265 
3B 3.45 0.0731 
4A 1.16 0.2843 
4B 0.01 0.9283 
5A 0.51 0.4759 
5B 2.28 0.1397 
 
Except for model 1A, all the p-values are greater than 0.05, this means that the reported 
standard errors are reliable because the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the model was 
not rejected. Therefore, there is strong evidence against heteroskedasticity in almost all the 
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models. In order to address potential heteroskedasticity problems, and in order to obtain test 
statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity, particularly for model 1A, robust multiple 
linear regression was used in every calculation for all the models. 
 
Appendix 2.13: Summary of Joint Significance Tests 
(1A) lnsmeden 
First we the restricted and unrestricted models are defined: 
 Restricted model (Excluding all the not significant variables): 
lnsmeden = β8 + β7 ln GDPpc + β6gov+β<labor+β=tax+β>trans + u 
The estimation results are the following: 
 ]6 = 0.3475 
Unrestricted model: 
lnsmeden = β8 + β7 ln GDPpc + β6gov+β<promar+β=function+β>labor+βItax+βKmacro 
+βLinfra+βMtrans + u 
]6
 = 0.4325 
 
We have the same dependent variable for both models. Therefore, we can apply a joint 
hypothesis test. 
H8 ∶  β< = 0 , β= = 0, βK = 0 , βL = 0 
H7 ∶  H8 is not true 
With a 5% significance level, q = 4, and n − k − 1 =68, the critical value is  c ≅ 2.53 
In order to calculate the F statistic we use the following equation: 
F =
R²³6 − R³6q
1 − R²³6 n − k − 1
= 2.55 
161 
 
Since F >  H8is rejected. Consequently, there is strong evidence for stating that the analyzed 
variables are jointly statistically significant in the model. 
Similar procedures were taken for models 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B. For the sake of 
brevity the detailed calculations are not presented. The Table below summarizes the results. 
Table 2.13.1: Joint Significance Test Results 
Model Significance level Critical value (c) F-statistic 
1A 5% 2.53 2.55 
1B 5% 2.53 8.75 
2A 5% 2.37 0.211 
2B 5% 2.42 0.581 
3A 5% (2.45) 2.25 (1.52) 1.45 
3B 5% 3.13 0.63 
4A 5% 2.37 0.508 
4B 5% 2.78 1.69 
 
Appendix 2.14: Complementary Tables for Other Employment Variables 
Table 2.14.1: Descriptive Statistics for empgrowth by Income Level (Sample A) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
High Income: OECD 
empgrowth 6 3.55 1.11669 1.9 4.7 
infra 6 .4846494 .1037205 .3802374 .6534814 
governance 6 .3357158 .0528853 .2753448 .4087012 
High Income: nonOECD 
empgrowth 3 5.866667 1.059874 4.9 7 
Infra 2 .5607366 .0652582 .5145921 .6068811 
governance 3 .3713675 .1504942 .2007989 .4854318 
Upper Middle Income 
empgrowth 33 6.193939 4.411628 1 23.8 
Infra 26 .6409272 .0979753 .443212 .8152534 
governance 29 .4947168 .1429368 .2174751 .7794067 
Lower Middle Income 
empgrowth 37 6.145946 4.274316 -3.3 17.2 
Infra 27 .7797847 .0889699 .5887812 .9518008 
governance 31 .6260692 .1042727 .3849111 .817634 
Low Income 
empgrowth 24 7.383333 5.151924 -7.4 13.4 
Infra 14 .8668131 .046581 .7987509 .9840839 
governance 20 .7029515 .107943 .5343227 .8893903 
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Table 2.14.2: Descriptive Statistics for pfulltw by Income Level (Sample A) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
High Income: OECD – nonOECD 
pfulltw 15 89.26 48.61995 30.9 186.4 
tax 15 .3118065 .1056667 .0400234 .4427238 
governance 15 .2954564 .1095341 .1028866 .4854318 
Upper Middle Income 
pfulltw 36 68.08611 53.41676 14.5 270.7 
tax 31 .2389634 .0653938 .0836956 .3544551 
governance 35 .4792719 .129724 .2174751 .7794067 
Lower Middle Income 
pfulltw 42 59.17857 48.12515 11.7 223.9 
tax 40 .2651371 .1004768 .036364 .4648126 
governance 40 .6218732 .1196792 .3849111 .9497885 
Low Income 
pfulltw 29 57.34828 68.29957 9.4 341.1 
tax 28 .2837545 .0955038 .0997977 .536701 
governance 29 .7152755 .1081798 .5343227 .9773704 
 
Appendix 2.15: Concurrent Findings 
Table 2.15.1: Summary – Significant Variables for each Model85 
Panel Models Dep. Var. 
Explanatory Variables that 
appear as Significant Area Aspect 
Concurrent 
to most 
models micro small medium Large 
SAMPLE A 
All 
(Including 
developing) 
50% 
(5A) shareuskprodw Tax 
Employment 
 
Tax 
 
(4A), 
(4A’) pfulltw 
tax(gov) 
trans Quality (3A), 
(3A’) empgrowth 
macro(gov) 
trans(gov) 
(2A) msmeemplo PROMAR(GOV) LABOR(GOV) 
 
 
(1A) densities  tax trans (-) 
 Size Quantity 
  micro small medium Large  
SAMPLE B 
Developed 
(80%) 
(4B), 
(4B’) pfulltw 
tax(gov) 
promar(gov) 
function(gov) 
Employment Quality Promar(gov) 
------ 
Tax (gov) 
------ 
 
(3B), 
(3B’) empgrowth 
macro(gov) 
trans(gov) 
promar(gov) 
tax(gov) 
(2B) msmeemplo PROMAR(GOV)   
(1B) densities 
 tax 
trans (-) 
labor 
 
Size Quantity 
   micro Small medium Large    
                                                     
85
 A negative symbol after the variable “(-)” indicates the finding supports the theory that constraining business 
environments generate large numbers of small enterprises that are either not able to grow or do not have the 
incentives to grow beyond a certain size. The symbol “(gov)” after a variable’s name means that the variable is 
significant including its interaction with governance. 
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Appendix 2.16: List of Countries for Sample A and Sample B 
List of countries Sample A 
Afghanistan Chile Guatemala Luxembourg Peru Taiwan, China 
Albania China Guinea Macedonia, FYR Philippines Tajikistan 
Antigua and Barbuda Colombia Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Poland Tanzania 
Argentina Comoros Guyana Malawi Portugal Thailand 
Armenia Congo, Rep. Haiti Malaysia Puerto Rico (U.S.) Timor-Leste 
Australia Costa Rica Honduras Maldives Romania Togo 
Austria Côte d'Ivoire Hong Kong, China Mali Rwanda Tonga 
Bahamas, The Croatia Hungary Marshall Islands Samoa Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Bangladesh Cyprus Iceland Mauritania São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Tunisia 
Belarus Czech Republic India Mauritius Senegal Turkey 
Belgium Denmark Indonesia Mexico Serbia Uganda 
Belize Djibouti Ireland Micronesia, F. Ss. Seychelles Ukraine 
Benin Dominica Israel Moldova Sierra Leone United Kingdom 
Bhutan Dominican Republic Italy Mongolia Singapore United States 
Bolivia Egypt, Arab Rep. Jamaica Montenegro Slovak Republic Uruguay 
Bosnia and Herzegovina El Salvador Japan Morocco Slovenia Uzbekistan 
Botswana Eritrea Jordan Mozambique Solomon Islands Vanuatu 
Brazil Estonia Kenya Namibia South Africa Vietnam 
Brunei Darussalam Ethiopia Kiribati Nepal Spain West Bank and 
Gaza 
Bulgaria Fiji Korea, Rep. Netherlands Sri Lanka Zambia 
Burkina Faso Finland Kosovo New Zealand St. Kitts and Nevis Zimbabwe 
Burundi France Kyrgyz Republic Nicaragua St. Lucia  
Cambodia Gambia, The Lao PDR Niger St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
 
Cameroon Georgia Latvia Pakistan Sudan  
Canada Germany Lebanon Palau Suriname  
Cape Verde Ghana Lesotho Panama Swaziland  
Central African Republic Greece Liberia Papua New Guinea Sweden  
Chad Grenada Lithuania Paraguay Switzerland  
 
 
List of countries Sample B 
Argentina Colombia Hungary Mongolia Romania Tunisia 
Australia Côte d'Ivoire Italy Montenegro Senegal Turkey 
Austria Croatia Japan Morocco Serbia Uganda 
Belarus Czech Republic Korea, Rep. Mozambique Singapore Ukraine 
Belgium Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan South Africa United Kingdom 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Dominican Republic Lebanon Panama Spain Vietnam 
Brazil Estonia Luxembourg Peru Sweden Switzerland 
Bulgaria Finland Macedonia, FYR Philippines Taiwan, China  
Cameroon Ghana Mexico Poland Tajikistan  
Chile Guatemala Moldova Puerto Rico (U.S.) Thailand  
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Appendix 2.17: IV-Procedure – First Stage Regression Results 
Independent Variables ln_smeden promar function labor tax 
 (1A) First Stage 
ln GDPpc 0.448 -0.01844 -0.0027 -0.01637 -0.02784 
 (0.318) 0.012168 0.009887 0.037952 0.0201 
governance 0.273 -0.09101 0.013078 0.1778 -0.15524 
 (1.869) 0.061719 0.068495 0.290467 0.14142 
promar -2.809     
 (6.403)     
promar_gov      
      
function -10.48*     
 (6.218)     
labor -1.640     
 (1.420)     
labor_gov      
      
tax -1.322     
 (4.130)     
macro 1.266 0.111048* 0.053046 -0.0428 0.028453 
 (1.848) 0.057546 0.043409 0.197967 0.109087 
infra 0.404 0.131822* 0.080701 0.010988 -0.15613 
 (1.531) 0.077503 0.082045 0.303489 0.15756 
trans 1.661 -0.03199 -0.01029 0.20394 -0.19839 
 (1.761) 0.079859 0.07105 0.223018 0.125361 
english  -0.06437* 0.025212 -0.1556 -0.13299 
  0.03524 0.042473 0.197074 0.103046 
french  -0.02936 0.006614 0.080609 -0.09642 
  0.038727 0.046587 0.211905 0.109015 
german  -0.04253 -0.00976 -0.0172 -0.15137 
  0.034578 0.043929 0.229352 0.106445 
catholic  -7.6E-05 -5.2E-05 0.000233 1.96E-05 
  0.000201 0.000175 0.000677 0.000366 
muslim  0.000305 -0.00022 0.000744 -0.00022 
  0.000257 0.0002 0.000998 0.000445 
protestant  -0.00077 -0.00081 -1.6E-05 -0.00127 
  0.000496 0.000506 0.002264 0.001086 
ethnic_frac  0.019625 0.013342 0.341805*** -0.00452 
  0.030843 0.020935 0.100756 0.044366 
latitude  -0.12585** 0.101041** 0.438872*** 0.182168 
  0.063057 0.050311 0.169518 0.113259 
Constant -1.340 0.417515*** 0.061087 0.24142 0.832651*** 
 (4.154) 0.133497 0.129169 0.545195 0.277589 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 
r2 first (centered)  0.8209 0.5075 0.4489 0.5880 
r2 first (uncentered)  0.9788 0.9423 0.9168 0.9489 
Angrist-Pischke F (promar) 
p-value 
4.94 
0.0009 
4.94 
0.0009 
3.74 
0.0058 
3.55 
0.0077 
1.15 
0.3446 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 0.68     
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
4.94 
0.4232 
    
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
6.075 
0.1936 
    
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
2.11 
0.0514 
    
Instrumented: promar, tax, function, labor    
 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Independent Variables ln_smeden tax 
 (1A) First Stage 
ln GDPpc 0.467* -0.0248 
 (0.252) (0.0216) 
governance -0.436 -0.131 
 (1.684) (0.146) 
promar -0.298 0.206 
 (2.732) (0.259) 
function -3.245 -0.158 
 (3.906) (0.284) 
labor -0.660 -0.0214 
 (0.599) (0.0743) 
tax -3.860  
 (2.655)  
macro 0.685 0.0131 
 (1.057) (0.118) 
infra -0.833 -0.170 
 (1.157) (0.158) 
trans 0.894 -0.189 
 (1.211) (0.129) 
english  -0.119 
  (0.107) 
french  -0.0876 
  (0.114) 
german  -0.145 
  (0.112) 
catholic  3.20e-05 
  (0.000371) 
muslim  -0.000301 
  (0.000493) 
protestant  -0.00124 
  (0.00121) 
ethnic_frac  0.000853 
  (0.0487) 
latitude  0.233* 
  (0.128) 
Constant -1.252 0.762** 
 (2.987) (0.320) 
Observations 66 66 
r2 first (centered)  0.5936 
r2 first (uncentered)  0.9596 
Angrist-Pischke F (tax) 
p-value 
1.14 
0.3561 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 
1.14 
20.25 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
7.92 
0.4414 
 
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
6.742 
0.4562 
 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
1.55 
0.1637 
 
Instrumented: tax  
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Independent Variables ln_smeden tax 
 
(1A: only tax) First Stage 
ln GDPpc 0.200 -0.0223 
 (0.345) (0.0221) 
governance -1.500 -0.118 
 (1.661) (0.139) 
tax -7.158**  
 (3.462)  
macro -0.0766 -0.0578 
 (1.381) (0.113) 
infra -2.676 -0.188 
 (1.886) (0.158) 
trans 0.238 -0.126 
 (1.386) (0.132) 
english  -0.116 
  (0.103) 
french  -0.0722 
  (0.113) 
german  -0.121 
  (0.114) 
catholic  0.000101 
  (0.000406) 
muslim  -3.64e-05 
  (0.000464) 
protestant  -0.000681 
  (0.00118) 
ethnic_frac  0.0533 
  (0.0610) 
latitude  0.157 
  (0.110) 
Constant 3.116 0.747** 
 (4.859) (0.305) 
Observations 69 69 
r2 first (centered)  0.5369 
r2 first (uncentered)  0.9375 
Angrist-Pischke F (tax) 
p-value 
1.13 
0.3607 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 
1.13 
20.25 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
8.56 
0.3807 
 
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
9.086 
0.2465 
 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
3.02 
0.0069 
 
Instrumented: tax  
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Independent Variables msmeemplo promar promar_gov 
 (2A) First Stage 
ln GDPpc -0.0765 -0.01363 -0.0141** 
 (0.0576) 0.011654 0.006124 
governance 0.457 0.024394 0.004153 
 (0.621) 0.108407 0.046767 
promar -0.228   
 (1.387)   
promar_gov -4.920**   
 (2.360)   
function -0.215 0.250659** 0.089684 
 (0.641) 0.117052 0.065602 
labor -0.209 0.069134 0.000485 
 (0.190) 0.04515 0.014379 
labor_gov 0.885 -0.15345 -0.00808 
 (0.554) 0.097614 0.049747 
tax -0.0106 0.068397 0.020807 
 (0.251) 0.050876 0.017818 
macro 0.167 0.080106* 0.027267 
 (0.262) 0.044648 0.021673 
infra 0.0865 0.147148** 0.047224 
 (0.351) 0.066252 0.036252 
trans -0.0418 -0.01516 -0.02874 
 (0.319) 0.075458 0.038188 
english  -0.02411 0.005444 
  0.036959 0.01316 
french  0.011788 -0.00545 
  0.038003 0.015717 
german  0.001809 0.001097 
  0.036696 0.013254 
catholic  -3.3E-05 9.52E-05 
  0.000189 0.000102 
muslim  0.00042 4.21E-05 
  0.000292 0.000181 
protestant  -3.9E-05 6.93E-05 
  0.00037 0.000148 
ethnic_frac  0.016721 -0.0308 
  0.031752 0.019531 
latitude  -0.10749* 0.038837 
  0.061878 0.030727 
promarhatgov  -0.01084 0.788235*** 
  0.417684 0.192731 
Constant 1.330** 0.213715 0.092571 
 (0.593) 0.152059 0.071681 
Observations 75 75 75 
r2 first (centered)  0.8439 0.9523 
r2 first (uncentered)  0.9810 0.9832 
Angrist-Pischke F 
p-value 
 2.21 
0.0400 
4.27 
0.0005 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 
3.30 
18.30 
  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
15.37 
0.0524 
  
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
8.108 
0.3231 
  
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
2.06 
0.0495 
  
Instrumented: promar, promargov   
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Independent Variables msmeemplo labor labor_gov 
 (2A) First Stage 
ln GDPpc -0.0317 -0.01846 0.003216 
 (0.0513) 0.049614 0.023576 
governance 0.223 1.154571*** 0.31972 
 (0.542) 0.427287 0.20327 
promar 0.111 1.197994 0.205928 
 (1.211) 1.218989 0.496659 
promar_gov -2.517 -2.18564 -0.51835 
 (1.933) 2.16351 1.1078 
function -0.321 -0.33291 -0.20354 
 (0.655) 0.616949 0.301133 
labor -0.261   
 (0.420)   
labor_gov 0.379   
 (0.946)   
tax -0.0490 0.059614 0.023585 
 (0.266) 0.301869 0.099865 
macro 0.00154 -0.06416 -0.03158 
 (0.250) 0.163586 0.064214 
infra -0.0676 0.008545 0.067038 
 (0.310) 0.298224 0.120323 
trans 0.203 0.082616 0.08871 
 (0.316) 0.242787 0.106158 
english  -0.06753 0.116473 
  0.240085 0.074458 
french  0.137644 0.093666* 
  0.18589 0.055773 
german  0.014338 0.078039 
  0.208144 0.05077 
catholic  0.000969 0.000278 
  0.000718 0.000351 
muslim  0.001163 0.000517 
  0.001007 0.000525 
protestant  0.001747 0.001537* 
  0.002147 0.000823 
ethnic_frac  0.265102 0.018963 
  0.222702 0.092575 
latitude  0.556238*** 0.201443* 
  0.205853 0.106041 
laborhatgov  -0.57474 0.879188 
  1.406959 0.553042 
Constant 0.896* -0.09542 -0.35955 
 (0.528) 0.535852 0.243233 
Observations 75 75 75 
r2 first (centered)  0.4864 0.8299 
r2 first (uncentered)  0.9167 0.9369 
Angrist-Pischke F 
p-value 
 0.87 
0.5462 
0.89 
0.5308 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 
2.04 
18.30 
  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
p-value 
13.76 
0.0883 
  
Hansen J statistic 
p-value 
9.703 
0.2060 
  
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
p-value 
0.97 
0.4714 
  
Instrumented: labor, laborgov   
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Chapter 3  
Appendix 3.1: List of Variables and Definitions 
Name Description 
DATASET 1 
Productivity and utility 
Y Total annual sales in 2005 US$ 
K Net book value, the value of assets  after depreciation, of machinery, 
vehicles, and equipment in 2005 US$ 
LW Number of full time permanent workers at the end of last fiscal year 
LC Total annual cost of labor including wages, salaries, bonuses, social security 
payments in 2005 US$ 
M Total annual cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in 
production in 2005 US$ 
EC Total annual cost of electricity, fuel, and water used in production in 2005 
US$ (it includes communications and transportation costs) 
RC Total annual cost of rental of land, buildings, equipment, and furniture 
Investment Climate 
stability Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Stability 
measures macroeconomic and political stability. 
informal Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Informal 
is the degree of obstacle of practices of informal competitors to current 
operations  
corrupt Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Corruption as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
infrastructure Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. It is 
composed by electricity as a degree of obstacle for current operations, and 
transportation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. Equal weights 
applied. 
trade Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The 
regulation of trade as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
tax Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Tax rate 
as a degree of obstacle for current operations, and tax administrations as a 
degree of obstacle for current operations. Equal weights applied. 
opening Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The ease 
for opening a business as a degree of obstacle. 
labor Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The 
regulation of labor as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
finance Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Access 
to finance as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
eduworker Average educational attainment. 0-3 years of education, 4-6 years of 
education, 7-12 years of education, 13 years and above of education. 
courts Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Functioning of courts as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
crime Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Level of 
crime as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
Firm characteristics 
trasnform The first principal component of a variable measuring whether or not a firm 
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invested in R&D and whether or not the firm introduced a new product 
during the last fiscal year. Stata command polychoric applied. 
domsupply Percentage of inputs or supplies of domestic origin 
domsale Percentage of sales sold domestically 
visitbytax Whether or not the establishment was visited and/or inspected by tax 
officials. Yes (1). 
age Number of years since the establishment began operations 
size Number of full time permanent workers at the end of last fiscal year 
domown Whether or not the firm is foreign (0) or domestically owned (1) 
capacityu Percentage of the level of utilization of facilities. 
region Categorical variable; 1 Cochabamba, 2 La Paz, and 3 Santa Cruz 
Owners’ characteristics 
female Whether or not the owner is female (1). 
yearsexp How many years of experience in this sector does the top manager have. 
DATASET 2 
profit Profit in February 2007 
Investment Climate 
stability Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Stability 
measures macroeconomic and political stability. Equal weights applied. 
informal Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Informal 
is the degree of obstacle of practices of informal competitors to current 
operations  
corrupt Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Corruption as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
infrastructure Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Transportation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
trade Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Trade 
regulation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
tax Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Tax 
regulation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
labor Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Labor 
regulation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
finance Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Requirements to obtain credit as a degree of obstacle for current operations, 
and cost to obtain credit as a degree of obstacle for current operations. Equal 
weights are applied. 
eduworker Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Adequately educated workforce as a degree of obstacle for current 
operations. 
qualinput Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Access to 
quality raw materials as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
smallmarket Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Small 
markets / not being able to reach new clients as a degree of obstacle for 
current operations. 
tech Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Lack of 
machinery and adequate equipment as a degree of obstacle for current 
operations. 
transform Whether or not the firm is associated with other firms to improve prices in 
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order to access raw materials. Yes (1) 
courts Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Functioning of courts as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
crime Evaluated in a four scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Crime as 
a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
opening Number of fomal firms within 500 meters. 
Firm characteristics 
distancecity Straight line distance to city center (kilometers) 
age Number of years since the establishment began operations 
size Number male and female workers 
Owners’ characteristics 
female Whether or not the owner is female (1). 
eduowner Number of years of education 
enteff Entrepreneurial self-efficacy (enteff) is the first principal component of ten 
questions intended to measure the self-assessed ability to perform certain 
tasks. On a four point scale how owners were asked to assess their ability to 
perform ten business tasks; for example, sell a new product or service to a 
new client, hire good employees to expand business, estimate costs of a new 
project, resolve a difficult dispute with a client or supplier in another city, 
price their business correctly if they wish to sell it, and acquire new 
machinery among others.  
busgro Whether or not the motivation for starting a business was the opportunity to 
make that business grow. Yes (1). 
flehor Whether or not the motivation for starting a business was the flexibility of 
working hours. Yes (1). 
carfam Whether or not the motivation for starting a business was the additional time 
and location convenience to care for family members. Yes (1). 
povind Childhood poverty index (povind) intends to capture family wealth before 
becoming the owner of a business. The index is the first component of 
mothers years of schooling, the type of house floor when the owner was a 
child, and the frequency with which the household did not have enough to 
eat when the owner was a child (polychoric command in STATA was used 
given that one of the variables is dichotomous). 
ageowner Age of owner 
married Whether or not the owner is married. Yes (1). 
region Categorical variable; 1 El Alto, 2 Cochabamba, 3 La Paz, and 4 Santa Cruz 
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Appendix 3.2: Methodological Description 
Figure 3.2.1: Summary Description of Methodology 
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Appendix 3.3: Additional Estimations 
Table 3.3.1: TFP and Investment Climate variables – Inputted Values (dataset 1) 
 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3  TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 TFP3 
Independent Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) Independent Vars. (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability -0.0238 -0.0514 -0.0563 0.104 ic1 -0.182*** -0.171*** -0.173** -0.150* 
 (0.133) (0.130) (0.133) (0.154)  (0.0657) (0.0644) (0.0759) (0.0769) 
informal 0.238** 0.240** 0.244** 0.224* ic2 -0.0471 -0.0449 -0.0455 -0.0301 
 (0.110) (0.104) (0.106) (0.117)  (0.0586) (0.0567) (0.0587) (0.0580) 
corrupt -0.236* -0.232* -0.238* -0.306 ic3 -0.000633 -0.0222 -0.0338 -0.0942 
 (0.126) (0.123) (0.123) (0.190)  (0.0551) (0.0557) (0.0633) (0.0728) 
infrastructure -0.0981 -0.0457 -0.0631 -0.286      
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.179) (0.210)      
trade 0.122 0.149 0.153 0.113      
 (0.126) (0.133) (0.132) (0.147)      
tax -0.0460 -0.0185 -0.0181 0.251      
 (0.184) (0.173) (0.186) (0.199)      
opening 0.0439 -0.0273 -0.0314 -0.0876      
 (0.138) (0.142) (0.142) (0.163)      
labor -0.108 -0.165 -0.161 -0.267      
 (0.164) (0.150) (0.155) (0.184)      
finance -0.294** -0.271** -0.278** -0.221*      
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.119) (0.133)      
courts    -0.198      
    (0.191)      
crime    0.312*      
    (0.183)      
eduworker 0.204** 0.187** 0.184** 0.124 eduworker 0.192** 0.176* 0.178** 0.116 
 (0.0912) (0.0899) (0.0885) (0.0897)  (0.0900) (0.0896) (0.0890) (0.0918) 
transform -0.504** -0.458* -0.459* -0.490* transform -0.405* -0.380 -0.384* -0.359 
 (0.234) (0.242) (0.243) (0.251)  (0.222) (0.230) (0.231) (0.230) 
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domsupply  -0.0851 -0.0847 -0.0955 domsupply  -0.114 -0.119 -0.111 
  (0.193) (0.192) (0.219)   (0.192) (0.192) (0.227) 
domsale  0.202 0.205 0.0855 domsale  0.222 0.226 0.162 
  (0.264) (0.266) (0.290)   (0.259) (0.262) (0.289) 
age  0.396*** 0.397*** 0.412*** age  0.387*** 0.381*** 0.377*** 
  (0.109) (0.110) (0.114)   (0.107) (0.107) (0.110) 
size  -0.0712 -0.0710 -0.111 size  -0.0500 -0.0483 -0.0860 
  (0.0772) (0.0780) (0.0812)   (0.0750) (0.0758) (0.0798) 
domown  -0.593* -0.594* -0.590** domown  -0.557* -0.560* -0.546* 
  (0.301) (0.302) (0.286)   (0.318) (0.320) (0.296) 
capacityu  0.658** 0.648** 0.689** capacityu  0.717*** 0.720*** 0.733*** 
  (0.280) (0.278) (0.286)   (0.266) (0.267) (0.282) 
female  -0.185 -0.184 -0.271* female  -0.182 -0.186 -0.260* 
  (0.148) (0.150) (0.161)   (0.146) (0.149) (0.153) 
yearsexp  0.0114 0.0106 -0.00128 yearsexp  4.13e-05 0.00215 -0.0137 
  (0.0770) (0.0774) (0.0838)   (0.0767) (0.0766) (0.0799) 
_Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.0497 0.0772 _Iregion_2(LPZ)   0.0684 0.185 
   (0.188) (0.200)    (0.179) (0.198) 
_Iregion_3(SRZ)   -0.0680 0.124 _Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.0151 0.142 
   (0.235) (0.259)    (0.220) (0.239) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant 5.671*** 4.838*** 4.946*** 4.759*** Constant 4.953*** 4.023*** 3.985*** 4.178*** 
 (0.524) (0.823) (0.881) (0.958)  (0.286) (0.676) (0.697) (0.777) 
Observations 257 249 249 248 Observations 256 248 248 248 
R-squared 0.099 0.206 0.206 0.273 R-squared 0.071 0.179 0.180 0.234 
Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes No No Jointly significant (IC) Yes No No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0279 0.0365 0.0525 0.1315 Prob. > chi2 0.0395 0.0560 0.1491 0.2095 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 3.3.2: Profit and Investment Climate variables – Inputted Values (dataset 1) 
 lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit  lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stability 0.547* 0.107 0.130 0.121 ic1 -0.264*** -0.191** -0.158* -0.155* 
 (0.286) (0.169) (0.170) (0.221)  (0.101) (0.0737) (0.0890) (0.0934) 
informal 0.109 0.0895 0.107 0.138 ic2 -0.106 -0.108 -0.0913 -0.0934 
 (0.204) (0.108) (0.106) (0.125)  (0.110) (0.0708) (0.0759) (0.0795) 
corrupt -0.849*** -0.461*** -0.462*** -0.381 ic3 0.267** 0.0108 0.0496 0.0186 
 (0.251) (0.159) (0.160) (0.233)  (0.110) (0.0767) (0.0813) (0.0873) 
infrastructure 0.00275 0.162 0.230 0.0712      
 (0.265) (0.159) (0.171) (0.234)      
trade 0.418* -0.0833 -0.0559 -0.173      
 (0.236) (0.149) (0.145) (0.163)      
tax 0.108 0.182 0.299 0.384      
 (0.320) (0.217) (0.220) (0.256)      
opening 0.0633 -0.179 -0.150 -0.184      
 (0.244) (0.172) (0.166) (0.189)      
labor 0.112 -0.127 -0.125 -0.339      
 (0.275) (0.178) (0.179) (0.232)      
finance -0.653*** -0.380*** -0.370*** -0.309*      
 (0.230) (0.132) (0.136) (0.168)      
courts    0.296      
    (0.263)      
crime    0.0570      
    (0.207)      
eduworker 0.0723 0.252** 0.250** 0.198 eduworker 0.0348 0.252** 0.246** 0.203 
 (0.168) (0.118) (0.120) (0.123)  (0.169) (0.122) (0.123) (0.124) 
transform 1.088** -0.0869 -0.0553 0.0106 transform 1.259*** -0.0536 -0.0201 0.0207 
 (0.466) (0.320) (0.322) (0.337)  (0.471) (0.324) (0.323) (0.329) 
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domsupply  0.220 0.256 0.282 domsupply  0.277 0.302 0.309 
  (0.271) (0.271) (0.314)   (0.262) (0.262) (0.314) 
domsale  0.194 0.164 0.0789 domsale  0.208 0.190 0.131 
  (0.361) (0.359) (0.408)   (0.364) (0.363) (0.404) 
visitbytax  -0.0834 -0.0741 -0.114 visitbytax  -0.0875 -0.0807 -0.111 
  (0.195) (0.196) (0.203)   (0.197) (0.198) (0.203) 
age  0.612*** 0.623*** 0.649*** age  0.607*** 0.617*** 0.619*** 
  (0.137) (0.136) (0.144)   (0.134) (0.133) (0.141) 
size  1.352*** 1.341*** 1.323*** size  1.357*** 1.351*** 1.317*** 
  (0.0869) (0.0876) (0.0917)   (0.0849) (0.0853) (0.0890) 
domown  -0.594 -0.598 -0.525 domown  -0.536 -0.526 -0.476 
  (0.414) (0.415) (0.429)   (0.419) (0.420) (0.406) 
capacityu  0.0830 0.114 0.0527 capacityu  0.258 0.272 0.189 
  (0.355) (0.354) (0.379)   (0.340) (0.337) (0.357) 
female  -0.321* -0.294 -0.294 female  -0.270 -0.244 -0.304 
  (0.183) (0.184) (0.196)   (0.186) (0.188) (0.192) 
yearsexp  0.113 0.109 0.0928 yearsexp  0.0898 0.0825 0.0682 
  (0.111) (0.108) (0.120)   (0.109) (0.108) (0.117) 
_Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.160 -0.227 _Iregion_2(LPZ)   -0.222 -0.162 
   (0.234) (0.254)    (0.230) (0.239) 
_Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.309 0.293 _Iregion_3(SRZ)   0.0988 0.148 
   (0.316) (0.349)    (0.300) (0.315) 
industry dummies    Yes industry dummies    Yes 
          
Constant 11.14*** 5.920*** 5.409*** 5.356*** Constant 10.57*** 4.430*** 4.498*** 4.660*** 
 (0.895) (1.008) (1.129) (1.280)  (0.510) (0.936) (0.967) (1.066) 
Observations 263 251 251 250 Observations 262 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.120 0.635 0.640 0.653 R-squared 0.074 0.622 0.625 0.638 
Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes No No Jointly significant (IC) Yes Yes No No 
Prob. > chi2 0.0005 0.0200 0.0539 0.1926 Prob. > chi2 0.0025 0.0416 0.2056 0.2923 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Appendix 3.4: Test for Functional Form Misspecification 
Table 3.4.1: Results Functional Form Misspecification 
Table Model Ramsey RESET test (Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |¸|) 
3.9 5 0.0200 0.002 
3.9 6 0.0854 0.404 
3.9 7 0.1098 0.480 
3.9 8 0.3539 0.848 
3.10 5 0.3414 0.228 
3.10 6 0.9234 0.539 
3.10 7 0.7694 0.323 
3.10 8 0.6877 0.284 
3.11 5 0.0631 0.462 
3.11 6 0.9430 0.670 
3.11 7 0.7565 0.832 
3.11 8 0.8841 0.981 
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Appendix 3.5: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
Table 3.5.1: PCA on IC variables – Dataset 1 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs            608 
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors         3 
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params 30 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 3.33473 1.74889 0.3032 0.3032 
Factor2 1.58584 0.34378 0.1442 0.4473 
Factor3 1.24207 0.31195 0.1129 0.5602 
Factor4 0.93012 0.04009 0.0846 0.6448 
Factor5 0.89003 0.15107 0.0809 0.7257 
Factor6 0.73896 0.10009 0.0672 0.7929 
Factor7 0.63887 0.08668 0.0581 0.851 
Factor8 0.55218 0.05435 0.0502 0.9012 
Factor9 0.49783 0.16526 0.0453 0.9464 
Factor10 0.33257 0.07578 0.0302 0.9767 
Factor11 0.2568 . 0.0233 1 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 1695.21 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
m_stability 0.5823 -0.0582 0.4097 0.4897 
m_informal 0.3568 0.0786 0.5765 0.5342 
m_corrupt 0.7067 -0.2513 0.4372 0.2463 
m_infrastr~e 0.6276 -0.2714 -0.1489 0.5103 
m_trade 0.433 0.5162 -0.0549 0.5431 
m_tax 0.7499 0.0898 -0.3059 0.336 
m_opening 0.68 -0.1186 -0.39 0.3715 
m_labor 0.5325 0.5205 0.0338 0.4444 
m_finance 0.4406 -0.438 -0.473 0.3903 
m_courts 0.3502 0.6936 -0.1028 0.3857 
m_crime 0.4032 -0.455 0.2108 0.5859 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
m_stability 0.1345 0.6791 0.1764 0.4897 
m_informal -0.1742 0.6339 0.1834 0.5342 
m_corrupt 0.2724 0.8223 0.0581 0.2463 
m_infrastr~e 0.6111 0.337 0.0522 0.5103 
m_trade 0.1176 0.0996 0.6581 0.5431 
m_tax 0.6531 0.2069 0.4413 0.336 
m_opening 0.7432 0.1507 0.2312 0.3715 
m_labor 0.1228 0.2263 0.6995 0.4444 
m_finance 0.7654 0.0184 -0.1537 0.3903 
m_courts 0.0262 -0.0297 0.7828 0.3857 
m_crime 0.3015 0.5148 -0.241 0.5859 
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Table 3.5.2: PCA on IC variables – Dataset 2 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs            439 
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors         3 
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params 30 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.94062 3.37724 0.4491 0.4491 
Factor2 1.56338 0.30789 0.1421 0.5913 
Factor3 1.25549 0.32891 0.1141 0.7054 
Factor4 0.92658 0.05782 0.0842 0.7896 
Factor5 0.86875 0.37182 0.079 0.8686 
Factor6 0.49694 0.0625 0.0452 0.9138 
Factor7 0.43444 0.19017 0.0395 0.9533 
Factor8 0.24426 0.09949 0.0222 0.9755 
Factor9 0.14478 0.07153 0.0132 0.9887 
Factor10 0.07325 0.02174 0.0067 0.9953 
Factor11 0.05151 . 0.0047 1 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 3649.79 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
m_stability 0.5421 0.2189 0.5867 0.3141 
m_informal 0.8438 -0.2792 0.3072 0.1158 
m_corrupt 0.7933 0.0761 0.1872 0.3298 
m_infrastr~e 0.5671 -0.3303 -0.0977 0.5597 
m_trade 0.8425 0.3464 -0.298 0.0813 
m_tax 0.7141 -0.4714 0.0497 0.2654 
m_labor 0.7283 0.2449 -0.4356 0.2199 
m_finance 0.4838 0.595 0.3609 0.2817 
m_courts 0.7434 0.3556 -0.3231 0.2165 
m_crime 0.6217 -0.6347 0.082 0.2039 
opening -0.2456 0.1928 0.5 0.6525 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
m_stability 0.1241 0.3007 0.7616 0.3141 
m_informal 0.2709 0.8103 0.3928 0.1158 
m_corrupt 0.4644 0.4922 0.4607 0.3298 
m_infrastr~e 0.2959 0.5919 -0.0485 0.5597 
m_trade 0.9008 0.2317 0.2314 0.0813 
m_tax 0.2473 0.8193 0.0473 0.2654 
m_labor 0.8582 0.2066 0.0317 0.2199 
m_finance 0.3833 -0.058 0.7537 0.2817 
m_courts 0.8521 0.1561 0.1819 0.2165 
m_crime 0.093 0.8864 -0.0419 0.2039 
opening -0.3728 -0.2057 0.4077 0.6525 
 
 
 
180 
 
Appendix 3.6: Tests for Joint Significance 
For Table 3.9: 
Table 3.6.1: Test for joint significance of female and yearsexp. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.9 3 2 174 0.6328 0.2850 0.881 
3.9 4 2 164 0.4069 0.4605 0.533 
3.9 7 2 180 0.4378 0.4378 0.480 
3.9 8 2 172 0.2742 0.2742 0.848 
Table 3.6.2: Test for joint significance of size domsale and domsupply (after eliminating 
female and yearsexp). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.9 3 3 180 0.3946 0.1183 0.490 
3.9 4 3 170 0.2938 0.6915 0.884 
3.9 7 3 186 0.4097 0.0519 0.206 
3.9 8 3 178 0.3279 0.1443 0.279 
Table 3.6.3: Test for joint significance of stability, corrupt, infrastructure, trade, tax, opening, 
labor, courts, and crime (after eliminating size domsale and domsupply) in models 3 and 
4. Test for joint significance of ic2, and ic3 (after eliminating size domsale and 
domsupply) in models 7 and 8. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.9 3 7 184 0.2650 0.2621 0.426 
3.9 4 9 174 0.3009 0.6953 0.740 
3.9 7 2 190 0.6086 0.1238 0.121 
3.9 8 2 182 0.6134 0.1206 0.192 
Table 3.6.4: Test for joint significance of region (after eliminating stability, corrupt, 
infrastructure, trade, tax, opening, labor, courts and crime). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.9 3 2 194 0.2676 0.1020 0.294 
3.9 4 2 184 0.3529 0.1588 0.612 
3.9 7 2 192 0.5347 0.2078 0.173 
3.9 8 2 184 0.6135 0.3416 0.286 
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Table 3.6.5: Test for joint significance of informal, finance, eduworker, and transform (after 
eliminating region) in models 3 and 4. Test for joint significance of ic1 (after 
eliminating region) in models 7 and 8. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.9 3 4 196 0.0002 0.1882 0.610 
3.9 4 4 186 0.0016 0.1402 0.900 
3.9 7 1 194 0.0042 0.1107 0.185 
3.9 8 1 186 0.0123 0.3353 0.387 
For Table 3.10: 
Table 3.6.6: Test for joint significance of female and yearsexp. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.10 3 2 196 0.4927 0.9052 0.537 
3.10 4 2 185 0.6197 0.6101 0.424 
3.10 7 2 201 0.6968 0.7694 0.323 
3.10 8 2 193 0.5740 0.6877 0.284 
Table 3.6.7: Test for joint significance of capacityu, visitbytax, domsale and domsupply (after 
eliminating female and yearsexp). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.10 3 4 203 0.6035 0.5494 0.642 
3.10 4 4 192 0.9094 0.5657 0.830 
3.10 7 4 208 0.6018 0.8987 0.685 
3.10 8 4 200 0.9081 0.8891 0.583 
Table 3.6.8: Test for joint significance of region (after eliminating capacityu, visitbytax, 
domsale and domsupply). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.10 3 2 210 0.0692 0.7617 0.784 
3.10 4 2 199 0.0556 0.7737 0.707 
3.10 7 2 215 0.1550 0.9439 0.614 
3.10 8 2 207 0.1699 0.8919 0.522 
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Table 3.6.9: Test for joint significance of stability, informal, infrastructure, trade, tax, labor, 
crime, and transform (after eliminating region) in models 3 and 4. Test for joint 
significance of ic2, ic3, and transform (after eliminating region) in models 7 and 8. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.10 3 7 212 0.9040 0.7793 0.535 
3.10 4 8 201 0.5794 0.9485 0.976 
3.10 7 3 127 0.0993 0.9856 0.913 
3.10 8 3 209 0.1367 0.9718 0.801 
Table 3.6.10: Test for joint significance of (after eliminating stability, informal, 
infrastructure, trade, tax, labor, crime, and transform) in models 3 and 4. Test for joint 
significance of (after eliminating ic2, ic3, and transform) in models 7 and 8. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.10 3 4 222 0.0003 0.8649 0.823 
3.10 4 5 212 0.0045 0.9602 0.958 
3.10 7 2 221 0.0022 0.9368 0.877 
3.10 8 2 213 0.0080 0.9610 0.984 
For Table 11: 
Table 3.6.11: Test for joint significance of lneduowner, busgro, flehor, and povind. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.11 3 4 170 0.1808 0.6798 0.560 
3.11 4 4 168 0.2083 0.6479 0.554 
3.11 7 3 191 0.3679 0.7565 0.828 
3.11 8 4 176 0.1519 0.8841 0.981 
Table 3.6.12: Test for joint significance of age, and lndistancecity (after eliminating 
lneduowner, busgro, flehor, and povind). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.11 3 2 186 0.4604 0.6358 0.625 
3.11 4 2 184 0.4760 0.5783 0.653 
3.11 7 2 196 0.4286 0.6814 0.685 
3.11 8 2 192 0.4439 0.8201 0.823 
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Table 3.6.13: Test for joint significance of qualinput, smallmarket, and tech (after eliminating 
age, and lndistancecity). 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.11 3 3 189 0.9760 0.6046 0.784 
3.11 4 3 187 0.9832 0.5397 0.783 
3.11 7 3 199 0.8982 0.5390 0.744 
3.11 8 3 195 0.8931 0.7227 0.946 
Table 3.6.14: Test for joint significance of corrupt, trade, courts, crime, and transform (after 
eliminating qualinput, smallmarket, and tech) in models 3 and 4. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.11 3 3 212 0.3385 0.5381 0.659 
3.11 4 5 210 0.4603 0.4994 0.696 
Table 3.6.15: Test for joint significance of stability, informal, tax, labor, finance, opening, 
and eduworker (after eliminating corrupt, trade, courts, crime, and transform) in model 
4. Test for joint significance of ic1, ic2, ic3, eduworker, and transform in models 7 and 8. 
Table Model 
Joint Significance Test Functional Form Test 
F N Test Prob>F 
RESET 
test 
(Prob > F) 
Link test 
(P > |%|) 
3.11 4 7 218 0.0000 0.4919 0.648 
3.11 7 5 222 0.7550 0.5491 0.963 
3.11 8 5 218 0.8595 0.6580 0.866 
 
Appendix 3.7: Heteroskedasticity Tests Results 
Table 3.7.1 Heteroskedasticity Tests Results 
Table Model White Stat. p-value 
3.12 3 32.77708 0.5759 
3.12 4 65.29812 0.8657 
3.12 7 34.35875 0.1559 
3.12 8 61.73383 0.592 
3.13 3 23.83227 0.9235 
3.13 4 65.29812 0.8657 
3.13 7 17.08487 0.6475 
3.13 8 67.51828 0.0866 
3.14 4 153,9702 0.6817 
3.14 7 136.6178 0.0569 
3.14 8 153.6282 0.3588 
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Appendix 3.8: Instrumental Variables (IV) Procedure 
Measuring Fractionalization in Bolivia 
According to Alesina et al. (2003) one of the ways of calculating an ethno linguistic 
fractionalization variable (also called ELF) is subtracting from a value of 1 the Herfindahl 
index of ethno linguistic group shares and reflect the probability that “two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belonged to different groups.” This is expressed in the formula 
below86: 
a]/_s? = 1 − ¹ ?@6
º
?»7
 
According to Alesina et al. (2003) argued that it is important to account for differences 
in languages and ethnicity combined and not only individually. Using the example of Latin 
America, the previous authors rightly pointed out that while two individual could speak the 
same language (for example that of the former colony), they do not necessarily belong to the 
same ethnicity87. Using dataset 2 for the case of Bolivia, it was found that data for language 
was categorized into four groups: 
 
Table 3.8.1: Main Languages in Bolivia 
Language learned 
during childhood 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Castellano (Spanish) 420 66.77 66.77 
Quechua 55 8.74 75.52 
Aymará 150 23.85 99.36 
Guaraní 2 0.32 99.68 
Extranjero (Foreign) 2 0.32 100 
Total 629 100 
 
Likewise, dataset 2 suggest the existence of the following categories regarding ethnicity: 
 
                                                     
86
 ?@   is the share of group i in country j. For the case of Bolivia, it would be the share of group i in district j. 
87
 Posner (2004) further investigated for the case of Africa and proposed that fractionalization should account 
for the participation in power and decision making of different ethnic groups. 
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Table 3.8.2: Ethnic Self-identification in Bolivia 
Ethnic self-
identification 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Blanca 47 7.47 7.47 
Chola 23 3.66 11.13 
Mestiza 359 57.07 68.2 
Indígena 90 14.31 82.51 
Negra 4 0.64 83.15 
Originaria 79 12.56 95.71 
NS/NR 27 4.29 100 
Total 629 100 
 Consequently, for two individuals to be classified as part of the same group, they will 
have to be self-identified with the same ethnic and language category.  
Applying the equation based on the Herfindahl index the ethnic fractionalization 
(ethnicfr) variable was constructed. 
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Table 3.8.3: IV Procedure – IC is measured and instrumented by an overall indicator (ic), dataset2 
 
 lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ic 4.979 4.055 -3.214 -2.387 0.381 -0.748 -5.427 
 (6.353) (5.860) (2.808) (2.771) (3.791) (3.618) (3.867) 
m_eduworker -0.106 -0.103 -0.0806 -0.0832 -0.0919 -0.0883 -0.0736 
 (0.317) (0.297) (0.262) (0.253) (0.248) (0.246) (0.297) 
qualinput -0.111 -0.0964 0.0185 0.00539 -0.0383 -0.0205 0.0534 
 (0.123) (0.115) (0.0831) (0.0818) (0.0883) (0.0856) (0.106) 
smallmarket -0.110 -0.106 -0.0726 -0.0764 -0.0891 -0.0839 -0.0625 
 (0.105) (0.101) (0.0916) (0.0896) (0.0889) (0.0884) (0.101) 
tech 0.0114 0.00987 -0.00227 -0.000886 0.00374 0.00185 -0.00596 
 (0.0868) (0.0816) (0.0642) (0.0636) (0.0667) (0.0643) (0.0695) 
transform 0.409 0.371 0.0777 0.111 0.223 0.177 -0.0117 
 (0.444) (0.434) (0.506) (0.488) (0.444) (0.460) (0.574) 
lndistancecity -0.109 -0.0761 0.181 0.152 0.0538 0.0938 0.259* 
 (0.263) (0.244) (0.129) (0.127) (0.163) (0.157) (0.148) 
age 0.00839 0.00832 0.00774 0.00781 0.00803 0.00794 0.00756 
 (0.00623) (0.00601) (0.00596) (0.00579) (0.00555) (0.00560) (0.00656) 
lnsize 0.658*** 0.664*** 0.710*** 0.705*** 0.688*** 0.695*** 0.724*** 
 (0.161) (0.149) (0.110) (0.107) (0.112) (0.107) (0.125) 
female -0.458* -0.443* -0.325 -0.339 -0.384* -0.365* -0.289 
 (0.264) (0.251) (0.246) (0.235) (0.215) (0.220) (0.288) 
lneduowner -0.225 -0.224 -0.216 -0.217* -0.220* -0.219* -0.214 
 (0.158) (0.149) (0.132) (0.129) (0.128) (0.126) (0.148) 
enteff 0.202** 0.200** 0.191** 0.192** 0.196** 0.194** 0.188** 
 (0.0921) (0.0877) (0.0796) (0.0777) (0.0761) (0.0757) (0.0876) 
busgro 0.371 0.365 0.318 0.323 0.341 0.334 0.304 
 (0.277) (0.269) (0.282) (0.275) (0.259) (0.262) (0.314) 
flehor -0.153 -0.155 -0.176 -0.174 -0.166 -0.169 -0.183 
 (0.211) (0.202) (0.194) (0.189) (0.184) (0.184) (0.212) 
carfam -0.514* -0.491* -0.310* -0.330** -0.399** -0.371** -0.255 
 (0.276) (0.259) (0.162) (0.162) (0.191) (0.181) (0.185) 
povind -0.135 -0.123 -0.0279 -0.0387 -0.0750 -0.0602 0.00109 
 (0.118) (0.109) (0.0725) (0.0713) (0.0806) (0.0772) (0.0890) 
ageowner -0.0236* -0.0225** -0.0139* -0.0149* -0.0182** -0.0169** -0.0113 
 (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.00778) (0.00775) (0.00871) (0.00843) (0.00885) 
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married 0.604* 0.561* 0.226 0.264 0.392* 0.340 0.124 
 (0.329) (0.307) (0.199) (0.197) (0.236) (0.228) (0.242) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -5.125 -3.201 11.93** 10.21* 4.447 6.799 16.54** 
 (13.15) (12.12) (6.005) (5.899) (7.920) (7.578) (8.265) 
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.179 0.257 0.368 0.401 0.426 0.431 0.224 
F-statistic 2.23 1.18 3.23 4.29 2.15 1.56 5.20 
p-value 0.1367 0.3094 0.0238 0.0152 0.1195 0.2016 0.0238 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 2.51 2.63 8.89 7.77 4.49 4.97 4.98 
p-value 0.1133 0.2684 0.0308 0.0205 0.1058 0.1739 0.0256 
Cragg-Donal Wald F 1.83 0.92 2.12 3.10 1.76 1.20 4.42 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 2.23 1.18 3.23 4.29 2.15 1.56 5.20 
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38 19.93 9.08 19.93 19.93 9.08 16.38 
Hansen J statistic e.e.i. e.e.i. e.e.i. e.e.i. e.e.i. e.e.i. e.e.i. 
p-value        
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 0.86 1.25 1.62 1.49 0.66 1.09 2.32 
p-value 0.3559 0.2899 0.1853 0.2292 0.5175 0.3538 0.1298 
Instrumented ic ic ic ic ic ic ic 
Instruments 
ethnicfr ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
distancecity 
 
ethnicfr 
distancecity_ethnicfr 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8.4: IV Procedure – IC is measured by PCA results, dataset2 
 lnprofit lnprofit 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) 
ic1 4.160 4.029 
 (8.328) (6.791) 
ic2 -1.216 -1.170 
 (1.651) (2.400) 
ic3 0.162 0.141 
 (2.052) (1.559) 
m_eduworker -0.111 -0.125 
 (1.187) (0.973) 
qualinput -0.267 -0.259 
 (0.587) (0.482) 
smallmarket 0.120 0.114 
 (0.353) (0.342) 
tech 0.0352 0.0344 
 (0.214) (0.203) 
transform -0.926 -0.888 
 (1.669) (1.733) 
lndistancecity -0.662 -0.638 
 (1.506) (1.206) 
age 0.0261 0.0255 
 (0.0368) (0.0342) 
lnsize 1.004** 0.995* 
 (0.500) (0.515) 
female 0.325 0.303 
 (1.203) (1.156) 
lneduowner -0.696 -0.680 
 (0.942) (0.781) 
enteff -0.207 -0.194 
 (0.692) (0.627) 
busgro 0.761 0.748 
 (1.200) (1.056) 
flehor 0.499 0.476 
 (1.164) (1.055) 
carfam -0.525 -0.521 
 (0.607) (0.567) 
povind 0.358 0.344 
 (0.587) (0.612) 
ageowner -0.0324 -0.0318 
 (0.0448) (0.0367) 
married 0.827 0.814 
 (1.087) (0.927) 
scz 4.809 4.666 
 (12.77) (10.38) 
cbba 8.968 8.688 
 (15.97) (13.20) 
ea 4.562 4.405 
 (7.972) (6.695) 
id2 0.827 0.762 
 (2.457) (1.946) 
id3 1.438 1.342 
 (7.275) (5.362) 
id4 4.318 4.155 
 (10.53) (7.892) 
id5 -1.003 -0.972 
 (2.436) (2.087) 
id6 -2.152 -2.095 
 (3.408) (3.246) 
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id7 -3.453 -3.381 
 (4.911) (4.951) 
Constant -0.477 -0.257 
 (11.58) (8.852) 
Observations 206 206 
R-squared -3.217 -2.996 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic1) 0.46 0.56 
p-value 0.4973 0.4537 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic2) 7.50 3.08 
p-value 0.0068 0.0809 
Angrist-Pischke F (ic3) 2.15 4.10 
p-value 0.1445 0.0443 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 0.47 0.56 
p-value 0.4946 0.4528 
Cragg-Donal Wald F 0.10 0.14 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 0.13 0.16 
Stock-Yogo critical values(10%) 16.38 16.38 
Hansen J statistic e.e.i. e.e.i. 
p-value   
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 1.62 1.09 
p-value 0.1853 0.3538 
Instrumented   
Instruments 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distanceciy_ethnicfr 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8.5: IV Procedure – IC variables are instrumented individually  
 lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit lnprofit 
Dep. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
stability -2.029 -2.429 -1.643** -4.371 -1.630* -0.0269 -1.409* 
 (2.528) (3.435) (0.786) (2.936) (0.882) (1.594) (0.776) 
informal 2.417 3.674 2.751* 8.524 2.094** 0.0586 1.815* 
 (2.204) (6.190) (1.477) (6.309) (0.981) (2.090) (1.062) 
corrupt -0.544 -1.088 -1.356 -2.376 -0.637 0.504 -0.475 
 (0.599) (2.109) (1.296) (1.928) (0.688) (1.182) (0.586) 
infrastructure -1.359*** -1.516** -2.856 -0.936 -1.544** -0.934* -1.444*** 
 (0.369) (0.698) (2.113) (0.688) (0.766) (0.542) (0.508) 
trade -0.0569 0.125 0.527 2.464 0.104 -0.547 -0.0802 
 (0.461) (0.926) (0.991) (2.481) (0.874) (0.620) (0.389) 
tax 1.299 0.626 1.703* -14.53 1.834 3.726 1.641 
 (1.259) (3.302) (0.955) (14.90) (1.465) (2.456) (1.156) 
labor -0.541 -0.579 -1.256 1.960 -0.985 -0.237 -0.548 
 (0.542) (0.574) (1.127) (2.384) (1.830) (0.530) (0.513) 
finance -0.367 0.0284 -0.00839 4.926 -0.488 -3.755 -0.598 
 (1.215) (2.296) (1.018) (5.204) (0.696) (3.004) (0.628) 
opening 0.00230* 0.00257 0.00134 0.00488 0.00208 0.00211 6.52e-05 
 (0.00133) (0.00183) (0.00190) (0.00335) (0.00136) (0.00134) (0.00682) 
courts 0.0574 -0.000847 -0.426 -0.824 0.0216 0.667 0.0665 
 (0.321) (0.420) (0.778) (0.975) (0.376) (0.582) (0.293) 
crime 0.489 0.817 1.237 12.70 0.240 -1.979 0.152 
 (1.424) (2.270) (1.806) (11.58) (0.935) (2.552) (1.077) 
eduworker -0.922* -1.064 -0.518 1.636 -0.834** -1.551* -0.785* 
 (0.489) (0.830) (0.648) (2.347) (0.391) (0.789) (0.433) 
qualinput -0.00125 0.00228 0.000277 0.0344 -0.00332 0.0151 -0.00876 
 (0.0637) (0.0676) (0.0683) (0.113) (0.0661) (0.0649) (0.0684) 
smallmarket -0.0565 -0.0579 -0.0394 -0.129 -0.0500 -0.0379 -0.0597 
 (0.0844) (0.0855) (0.0861) (0.169) (0.0857) (0.0943) (0.0851) 
tech 0.000176 -0.00168 -0.00432 0.0845 -0.0107 0.00605 0.00107 
 (0.0671) (0.0686) (0.0711) (0.141) (0.0727) (0.0725) (0.0678) 
transform 0.347 0.282 0.255 -0.437 0.335 0.365 0.317 
 (0.432) (0.463) (0.443) (0.857) (0.424) (0.451) (0.433) 
lndistancecity 0.0966 0.0862 0.0225 -0.0415 0.0784 0.0981 0.0472 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.143) (0.216) (0.112) (0.105) (0.157) 
age 0.00626 0.00617 0.00504 0.00211 0.00633 0.00551 0.00636 
 (0.00573) (0.00565) (0.00602) (0.00869) (0.00574) (0.00697) (0.00583) 
lnsize 0.646*** 0.634*** 0.675*** 0.554*** 0.671*** 0.631*** 0.668*** 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.121) (0.202) (0.143) (0.110) (0.134) 
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female -0.439** -0.396 -0.351 0.0311 -0.409* -0.474** -0.414* 
 (0.207) (0.255) (0.257) (0.548) (0.235) (0.222) (0.216) 
lneduowner -0.208 -0.201 -0.208 -0.100 -0.198 -0.226 -0.208 
 (0.132) (0.139) (0.140) (0.233) (0.144) (0.140) (0.132) 
enteff 0.168** 0.154 0.143 0.0743 0.171** 0.189** 0.165** 
 (0.0725) (0.0962) (0.0880) (0.149) (0.0718) (0.0748) (0.0746) 
busgro 0.388 0.347 0.494* -0.157 0.430 0.573 0.442 
 (0.275) (0.350) (0.285) (0.655) (0.278) (0.376) (0.277) 
flehor -0.188 -0.176 -0.218 -0.0991 -0.202 -0.217 -0.196 
 (0.188) (0.193) (0.213) (0.281) (0.205) (0.191) (0.188) 
carfam -0.220 -0.224 -0.244 -0.322 -0.244 -0.161 -0.275 
 (0.165) (0.162) (0.169) (0.284) (0.168) (0.180) (0.214) 
povind -0.0275 -0.0166 -0.00718 0.0540 -0.0387 -0.0311 -0.0327 
 (0.0663) (0.0829) (0.0709) (0.136) (0.0778) (0.0669) (0.0642) 
ageowner -0.0116 -0.0114 -0.0147 -0.0174 -0.0129 -0.0120 -0.0133 
 (0.00821) (0.00817) (0.00903) (0.0130) (0.00871) (0.00851) (0.00827) 
married 0.246 0.238 0.265 0.221 0.252 0.282* 0.306 
 (0.184) (0.192) (0.164) (0.242) (0.162) (0.168) (0.203) 
region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.009** 6.007 6.407** -25.20 7.664*** 14.18* 7.564** 
 (2.754) (5.227) (3.028) (30.22) (2.906) (7.441) (2.983) 
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.529 0.520 0.488 -0.271 0.527 0.466 0.524 
F-statistic 5.11 1.47 1.94 0.61 2.71 2.82 3.26 
p-value 0.0021 0.2254 0.1254 0.6069 0.0467 0.0404 0.0229 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 16.61 5.73 6.50 2.31 7.46 12.65 10.51 
p-value 0.0008 0.1255 0.0898 0.5099 0.0587 0.0055 0.0147 
Cragg-Donal Wald F 4.83 1.10 1.75 0.64 3.00 3.01 2.36 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 5.11 1.47 1.94 0.61 2.71 2.82 3.26 
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Hansen J statistic 4.592 4.481 3.645 0.184 4.517 2.749 4.5560 
p-value 0.1007 0.1064 0.1616 0.9120 0.1045 0.2529 0.1023 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 1.32 1.27 1.52 1.01 1.33 1.36 1.28 
p-value 0.2694 0.2855 0.2113 0.3890 0.2659 0.2573 0.2819 
Instrumented stability informal infrastructure tax labor finance opening 
Instruments 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
ethnicfr 
latitude_ethnicfr 
distancecity 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4  
Appendix 4.1: Selection of Countries 
After a data cleaning process, the final sample includes eight countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Countries such as 
Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador and Mexico were excluded because the analyzed sector 
(ISIC 1810) has a particular relevance in those economies which seems to be different from 
the countries in the south. Namely, manufacture of wearing apparel represents a large 
proportion of exports in those countries as shown in the figures below. 
Figure 4.1.1: Share of Manufacture of Wearing Apparel in Total Exports 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN-COMTRADE. 
In addition, the previous difference has been persistent over time. The figures below 
show that the sector of manufacturing of apparel has a different behavior both in terms of 
exports and imports in Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador and Mexico. 
Figure 4.1.2: Share of Manufacture of Wearing Apparel in Total Exports 2007-2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN-COMTRADE. 
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Figure 4.1.3: Share of Manufacture of Wearing Apparel in Total Imports 2007-2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN-COMTRADE. 
 
While countries in the LAC region might have some differences in regard to the main 
sectors of their economies, they are relatively more homogeneous in terms of their imports. 
Once countries such as Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador and Mexico are excluded, the sector 
of manufacture of wearing apparel has relatively the same importance in the rest of the 
economies analyzed in this study.  
 
Figure 4.1.4: Share in Total Exports by Sectors – Average 2007-2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN-COMTRADE. 
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Figure 4.1.5: Share in Total Imports by Sectors – Average 2007 - 2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN-COMTRADE. 
Finally, countries in the region have more or less behaved with the same trends in terms 
of economic growth during the last decade. 
Figure 4.1.6: GDP per Capita Growth (annual %) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the World Bank Data. 
Note: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions 
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
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Finally, the contribution of value added to GDP in the South American countries 
included in the sample is more homogenous across time. 
 
Figure 4.1.7: Share Manufacturing Value Added in GDP 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the World Bank Data. 
Note: Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is 
the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value 
added at factor cost is used as the denominator. 
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Appendix 4.2: Variables Description 
Table 4.2.1: List of Variables 
Name Description 
Productivity and utility 
Y Total annual sales in 2005 US$ 
K Net book value, the value of assets  after depreciation, of machinery, 
vehicles, and equipment in 2005 US$ 
L Number of full time permanent and temporary workers at the end of last 
fiscal year 
LC Total annual cost of labor including wages, salaries, bonuses, social security 
payments in 2005 US$ 
M Total annual cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in production 
in 2005 US$ 
E Total annual cost of electricity in 2005 US$ 
Investment Climate 
stability Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Stability 
measures political stability. 
informal Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Informal 
is the degree of obstacle of practices of informal competitors to current 
operations  
corrupt Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Corruption as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
infrastructure Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. It is 
composed by electricity as a degree of obstacle for current operations, and 
transportation as a degree of obstacle for current operations. Equal weights 
applied. 
trade Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The 
regulation of customs and trade as a degree of obstacle for current 
operations. 
tax Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Tax rate 
as a degree of obstacle for current operations, and tax administrations as a 
degree of obstacle for current operations. Equal weights applied. 
opening Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The ease 
for opening a business, business licensing and permits, as a degree of 
obstacle. 
labor Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. The 
regulation of labor as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
finance Proportion of the establishment’s working capital that was financed from 
banks (private and state-owned). 
eduworker Average educational attainment. 0-3 years of education, 4-6 years of 
education, 7-12 years of education, 13 years and above of education. 
courts Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. 
Functioning of courts as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
crime Evaluated in a five scale from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Level of 
crime, theft and disorder as a degree of obstacle for current operations. 
Firm characteristics 
age Number of years since the establishment began operations. 
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size Number of full time permanent workers at the end of last fiscal year. 
capacityu Percentage of the level of utilization of facilities. 
Others 
d_market Distance to market. Distance in kilometers to Washington D.C., United 
States 
d_port Distance to closest port. Distance in kilometers to closest port. Port cities are 
assigned a value of zero. 
population City population. 
 
 
Appendix 4.3: Analysis of Production Function Coefficients 
The estimated coefficients for capital and labor of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
using levpet (LP) and xtreg, fe (FE) strongly differ with the estimated coefficients obtained 
by pooled OLS, GEE, and RE. Please, see Table 2 of the Results section. 
The following hypotheses main explain the discrepancy: 
Reduced number of periods in my panel data: 
The panel data has only two periods. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009) the “RE 
estimator approaches the within estimator as T gets large and as σ_α^2 gets large relative to 
σ_ϵ^2 because in those cases θ ̂_i→1.” Therefore, it is possible that because T=1, the 
coefficients obtained by RE do not approach the coefficients obtained by FE and LP. 
Reduced number of firms with observations in both periods: 
Data is an unbalanced panel of 974 firms. Only 192 firms have observations in both 
time periods. All observations belong to the same 4-digit level International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) code (ISIC 1810). See Table below. 
Table 4.3.1: Panel Data Characteristics 
idpanel:  101077, 101078, ..., 498179                       n =        974 
year2:  1, 2, ..., 2                                       T =          2 
idpanel:  101077, 101078, ..., 498179                       n =        974 
Delta(year2) = 1 unit 
Span(year2)  = 2 periods 
(idpanel*year2 uniquely identifies each observation) 
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Distribution of T_i:   min      5%     25%       50%       75%     95%     max 
                                                1        1             1            1          1            2       2 
Freq. Percent Cum. Pattern 
508 52.16 52.16 1. 
274 28.13 80.29 .1 
192 19.71 100.00 11 
974 100.00  xx 
Little variation over time (within variation) in key variables: 
According to the results presented in Table below, there is more variation across 
individuals (between variation) than over time (within variation) which may suggest that 
within estimation may lead to considerable efficiency loss as highlighted by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009). In addition the authors explained that “in the FE model the coefficient of a 
regressor with little within variation will be imprecisely estimated and will not be identified if 
there is no within variation at all.” 
Table 4.3.2: Overall, Between, and Within Variation 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
idpanel overall 193404.3   151333.7     101077 498179 N =    1166 
 between  161484.5     101077 498179 n =     974 
 within  0 193404.3 193404.3 T-bar = 1.19713 
y overall 13.08743   1.875704   6.813706   21.75875 N =    1042 
 between  1.878465 6.813706   21.75875 n =     873 
 within  .2051117   11.59383   14.58103 T-bar = 1.19359 
va3 overall 12.50667   1.894455   6.079737   21.75873 N =     865 
 between  1.897157   6.079737   21.75873 n =     739 
 within  .2569863   10.51623   14.49711 T-bar =  1.1705 
k overall 10.79024   1.919926   5.002411   18.78616 N =     727 
 between  1.895633   5.002411   18.78616 n =     634 
 within  .3840536   8.753728   12.82675 T-bar = 1.14669 
lw overall 3.597449   1.314783   .6931472   8.594154 N =    1028 
 between  1.277099   1.098612   8.594154 n =     859 
 within  .1904148   1.906752   5.288146 T-bar = 1.19674 
m overall 12.06687   2.068275   5.897415   17.63348 N =     881 
 between  2.055938   5.897415   17.63348 n =     748 
 within  .3140932   9.945006   14.18873 T-bar = 1.17781 
e overall 8.501361   1.762031   2.229823    14.1232 N =     912 
 between  1.750252   2.229823    14.1232 n =     774 
 within  .3315627    5.89639   11.10633 T-bar = 1.17829 
year overall 2007.599   1.960152 2006 2010 N =    1166 
 between  1.727336 2006 2010 n =     974 
 within  1.14824   2005.599   2009.599 T-bar = 1.19713 
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I also conducted some tests. The first two tests indicate that I could use random effects (RE). 
Test 1: Testime for Time Fixed effects 
No time fixed effects are needed (Prob>F is >0.05). 
( 1)  2010.year = 0  
F(  1,    80) =     2.07 
Prob > F =     0.1539 
 
Test 2: Testing for random effects: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
I reject the null, and conclude that random effects is appropriate (no evidence of significant 
differences across countries). 
va [idpanel,t] = Xb + u[idpanel] + e[idpanel,t] 
Estimated results: Var      sd = sqrt(Var) 
va 3.666755        1.914877 
e .3669783        .6057874 
u .8647367        .9299122 
 
Test:   Var(u) = 0  
chibar2(01) =     13.17 
Prob > chibar2 =    0.0001 
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Appendix 4.4: Instrumental Variables (IV) Procedure 
Table 4.4.1: First Stage Regression Results for Table 4.5 (TFP) 
 tfp_stch ic tfp_stch ic tfp_stch ic1 ic2 ic3 
Ind. Vars. (4) First Stage (5) First Stage (6) First Stage First Stage First Stage 
ic -6.122**  -4.740**      
 (2.970)  (2.135)      
ic1     0.0417    
     (1.194)    
ic2     0.0878    
     (0.500)    
ic3     -0.437    
     (0.319)    
distance_market -0.702 0.467092*** -0.898 0.280685* 1.286 -0.45536 3.435788*** 13.47408*** 
 (2.376) (0.109491) (2.206) (0.143533) (4.356) (0.360738) (1.056121) (1.765704) 
distance_port 0.139* 0.025387*** 0.111* 0.02806*** 0.0761 0.093619*** 0.160709*** 0.308491*** 
 (0.0734) (0.001964) (0.0624) (0.002081) (0.0678) (0.004143) (0.009022) (0.020123) 
population 0.622*** 0.074604*** 0.532*** 0.071921*** 0.156 0.39053*** 0.227383*** -0.04481 
 (0.204) (0.009813) (0.174) (0.013789) (0.494) (0.022905) (0.026366) (0.090283) 
age 0.171*** -0.00085 0.176*** -7E-05 0.178*** 0.001655 0.007838 0.004882 
 (0.0662) (0.002402) (0.0653) (0.0021) (0.0661) (0.004834) (0.006623) (0.016979) 
eduworker 0.260*** -0.00117 0.261*** -0.00044 0.259*** 0.009926* -0.01008* -0.01454 
 (0.0624) (0.00234) (0.0621) (0.002131) (0.0656) (0.005489) (0.006087) (0.017851) 
capacityu 0.141 -0.01096* 0.149 -0.00471 0.183 -0.00115 -0.01328 -0.03069 
 (0.144) (0.006642) (0.136) (0.004724) (0.126) (0.010533) (0.012759) (0.041055) 
latitude  -1.40016***  -1.57101  22.60679*** 66.38824** 80.30537* 
  (0.363637)  (4.195861)  (7.595884) (26.3848) (42.63033) 
ethnicfr*latitude    -2.88405  -41.2892*** -71.37*** -124.465*** 
    (5.127292)  (8.411476) (25.87459) (44.62732) 
religionfr*latitude    5.397358  -36.3575** -144.377** -194.67** 
    (9.153606)  (16.81938) (59.97461) (97.31925) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.35 -3.02598*** 14.99 -1.42114 -7.934 -2.98545 -39.2391*** -123.527*** 
 (20.27) (1.081555) (19.04) (1.334186) (34.61) (3.573536) (11.68125) (18.46022) 
Observations 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 
R-squared 0.228 0.9554 0.244 0.9602 0.265 0.9912 0.9877 0.8807 
F-statistic 14.83  21.95  38.84; 7.19; 40.33    
Angrist-Pischke F      27.69 5.01 18.59 
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p-value      0.0000 0.0256 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 27.05  41.02  3.838    
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0501    
Cragg-Donal Wald F 98.89  60.77  17.613    
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 14.83  21.95  2.461    
Stock-Yogo critical 
values(10%) 
16.38  9.08  not available    
Hansen J statistic 0.000  1.659  0.000    
p-value e.e.i.  0.4362  e.e.i.    
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 8.00  2.89  2.89    
p-value 0.0048  0.0350  0.0350    
Instrumented ic  ic  ic1 ic2 ic3    
Instruments 
latitude  latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
 latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
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Table 4.4.2: First Stage Regression Results for Table 4.6 (average wage rates) 
Ind. Vars.   ic   ic1 ic2 ic3 
 (1) First Stage (2) First Stage First Stage First Stage 
ic -6.965**      
 (2.800)      
ic1   -0.760***    
   (0.192)    
ic2   0.248    
   (0.397)    
ic3   -0.165*    
   (0.0994)    
age 0.0921*** 0.001188 0.0889*** 0.007135* -0.00044 -0.00137 
 (0.0212) (0.001231) (0.0186) (0.004187) (0.005329) (0.007597) 
size 0.174*** 0.001403** 0.164*** 0.003674* -0.0009 -0.01179*** 
 (0.0120) (0.000636) (0.0108) (0.002177) (0.002723) (0.003882) 
eduworker 0.153*** 0.005136*** 0.121*** 0.015402*** 0.010528 -0.02809*** 
 (0.0288) (0.001586) (0.0242) (0.005392) (0.007421) (0.009875) 
capacityu 0.0826** -0.00146 0.0913*** 0.001839 0.002998 -0.00248 
 (0.0326) (0.00183) (0.0298) (0.006779) (0.008653) (0.011899) 
distance_market 1.105 0.425072*** -1.518 2.170447*** 4.784643*** 0.28467 
 (0.972) (0.053269) (1.361) (0.218202) (0.446927) (0.456727) 
distance_port 0.196*** 0.024393*** 0.0511 0.107046*** 0.170192*** -0.01251** 
 (0.0670) (0.000731) (0.0602) (0.003679) (0.0058) (0.005836) 
population 0.598*** 0.067554*** 0.300*** 0.370337*** 0.204099*** -0.33508*** 
 (0.190) (0.002571) (0.104) (0.009128) (0.011665) (0.017658) 
year 0.209*** -0.00764*** 0.268*** -0.00931* 0.002782 0.061134*** 
 (0.0353) (0.001729) (0.0282) (0.005553) (0.007752) (0.009989) 
latitude  -0.40265***  -11.0288*** 37.29959*** 133.1409*** 
  (0.066997)  (3.718717) (8.457756) (8.821894) 
ethnicfr*latitude    1.3428 -40.6051*** -154.41*** 
    (4.120682) (8.562383) (9.654216) 
religionfr*latitude    18.59166** -87.779*** -273.063*** 
    (8.398597) (19.35576) (19.93454) 
Country dummy yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Constant 0.629 -2.93024*** 16.30 -22.5938*** -47.895 -9.81864** 
 (7.279) (0.488222) (13.11) (2.08218) (4.57244) (4.551707) 
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Observations 5,263 5,263 5,263 5,263 5,263 5,263 
R-squared 0.248 0.9495 0.357 0.9676 0.9475 0.8845 
Angrist-Pischke F 36.12  325.46; 15.73; 141.03    
p-value 0.0000  0.0000; 0.0001; 0.0000    
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 35.39  16.24    
p-value 0.0000  0.0001    
Cragg-Donal Wald F 46.32  31.73    
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 36.12  5.68    
Stock-Yogo critical values 
(10%) 
16.38  16.38    
Hansen J statistic e.e.i.  -    
p-value       
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 7.76  6.93    
p-value 0.0054  0.0001    
Instrumented ic  ic1 ic2 ic3    
Instruments 
latitude  latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
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Table 4.4.3: First Stage Regression Results for Table 4.6 (profits per employee) 
 profit_emp ic profit_emp ic1 ic2 ic3 
Ind. Vars. (3) First Stage (4) First Stage First Stage First Stage 
ic -4.920      
 (3.741)      
ic1   -0.915***    
   (0.289)    
ic2   0.979*    
   (0.591)    
ic3   -0.299**    
   (0.137)    
age 0.100*** 0.001741 0.0955*** 0.007816* 0.00245 -0.00247 
 (0.0302) (0.001216) (0.0291) (0.004109) (0.005247) (0.007491) 
size 0.246*** 0.001431** 0.238*** 0.003078 -0.00172 -0.01151*** 
 (0.0166) (0.000624) (0.0157) (0.002123) (0.002672) (0.003794) 
eduworker 0.228*** 0.005218*** 0.197*** 0.01568*** 0.011005 -0.02868*** 
 (0.0382) (0.001562) (0.0334) (0.005326) (0.007267) (0.0098) 
capacityu 0.230*** -0.00172 0.231*** 0.002145 0.004653 -0.00566 
 (0.0489) (0.001889) (0.0482) (0.006784) (0.008889) (0.012073) 
distance_market 0.274 0.43981*** -4.008** 2.046993*** 4.536182*** 0.483142 
 (1.215) (0.050761) (1.917) (0.21823) (0.431127) (0.446754) 
distance_port 0.123 0.024595*** -0.0747 0.104014*** 0.165293*** -0.00798 
 (0.0906) (0.000697) (0.0885) (0.003619) (0.005661) (0.005772) 
population 0.392 0.06854*** 0.0869 0.372262*** 0.199372*** -0.33357*** 
 (0.256) (0.002456) (0.156) (0.008655) (0.010965) (0.016412) 
year 0.0450 -0.00845*** 0.104*** -0.00956* -0.00323 0.06119*** 
 (0.0479) (0.001705) (0.0399) (0.005503) (0.007565) (0.009924) 
latitude  -0.41175***  -13.8057*** 35.55459*** 135.0526*** 
  (0.068208)  (3.538774) (7.848517) (8.278194) 
ethnicfr*latitude    4.981336 -38.3091*** -157.221*** 
    (3.831807) (7.924295) (8.945893) 
religionfr*latitude    24.36236*** -83.6767*** -276.985*** 
    (8.083742) (18.00631) (18.84467) 
Country dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.988 -3.07754*** 41.58** -21.298*** -45.486*** -11.7523*** 
 (8.851) (0.463348) (18.52) (2.086512) (4.381957) (4.45638) 
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Observations 5,577 5,577 5,577 5,577 5,577 5,577 
R-squared 0.199 0.9482 0.217 0.9672 0.9469 0.8851 
Angrist-Pischke F 36.44  376.69; 16.49; 175.64    
p-value 0.0000  0.0000; 0.0000; 0.0000    
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 35.65  16.50    
p-value 0.0000  0.0000    
Cragg-Donal Wald F 48.10  31.03    
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 36.44  5.77    
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38  16.38    
Hansen J statistic e.e.i.  -    
p-value       
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 1.85  4.06    
p-value 0.1744  0.0068    
Instrumented ic  ic1 ic2 ic3    
Instruments 
latitude  latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
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Table 4.4.4: IV Procedure – IC variables are instrumented individually (TFP) 
 tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch 
Ind. Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
stability -3.878 -2.907 -2.867 -4.373 -3.310 -5.078 -2.262 
 (3.320) (5.220) (3.335) (3.680) (3.112) (4.969) (3.569) 
infrastructure 1.735* 2.200* 1.562 2.870** 2.287** 2.639** 1.757 
 (0.961) (1.277) (1.755) (1.289) (1.007) (1.259) (1.634) 
informal -4.284* -2.715 -3.723 -3.467 -2.736 -5.459 -2.543 
 (2.529) (3.267) (2.850) (2.582) (2.239) (5.971) (2.309) 
corrupt 2.778 1.666 1.692 2.854 2.220 2.880 1.312 
 (3.712) (5.323) (3.807) (3.937) (3.723) (3.869) (3.883) 
trade 1.449** 1.557** 1.601** 1.369* 1.784* 1.330 1.719** 
 (0.728) (0.721) (0.762) (0.794) (0.926) (0.947) (0.850) 
tax -5.833** -8.215*** -5.874 -9.536*** -8.515*** -8.096*** -7.399* 
 (2.724) (2.311) (5.310) (3.254) (2.839) (2.230) (3.905) 
opening -2.012 -2.163 -1.790 -2.930 -2.375* -2.670* -1.860 
 (1.431) (2.313) (1.939) (1.800) (1.304) (1.493) (1.796) 
labor 7.837*** 9.737** 7.391 12.45** 10.00*** 11.48** 8.428 
 (3.033) (4.779) (6.382) (4.973) (3.472) (4.606) (5.288) 
finance -2.648* -2.880 -2.396 -3.690** -3.136** -3.622* -2.548 
 (1.352) (1.972) (1.841) (1.671) (1.319) (1.985) (1.840) 
courts -2.280 -3.388 -1.960 -4.583* -3.617* -3.725** -2.747 
 (1.848) (2.505) (3.663) (2.561) (1.963) (1.882) (2.768) 
crime -1.922 -0.711 -1.023 -1.406 -0.741 -1.620 -0.473 
 (1.831) (2.571) (1.869) (1.996) (1.835) (2.362) (2.122) 
distance_market -1.955 -3.869 -2.537 -5.490 -4.246 -4.602 -3.076 
 (2.580) (4.017) (3.977) (3.379) (2.795) (2.828) (3.520) 
distance_port 0.0675 0.0135 0.0357 0.00630 0.0153 0.0395 0.0144 
 (0.0701) (0.0767) (0.0856) (0.0741) (0.0741) (0.0963) (0.0741) 
population 0.0646 0.104 0.00381 0.150 0.0986 0.0847 0.0472 
 (0.317) (0.303) (0.370) (0.320) (0.329) (0.300) (0.356) 
age 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0651) (0.0643) (0.0642) (0.0641) (0.0640) (0.0638) (0.0641) 
eduworker 0.216*** 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0636) (0.0634) (0.0636) (0.0635) (0.0636) (0.0635) 
capacityu 0.201* 0.180 0.188 0.175 0.178 0.181 0.182 
 (0.113) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) 
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Bolivia -0.179 -1.386 -0.622 -0.969 -1.467 0.124 -1.421 
 (1.362) (1.813) (1.643) (1.434) (1.153) (3.186) (1.252) 
Chile -2.342 -3.087 -2.111 -4.023 -2.967 -4.060 -2.379 
 (2.185) (2.205) (2.871) (2.564) (2.451) (3.260) (2.842) 
Colombia 1.363 0.405 1.023 0.00904 0.302 0.618 0.789 
 (2.162) (2.348) (2.323) (2.188) (2.174) (2.268) (2.217) 
Ecuador 0.271 -0.547 -0.373 -0.317 -0.680 0.114 -0.604 
 (1.185) (1.215) (1.183) (1.288) (1.256) (1.951) (1.234) 
Paraguay -1.633 -2.172 -1.413 -2.448* -2.385* -1.792 -1.953 
 (1.486) (1.349) (2.043) (1.405) (1.332) (1.451) (1.584) 
Peru 3.156** 2.856 2.551 3.724** 3.038** 3.919 2.574 
 (1.273) (2.043) (1.801) (1.832) (1.257) (2.562) (1.837) 
Uruguay -1.152 -2.015 -1.075 -2.749 -2.116 -2.367 -1.538 
 (1.826) (2.023) (2.614) (2.128) (1.875) (1.946) (2.257) 
Constant 33.27 49.67 38.21 66.07** 53.74** 60.17** 42.23 
 (24.76) (40.21) (36.48) (32.83) (26.50) (30.43) (33.61) 
Observations 635 619 619 619 619 619 619 
R-squared  0.285 0.284 0.285 0.285 0.284 0.284 
F-statistic  6.63 6.13 10.01 98.94 4.77 23.96 
p-value  0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  9.08 25.64 37.53 3.96 10.05 43.64 
p-value  0.0282 0.0000 0.0000 0.2663 0.0181 0.0000 
Cragg-Donal Wald F  62.58 40.96 132.29 308.37 37.70 110.70 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F  6.63 6.13 10.01 98.94 4.77 23.96 
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%)  13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 
Hansen J statistic  2.457 2.501 1.963 2.188 2.233 2.452 
p-value  0.2928 0.2864 0.3747 0.3348 0.3273 0.2935 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F  1.76 1.36 2.89 2.60 1.13 1.09 
p-value  0.1536 0.2554 0.0349 0.0515 0.3350 0.3508 
Instrumented - finance tax labor trade informal infrastructure 
Instruments - 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
latitude 
ethnicfr*latitude 
religionfr*latitude 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Note: Two Stage Least Squares regressions were used. In the first stage, the regression equation estimated is:  _ ; J;  ;  ;  ;  

 =
^ + 57
 + 56ℎ ∗ 
 + 5<	 ∗ 
 + 
. The investment climate variables are instrumented in each equation one at a time. The variable latitude is the distance 
south if the earth’s equator. The interactions of latitude with ethnic fractionalization (ethnicfr) and religious fractionalization (religionfr) were also considered. Fractionalization reflects the probability 
that two random individuals from a given country will not share a common characteristic such as ethnicity or religion. Data for fractionalization comes from Dahlberg et al. (2015) based on Alesina et 
al. (2003).  
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Table 4.4.5: IV Procedure – IC variables are instrumented individually (average wage rates and profits per employee) 
Ind. Vars.     profit_emp profit_emp profit_emp profit_emp 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
trade 3.079 0.833** 7.389 1.167** 1.021*** 0.994*** 
(3.260) (0.332) (7.716) (0.516) (0.363) (0.351) 
stability 1.496 0.120 3.948 0.445 -5.444 -1.755 
 (2.167) (0.869) (4.563) (1.119) (5.877) (1.963) 
infrastructure -0.857 -0.0595 -2.454 -0.168 1.793 0.586 
 (1.179) (0.288) (2.913) (0.368) (1.909) (0.613) 
informal 1.248 0.278 4.592 2.117** -1.982 0.585 
 (1.599) (0.747) (3.290) (1.042) (4.158) (1.492) 
corrupt 1.412 0.876 3.627 1.518 7.615 3.686* 
 (1.205) (0.806) (2.974) (1.160) (6.226) (2.128) 
tax -0.563 -0.241 -0.986 -0.402 -3.227 -1.413 
 (0.905) (0.764) (1.342) (1.001) (3.014) (1.283) 
opening -0.723 -0.740 -1.415* -1.226** -5.822 -2.887** 
 (0.520) (0.463) (0.807) (0.581) (4.595) (1.446) 
labor -2.016 -0.120 -6.464 -1.222 7.617 2.080 
 (3.029) (1.220) (6.717) (1.571) (8.815) (2.818) 
finance -0.204 -0.0907 -0.721 -0.247 -4.067 -1.622 
 (0.507) (0.458) (0.908) (0.579) (3.861) (1.244) 
courts 0.694 0.359 1.802 0.762 -2.612 -0.480 
 (0.789) (0.615) (1.500) (0.785) (3.428) (1.221) 
crime 1.325 -0.434 4.266 -0.280 -3.244 -1.442 
 (2.616) (0.505) (5.745) (0.732) (2.923) (1.008) 
age 0.0858*** 0.0844*** 0.103*** 0.0942*** 0.0978*** 0.0953*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0316) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0289) 
size 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.227*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0186) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) 
eduworker 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.177*** 0.199*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0236) (0.0412) (0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0322) 
capacityu 0.0946*** 0.0958*** 0.232*** 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0297) (0.0501) (0.0478) (0.0480) (0.0478) 
distance_market 0.590 -0.688 1.668 -1.504 -8.388 -4.058* 
 (2.106) (0.878) (4.389) (1.167) (6.747) (2.261) 
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distance_port 0.0416* 0.0378 0.0264 0.0176 0.0407 0.0258 
 (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0339) (0.0311) (0.0399) (0.0323) 
population -0.203 0.0296 -0.699 -0.0197 0.127 0.0466 
 (0.339) (0.0746) (0.846) (0.107) (0.164) (0.105) 
year2010 0.287*** 0.275*** 0.139** 0.105*** 0.117*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0284) (0.0564) (0.0395) (0.0419) (0.0397) 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 2.765 12.47 -2.939 19.90* 89.93 45.70** 
 (17.11) (8.507) (33.46) (11.21) (68.93) (22.72) 
Observations 5,263 5,263 5,577 5,577 5,577 5,577 
R-squared 0.356 0.367 0.190 0.239 0.231 0.238 
F-statistic 4.70 591.36 1.88 549.15 27.87 233.85 
p-value 0.0302 0.0000 0.1702 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 4.49 86.94 1.83 130.16 25.19 477.20 
p-value 0.0340 0.0000 0.1764 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donal Wald F 51.44 1826.28 18.12 1736.13 114.90 387.55 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 4.70 591.36 1.88 549.15 27.87 233.85 
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38 9.08 16.38 9.08 16.38 9.08 
Hansen J statistic e.e.i. - e.e.i. - e.e.i. - 
p-value       
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F 1.03 2.52 1.48 2.45 1.73 1.51 
p-value 0.3105 0.0562 0.2244 0.0613 0.1881 0.2103 
Instrumented trade trade trade trade opening opening 
Instruments 
latitude latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
latitude latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
latitude latitude  
ethnicfr*latitude  
religionfr*latitude 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, **, * stand for significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
Note: Two Stage Least Squares regressions were used. In the first stage, the regression equation estimated is:  _ ; 	 = ^ +
57
 + 56ℎ ∗ 
 + 5<	 ∗ 
 + 
. The investment climate variables are instrumented in each equation one at a time. The 
variable latitude is the distance south if the earth’s equator. The interactions of latitude with ethnic fractionalization (ethnicfr) and religious fractionalization 
(religionfr) were also considered. Fractionalization reflects the probability that two random individuals from a given country will not share a common 
characteristic such as ethnicity or religion. Data for fractionalization comes from Dahlberg et al. (2015) based on Alesina et al. (2003).  
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Difference in Differences Method 
This study counts with panel data for two periods (yeardid). The treatment and control groups 
were determined according to improvements in the investment climate. A single overall 
indicator for investment climate (IC) was calculated for every city as the average of the 
investment climate variables (stability, infrastructure, informal, corrupt, trade, tax, opening, 
labor, finance, courts, and crime88). Subsequently, the change in this overall IC indicator was 
measured. Those cities that improved the IC were included in the treatment group. The cities 
that did not improve the IC indicator were included in the control group.  
The following equation was used for the empirical estimation: 
_ℎ = 58 + 570 + 56 + 5< ∗ 0 + 
 
The analysis  of TFP in pre and post periods as well as in treated and non-treated groups 
reveal that average TFP has improved from one period to the other for both the treated and 
non-treated cities. However, the improvement in the treated group was slower compared to 
the non-treated. It is possible that improvements for those cities with already high 
productivity are more difficult to achieve. On the other hand, those cities with ample room 
for improvement in terms of investment climate might have more opportunities for 
productivity improvement. 
 
Table 4.4.6: Difference in Differences 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
0 1 Difference 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 0 7.079282 7.660799 0.581517 
1 7.193575 7.49557 0.301995 
 Difference 0.114293 -0.16523 -0.27952 
 
The results of the estimation are presented in the table below. 
                                                     
88
 The variable finance was re-scaled to match the measurement scale used in all the other variables. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch tfp_stch 
      
yeardid 0.582*** 0.523*** 0.0479 0.0513 0.266*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.0988) 
treatment 0.114 0.105 0.00922 0.00941 0.294** 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.105) (0.106) (0.132) 
treatment_yeardid -0.280* -0.279* 0.0772 0.107 0.0735 
 (0.156) (0.154) (0.150) (0.150) (0.147) 
2.country2     -1.587*** 
     (0.198) 
3.country2     -0.545*** 
     (0.172) 
4.country2     -0.880*** 
     (0.124) 
5.country2     -1.054*** 
     (0.167) 
10.country2     -0.790** 
     (0.313) 
11.country2     -1.324*** 
     (0.185) 
12.country2     -0.905*** 
     (0.228) 
age  0.0150*** 0.0110***   
  (0.00287) (0.00275)   
gdp   0.000153*** 0.000163***  
   (1.73e-05) (1.74e-05)  
Constant 7.079*** 6.798*** 6.328*** 6.499*** 7.885*** 
 (0.0831) (0.0981) (0.111) (0.104) (0.104) 
      
Observations 674 673 673 674 674 
R-squared 0.042 0.083 0.181 0.158 0.201 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Estimation by command diff in Stata for model (1). 
baseline follow-up 
control 205 129 334 
treated 188 152 340 
393 281 
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DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION 
 
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP 
 Outcome 
variable Control Treated 
Diff 
(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
tfp_stch 7.079 7.194 0.114 7.661 7.496 -0.165 -0.28 
Std. Error 0.083 0.077 0.113 0.088 0.083 0.121 0.156 
t 85.22 93.27 1.01 86.6 90.02 -1.36 -1.79 
P>t 0 0 0.314 0 0 0.174 0.073* 
 
The shortcomings of this methodology include that countries could be self-selected into 
improving the investment climate, the possibility that the tendency of the variables analyzed 
are not parallel, and the limitation of having only two periods for the analysis. For example, 
having only two periods not only reduces the power of analysis of this methodology but also 
impedes tests for checking the trends in variables since some of the tests require at least three 
serial observations. 
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Intention to Treat (ITT) & Treatment on the Treated (ToT) 
id city mean 
ic_ 
change 
mean 
tfp_stch_ 
change 
mean 
tfp_stch 
2006 
mean 
tfp_stch 
2010 
mean 
tfp_stch 
n Random# T-C Intention to 
treat 
Treated 
1 Antofagasta 0.0221048 . . 8.111442 8.111441 3 0.475635 C no no 
4 Azuay -0.0612161 . . 6.968636 6.968636 8 0.837007 C no yes 
6 Bogota 0.0462894 0.023597 7.078207 7.245232 7.168936 102 0.918399 C no no 
10 Canelones -0.0069705 0.366018 5.891423 8.04779 6.75397 13 0.763889 C no yes 
11 Central 0.210061 0.107975 7.13673 7.907321 7.367907 28 0.569102 C no no 
14 Cochabamba 0.0234515 . 6.240716 . 6.240716 22 0.846251 C no no 
17 La Paz 0.0133033 0.274926 5.831141 7.434273 5.954459 63 0.782572 C no no 
19 Los Lagos 0.120854 0.103111 7.583311 8.365237 7.843953 5 0.86062 C no no 
20 Medellin -0.1713068 0.056997 7.49063 7.91757 7.597365 99 0.565254 C no yes 
21 Mendoza . . 6.852402 . 6.852402 0 0.657856 C no no 
24 Rosario 0.0548994 0.154895 7.452182 8.606488 7.798474 19 0.856958 C no no 
25 Santa Cruz 0.1802222 0.090882 6.736431 7.348653 6.764259 31 0.696145 C no no 
26 Santiago -0.0925839 0.011096 7.719349 7.804999 7.760461 95 0.817795 C no yes 
27 Trujillo . . . 5.600076 5.600076 0 0.706574 C no no 
2 Arequipa -0.2551031 -0.13793 6.607647 5.69626 6.202586 10 0.002881 T yes yes 
3 Asuncion 0.0702331 0.026183 6.918342 7.099483 6.95457 28 0.426869 T yes no 
5 Barranquilla -0.0208104 0.025744 6.439915 6.605706 6.512449 22 0.413005 T yes yes 
7 Buenos Aires 0.0867308 0.007071 8.055611 8.112572 8.08465 182 0.186059 T yes no 
8 Bío Bío . . 7.316042 . 7.316042 0 0.156997 T yes no 
9 Cali 0.0779631 0.082836 6.753035 7.312428 6.951529 51 0.244384 T yes no 
12 Chaco . . . 6.624072 6.624072 0 0.338552 T yes no 
13 Chiclayo -0.0067652 . 6.378454 . 6.378454 7 0.388606 T yes yes 
15 Cordoba 0.0790886 -0.02251 7.718662 7.544919 7.631791 9 0.070307 T yes no 
16 Guayas 0.1700479 0.115359 6.66732 7.436455 7.051887 6 0.324344 T yes no 
18 Lima -0.0204444 0.062079 6.882302 7.309546 7.101134 203 0.383165 T yes yes 
22 Montevideo -0.1177917 0.084567 7.200906 7.809865 7.551058 109 0.470053 T yes yes 
23 Pichincha 0.0566961 -0.01259 6.972628 6.884849 6.966358 20 0.062132 T yes no 
28 Valparaiso -0.0068756 0.110249 7.343921 8.153577 7.748749 14 0.072887 T yes yes 
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Main indicators: 
Average change Y(T) 0.031005 
Average change Y(C) 0.132166 
Prob(treated|T) 0.43 
Prob(treated|C) 0.29 
ss = /	 ℎ	 gs − /	 ℎ	 g_ 
ss = −0.101161 
ss = /	 ℎ	 gs − /	 ℎ	 g_;|s − ;|C  
ss = −0.007081 
The figure below shows the basic setup of a randomized evaluation. 
Figure: Setup for a randomized evaluation 
 
Source: S. Cole (2015). 
Geneletti and Dawid (2011) argued that the comparison of two or more treatment 
groups implies the observation of two distinct effects: 
“Treatment effect: The specific power of the treatment to make a difference to the 
outcome of interest 
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Selection effect: The fact that we are not observing random subsets of the population 
of interest.” 
According to S. Cole (2015), “a sample selection bias could arise if factors other than 
random assignment influence program allocation.” 
Given the previous reasons, the methods of difference in differences (DD), intention to 
treat (ITT), and treatment on the treated (ToT) are probably not appropriate for this study.  
Therefore, the instrumental variables procedure detailed at the beginning of this Appendix 
was used. 
 
 
